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Critically discuss one model for the assessment and 
treatment of people given a diagnosis of personality disorder. 
Make specific reference to the perspectives of service users.
Adult Mental Health Essay
December 2007 
Year 1
4
I started Clinical Psychology Training with an awareness that there was some debate 
surrounding the personality disorder (PD) diagnosis but had limited knowledge other 
than that. During my second week of training I watched the 2nd year Clinical 
Psychology Trainees present their service related research projects. Michelle Conn 
(2007) had evaluated the provision of psychological therapies in five Community 
Mental Health Teams (CMHT’s) in the Guilford and Waverly borough. As part of 
this study she asked psychologists from each CMHT to identify the number of people 
on their caseloads with a diagnosis of PD. She found unexpected variation between 
teams, with numbers ranging from 0 -  50%. When she presented this information to 
the teams it became apparent that this disparity was more likely due to the different 
beliefs and attitudes held by the psychologists involved than actual differences of the 
populations they served. The psychologist from the team with 0% PD did not believe 
the diagnosis was either valid or ethical so refused to apply it to anybody, while the 
psychologist from the team with the largest number of people identified with PD took 
the view that in order to secure resources for specialist PD services she would need to 
demonstrate there was a significant proportion of people in need of those services, so 
classified as many people as possible with PD -  animated discussions reportedly 
ensued! This presentation made me realise that the debate surrounding PD is not just 
an academic debate but one that has material consequences very local to me and so 
therefore could have very real implications to my own clinical practice. I therefore 
decided to write this essay to increase my knowledge of PD and to begin to develop 
my own views on the issue.
The diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) (American 
Psychiatric Association 1994) identifies ten types of PD. I am going to focus on 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) as it is the most prevalent and the most likely 
to be seen by psychiatric services (Trull et al 2003, Bender et al 2006) so consequently 
the one I am most likely to come across in practice. It is also the diagnosis with the 
largest body of research evidence. The equivalent ICD-10 classification is 
emotionally unstable personality disorder and has slightly different diagnostic criteria. 
I have chosen to use DSM-IV as that is what is used in the majority of the literature.
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I will start by looking at what a diagnosis of BPD actually means in terms of 
diagnosis, to health services, to the people actually given the diagnosis and to my own 
clinical practice. I will then introduce the Metallization Based Treatment (MBT) of 
BPD and evaluate its method of assessment, treatment and acceptability to people 
with a diagnosis of BPD. I will finish by examining the research evidence for MBT.
WHAT DOES A DIAGNOSIS OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
ACTUALLY MEAN?
What does BPD mean as a diagnosis?
According to DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association 1994) BPD is ‘an enduring pattern 
of inner experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture’, plus several of the following features: deliberate self-harm or 
self-mutilation; destructive behaviour such as binge eating, starvation and substance 
misuse; impulsive acts such as sex and overspending; extreme feelings of emptiness, 
sadness and loneliness; anger that is inappropriate to the situation; unstable 
relationships that alternate between idealisation and devaluation; paranoid ideas; or 
severe dissociative symptoms -  where specific thoughts, feelings and actions are 
compartmentalised in the person's mind. My initial thoughts on reading through this 
list were firstly that it seems to rely heavily on subjective opinion — determining if 
someone’s behaviour ‘deviates markedly from expectations of culture’ could be 
thought of as a moral judgement. Secondly I was struck by how easily that list could 
be applied to many people at some point in their lives, especially adolescents. The 
validity of the diagnosis has been questioned on this basis, that it does not sufficiently 
differentiate between having the disorder and not having the disorder, leading for 
some to call for the diagnostic criteria to move from being categorical (either present 
or absent) to being dimensional (on a continuum) (Livesly 2001, cited in BPS report). 
Pilgrim (2001) states that to have credibility a medical diagnosis should have validity, 
etiological specificity and predict response to treatment. He presents evidence that PD 
fulfils none of these criteria. Skodol et al (2002) point out that using the DSM-IV 
classification system there are 151 different combinations of symptoms that can be 
described as BPD.
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What does BPD mean within UK mental health services?
A BPD diagnosis probably means one will have had a negative experience of UK 
mental health services. People given a BPD diagnosis have been described as 
untreatable ‘attention seeking’, ‘difficult’, the ‘patients psychiatrists don’t like’ (Lewis 
& Appleby 1988), and access to services has in some cases been denied on the basis 
of the diagnosis. In order to try and address these issues The National Institute for 
Mental Health in England (NIMHE) published ‘Personality disorder: No longer a 
diagnosis of exclusion’ (DH, 2003), which it states ‘sets out specific guidance on 
development of services for people with personality disorder. It brings this often 
neglected and isolated area of mental health into focus for the first time’ and the 
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) is due to publish treatment 
guidelines in 2008. Although the NIMHE report makes it clear that a PD diagnosis is 
not justification for exclusion from services as my opening anecdote illustrates there 
still exists confusion amongst clinicians as to what exactly it does mean. Moreover as 
the following study demonstrates the diagnosis does still also invoke negative 
associations within clinicians. Forsyth (2007) constructed a series of vignettes about 
patients failing to complete a therapy task and randomly added a diagnosis of BPD or 
Major depressive disorder (MDD) to the bottom of each vignette. These were then 
presented to 26 mental health workers who reported feeling angrier and less inclined 
to help in the scenarios where the patient was labelled BPD. The results of this study 
lead me to wonder whether in some situations a diagnosis of BPD might become 
something of a self fulfilling prophecy.
What does BPD mean to those people actually given the label?
The 10 service users interviewed by Stalker et al (2005) the BPD diagnosis means 
having little or no idea what the label assigned to you actually means and experiencing 
difficulties trying to find out. They all characterised their main difficulties as forming 
and maintaining interpersonal relationships and feeling able to trust people leading to 
feelings of loneliness and isolation which were compounded by awareness of the 
stigma attached. Almost all identified abuse as the cause of their difficulties with 
neglectful childhood circumstances and loss of an attachment figure also being 
identified. To the service users interviewed by Haigh (2003) PD was a disliked term 
and which they felt blamed them for their difficulties - alternatives were suggested
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such as attachment seeking or emotionally distressed. Despite this they, in general, 
felt the diagnosis gave legitimacy to their distress and preferred a label to being turned 
away and told ‘you are not mentally ill’ However they felt that professionals 
themselves did not really understand the diagnosis and clearer definitions needed to be 
developed. Castillo (2003) conducted a study in which 50 people with a diagnosis of 
PD were interviewed by researchers who also had a diagnosis of PD. As before the 
main difficulty was said to be problems with interpersonal relationships and the 
principal cause abuse with 88% reporting childhood abuse. Horn et al (2007) 
interviewed 5 service users with a diagnosis of BPD who found the diagnosis had 
bought a mixture of both positive and negative experiences. On the positive side it 
‘provided them with something to focus upon and a way to think about their 
difficulties’ and ‘a feeling of relief, that after years of “not fitting” and not knowing 
what was wrong with them they finally “knew”’ (Horn et al 2007, p263). However, it 
was also experienced as rejection by services, confusion about what it actually meant 
and again reluctance of professionals to explain it.
BPD also means you are probably a woman -  the ratio of women to men diagnosed is 
3:1 (Skodol & Bender 2003) and from a lower social class with a lower level of 
education (Torgersen et al 2001) and less likely to be from an ethnic minority 
(Ndegwa 2003). Whether all this is due to actual epidemiological differences or bias 
in diagnosis is debatable. The lower rate of people from ethnic minorities diagnosed 
with BPD could be due to lack of cultural understanding of the clinician diagnosing 
and a bias to diagnose with psychosis (Ndegwa 2003). However there is no research 
presently to investigate this. It means there is a high possibility that you have other 
mental health problems such as anxiety, depression, or substance misuse (Skodol et al 
1999). It means that by middle age there is a 10% chance you will have committed 
suicide (Stone in Roth & Fonagy 2004) but equally there is a good chance you will no 
longer meet the criteria for diagnosis (Zanarini et al 2003)
So what does this all mean for my clinical practice?
It means I should be mindful to be sensitive to the fact that people with this label will 
have probably had a negative experience of services and be confused as to what their 
diagnosis means and what their options are. I question whether I should accept the
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diagnosis at face value -  in fact in light of previous discussion I question whether I 
should accept it at all. However since the suicide rate and presentation to services of 
people given this diagnosis is high it means it is not something that I can ignore -  as 
Pilgrim (2001) points out even if it is a medical reification the people it subsumes 
display a range of anxiety provoking behaviour. I feel the MBT model that I will 
outline below offers the potential of a new way of conceptualizing many people 
currently with a BPD diagnosis.
MENTALIZATION BASED TREATMENT (MBT) 
Overview of MBT
Mentalization is ‘the capacity to reflect on one’s own mental states (thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, desires etc.), and to attribute mental states to others, as an explanation of their 
behaviour’ (Moorey 2005). If theory of mind means recognising that others have 
minds with a different perspective to ones’ own, then metallization involves being 
able to think about the content of those minds. It takes place both explicitly and 
implicitly, and means that the actions of ourselves and others are not necessarily taken 
at face value e.g. I may mentalise that my irritation with my flatmate for not washing 
up is due to my own stress at an essay deadline rather than her own untidiness, and 
metalize that her not doing the dishes is due to her family worries rather than because 
she wants to irritate me. The above example illustrates how problems with 
mentalization would lead to difficulties with interpersonal relationships, a key feature 
of BPD and as outlined above the feature people with the diagnosis cite as their main 
difficulty (Stalker et al 2005, Castillo 2003). MBT is based on the premise that people 
diagnosed with BPD find mentalizing in the context of attachment relationships 
difficult and so the focus of treatment is to enhance this capacity (Bateman & Fonagy 
2004)
MBT model of BPD
Fonagy & Bateman (2006, 2007) summarise the MBT model of BPD as follows ‘a 
constitutionally vulnerable individual who experiences developmental trauma in an 
attachment context becomes psychologically vulnerable in later attachment contexts
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as a result of instability of the self. In an attempt to cope, the individual decouples the 
mind from others’ minds and relies on earlier psychological mechanisms to organize 
the experience and in doing so reveals fragments of the self.’ (Fonagy & Bateman 
2006, p414). These two sentences succinctly capture what is to me an incredibly 
complex, intricate model of BPD as an attachment-related deficit in mentalization. 
The model is comprehensive in that it not only presents a developmental account of 
BPD consistent with epidemiological data and symptoms; but also offers an 
explanation of the neurobiological basis of BPD which specifies the therapeutic 
mechanisms of change.
MBT developmental account of BPD
The MBT theory follows that there are individual differences in the developmental 
capacity for mentalization (Torgersen et al 2000 cited in Fonagy & Bateman 2006). 
Metallization is not an innate ability or an ability that can be developed alone but is 
developed through a process of interactions with another person usually the infants’ 
primary care giver (Holmes 2006). Under normal development infants emotions are 
adequately and appropriately mirrored by a primary caregiver enabling the infant to 
internalise representations of their own and their caregivers’ emotions. They then 
progress through three different modes for representing mental states; psychic 
equivalence when they assume what is in their mind is real for example that there 
really is a monster in the wardrobe; pretend mode in which they can contemplate what 
is in their mind as long as no connection is made to reality as in early pretend play; 
and the teological mode in which mental states are represented by physical action 
(Fonagy et al, 2002 cited in Fonagy & Bateman 2006). Full mentalizing capacity is 
finally developed around the age of six. Children who experience neglect or 
disruption in early attachment relationships develop distorted representations of their 
own and others’ emotions (Crandell et al cited in Fonagy & Bateman 2006). When 
exposed to early trauma such as abuse in an attachment context, these individuals 
become less likely to metalize and more likely to revert to experiencing mental states 
as psychic equivalence (e.g. internalising the ‘badness’ of the abuser as part of the 
self), in pretend mode (e.g. dissociating the self from mental states) and in teological 
mode (e.g. needing to be physically touched to understand affection) (Fonagy et al 
1996 cited in Fonagy & Bateman 2006). Taking mentalization offline in this way is
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theorised as occurring for two reasons. Firstly it is protective -  it is too painful to 
confront the mental states of the abuser and potential abusers thereafter. However as 
will be explored below there is evidence to suggest that early trauma alters the neural 
pathways thought to underpin the attachment system rendering it hypersensitive or 
easily activated. The activation of the attachment system may inhibit the neural 
system which may underpin mentalization (Amsten 1998 cited in Fonagy & Bateman 
2006).
Proposed neurobiological basis of BPD and MBT mechanisms of change
Based on a good body of converging evidence from laboratory studies, animal studies 
and neuroimaging studies, Fonagy & Bateman (2006) present a case that the 
mesencephalic dopaminergic reward is very closely linked to a neural system which 
appears to underpin attachment. Distortion of the mesencephalic dopaminergic 
reward system is implicated in addiction, impulsivity and bias toward short term 
reward over long term reward - all symptoms of BPD, while as outlined above there 
are many studies which find problematic early attachments to be a common factor in 
those diagnosed with BPD. They hypothesise therefore that just as impairments in 
one system seem to be linked to impairments in the other, then improvements in one 
should induce improvements in the other.
They then go on to suggest that mentalization and interpersonal relatedness are also 
linked. Problems in interpersonal relatedness are another key aspect of BPD as 
identified above and include dramatic shifts between idealization and devaluation of 
others, inappropriate anger towards others and fear of abandonment. Since nobody 
has yet identified a neural systems underpinning mentalization or interpersonal 
relatedness the case for this is less robust than the link between attachment and 
reward. However, Bateman and Fonagy (2006) do point to a number of studies which 
show that the areas of the brain involved in mentalizing are also involved in aspects of 
interpersonal relatedness that patients with BPD find difficult. Again, improvement in 
one domain should produce improvement in the other.
Finally they present evidence that suggests the systems for attachment and 
mentalization are ‘loosely coupled’ in that activation of one, deactivates the other. 
Securely attached individuals have fairly inactive attachment systems but early
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disruption of attachment is thought to lead to the system being hypersensitive and 
constantly activated. A hypersensitive attachment system is thought to inhibit the 
system for mentalization, so activating the mentalization system, the goal of MBT, 
should deactivate the attachment system (and therefore the reward system) while 
enhancing interpersonal relatedness.
My attraction to this model for BPD is probably due to the fact that it is a 
biopsychosocial model which gives equal weight to the bio, psycho and social. This 
fits comfortably with the way I currently conceptualise mental health problems so 
does not require me to rethink any of my values. It seems to me also to reflect the 
way service users with the BPD diagnosis understand their own difficulties (Stalker et 
al 2005, Haigh 2003, and Castillo 2003). However Beresford (2003) points out that 
service users may only conceptualise themselves by recourse to a biopsychosocial 
model as it the only construction available to them. He proposes a social model would 
be more acceptable to many service users if available.
Assessment in MBT
Patients are initially assessed using the Revised Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines 
(DIB-R) (Zanarini et al 1989). This interview is based on the DSM-IV classification 
for BPD and includes dimensional measures for BPD symptoms and categorical 
measures for subsyndromal phenomenology. Research shows baseline inter-rater 
reliability, test-retest reliability, follow-up inter-rater reliability and inter-rater 
reliability among different generations of raters to be excellent. (Zanarini et al 2002). 
However since the DIB-R assesses individuals for BPD based on the DSM-IV 
classification for BPD which as outlined above has questionable validity, the validity 
of the DIB-R as a suitable assessment measure must also be questionable. Moreover 
since MBT is based on the premise that BPD is primarily a deficit in mentalizing 
ability in attachment contexts I find it surprising that neither attachment nor 
mentalisation are assessed since if there are not deficits to be found in these areas then 
MBT may not be the most appropriate treatment to offer. Fonagy et al (1998) have 
operationalised mentalistion as reflective function (RF) and published a manual for its 
assessment based on rating transcripts of the Adult Attachment interview (AAI) which 
is also used to assess attachment. Therefore I would like to see the AAI administered
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during the initial assessment interview, although since special training is required in 
order to administer the AAI I accept that this may not always be feasible.
If somebody is diagnosed as BPD on the basis of the initial assessment Bateman & 
Fonagy (2004) propose they then have between 1 and 3 more assessment meetings 
conducted by two members of the clinical team. The focus of these subsequent 
meetings is to motivate and engage the client for treatment, develop the therapeutic 
alliance, and determine whether partial hospitalisation or intensive outpatient (IOP) is 
required (see below). They provide no more information about what these further 
assessment meetings would entail. Since they propose delivering MBT in a 
psychoanalytic framework I can only assume that they would take the form of a 
generic psychoanalytic assessment. Lemma (2003) suggests generic psychoanalytic 
assessment should cover the patients’ point of view of their problem, motivation, 
internal world and quality of object relations (attachment figures), the transference 
relationship (therapeutic relationship), ego strength (capacity to be in touch with 
reality and self observational capacity), superego integration, defences, the way the 
patient relates to their body, their social networks and sociocultural factors. The way 
assessments are carried out she suggests ‘reflects individual differences between 
therapists at the level of their explicit and implicit theories about the mind and the 
process of psychotherapy, as well as personality differences’. (Lemma 2003 p i32). 
Based on the limited information provided it feels the assessment for MBT is focused 
around ascertaining if somebody fulfils the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for BPD, and 
then orienting them to MBT rather than assessing if it would be the most appropriate 
treatment, but perhaps at this stage clinicians are not in a position to do much more 
than this. NICE guidelines on treatment for BPD are not expected until 2008 so what 
would be the most appropriate treatment is, at present, still based very much on the 
personal opinion of the clinician. Moreover in a questionnaire issued to all Trusts in 
England it was found that only 17% had specialist PD and that these had generally 
been established through the enthusiasm of one local clinician working in one 
particular model (DH, 2003) — choice of BPD treatment for both clients and clinicians 
does not at present seem a realistic option.
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Treatment
If the theory underpinning the MBT model of BPD is incredibly complex, then the 
treatment philosophy is provocatively simple. BPD is understood as stemming from 
difficulties mentalizing in attachment contexts so the primary goal of MBT is to 
enhance the patients mentalizing ability in attachment contexts and consequently 
establish a more coherent sense of self and develop more secure relationships. The 
treatment combines individual and group therapy and hence offers numerous 
opportunities to focus on mentalization in attachment contexts. People are encouraged 
to metalize about their own present attachment relationships, the attachment 
relationships which form between themselves and other group members and the 
attachment relationships between themselves and their therapists. The key features of 
this approach are: 1) that the therapist focuses exclusively on the patients current 
mental states with the aim of creating more solid representations of internal states 2) 
Mental states and concepts that cannot be felt in subjective reality such as the 
unconscious are avoided. The aim is not insight but the recovery of mentalization and 
the focus is on mental states close to consciousness not what is buried deep in the 
unconscious 3) A transitional area of relatedness is created so thoughts and feelings 
can be played with. This is achieved through the therapist maintaining a genuine 
stance of not knowing and ‘Pushing the pause button’ to examine mentalization by 
asking questions or using questioning comments (e.g. I wonder if that was related to 
what she said to you in the group yesterday?) and by using the therapeutic relationship 
to highlight alternative perspectives (e.g. just as you have distrusted everyone around 
you in your past as you could not predict how they would respond you are now 
suspicious of me). However the patients use of the pause button with mentalizing 
explanations is considered equally valid and the therapist should be open about the 
reasoning behind their own mentalizing and their own mentalizing errors (Bateman & 
Fonagy 2004).
I have deliberately tried to summarise MBT using neutral language rather than 
describing it using the psychoanalytic language of the approach in which it is 
embedded. I did this to demonstrate that as Bateman & Fonagy suggest it could easily
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be embedded within other theoretical frameworks such as the cognitive framework. I 
think this is important since as Pilgrim (2001) points out theory driven models only 
encourage partisan support and alienate those from other camps. A criticism levelled 
at MBT is that it is nothing new (Holmes 2006). Indeed I think a degree of 
mentalizing (albeit with a different name) is evident in other approaches and as 
outlined above could be the active ingredient which leads to success in a number of 
approaches. Whatever therapeutic technique one uses the therapeutic relationship is in 
itself an attachment relationship, and psychological therapy requires a degree of 
mentalization in this context which would explain why therapies such as DBT and 
transference focused therapy also have some degree of success. A key strength of 
MBT in my view is that it has been manualised in a format that makes it accessible to 
a wide range of mental health professionals, not just psychologists and psychiatrists 
from a range of theoretical backgrounds e.g. an article on mentalizing appeared in the 
nursing standard (Gibson 2006) and the therapist in Bateman & Fonagy’s MBT trials 
was a mental health nurse. In light of the DH Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (DH 2007) initiative this is a very important consideration.
I think there could be problems with MBT however when the therapist and client 
come from different cultures. MBT relies on the therapist remaining sensitive to the 
clients mental state, however different cultures represent affect in different ways. For 
example Krause (1998) noted that people from Asian cultures were misdiagnosed with 
cardio problems as they described depression to their GP’s in terms of ‘having a heavy 
heart’. In the MBT model this description would potentially be misunderstood as a 
mentalizing error and a return to the teological mode of affect representation.
I also wonder if the implicit blame levelled at the individuals’ family in this model 
could also prove problematic. Research shows family involvement can have a 
positive impact on recovery (Hoffman et al 2007) but I would worry that this could be 
disrupted if it is presented as being largely due to inadequate attachment.
Model of Service Delivery
MBT is either delivered through an intensive outpatient programme (IOP) or a day 
hospital programme -  partial hospitalisation. The intensive outpatient programme 
consists of one 50 minute individual session and one 90 minute group session. Partial
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hospitalisation involves the individual attending the day hospital from 9.00am -  
4.30pm Monday to Friday. It includes one session of individual therapy, three 
sessions of group therapy, and optional sessions of expressive therapy. The duration 
of both programmes is 18 months. Patients that would be offered partial 
hospitalisation would be assessed as having more chaotic lifestyles and higher risk of 
suicide. In a review of models of service delivery Karterund & Umes (2004) found 
the partial hospitalisation to be optimal.
Service Users Opinions of MBT
There is no literature which specifically addresses service users’ opinions of MBT. 
The Halliwick Day Hospital which is a day hospital based on the MBT model was 
mentioned in Haigh (2003) as being helpful but MBT was not mentioned specifically. 
However there are some studies published regarding what people with a diagnosis of 
BPD or PD have found helpful and unhelpful in general (Castillo 2003, Haigh 2003, 
Horn et al 2007, Stalker et al 2005). The aspects of treatment that people reported as 
being helpful which may be congruent with MBT are continuity of staff, being treated 
with respect and not as if staff know better what you are feeling than you do (if the 
MBT therapist genuinely maintains the not-knowing stance), being given a clear 
explanation of the diagnosis and treatment and peer support groups. However MBT 
does not offer out of office hours contact with the team which was something 
specifically mentioned as helpful. Without any specific efforts to assess service users 
perspectives on the MBT model of BPD and treatment it is not possible to evaluate it 
from a users perspective - my personal opinions of what somebody else may find 
helpful based on second hand descriptions as above are far from adequate.
Evidence for MBT
MBT is a relatively new treatment approach so consequently the current evidence base 
is limited, consisting of only one Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) (Bateman & 
Fonagy 1999, 2001). Thirty eight patients were randomly allocated to receive either 
an MBT based treatment or standard psychiatric care. The treatment which was 
spread over five days each week for 18 months consisted of one session of individual
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MBT therapy, three sessions of MBT group therapy, one session of MBT expressive 
therapy, and a community meeting. Acts of self harm, suicide and inpatient stays 
were assessed using semi-structured interview and hospital records. Participants 
subjective view of symptoms was measured using the SCL-90-R. Depression and 
anxiety were measured using the Beck depression inventory and Spielberger state-trait 
anxiety inventory, and interpersonal functioning and social adjustment were measured 
using self report measures. At the end of treatment the experimental group had 
improved significantly on all outcome measures. At 18-month follow up the 
experimental group had continued to improve significantly on all measures as 
compared to control group which had deteriorated on some. Although these results 
are undeniably impressive I think they do need to be interpreted with some caution. It 
is well known that RCT’s conducted by the pioneers of the approach investigated (as 
this was) show better results than subsequent replications. The sample size in the 
study was small so the generalisability of the results is limited. The results were 
reported using percentage mean improvement so it is not possible to tell how many (if 
any) of the experimental group the treatment did not work for. The experimental 
group had the opportunity of attending a group session one time per week during the 
18 month follow up period
I have two more fundamental criticisms of this research. Firstly patients mentalizing 
and attachment relationships were not evaluated at any point during the study and 
there was no measure of treatment fidelity. In my view this means that even though 
Fonagy & Bateman (2006) have explicitly outlined the mechanisms of change for 
MBT the RCT does not show that it was an improvement in mentalizing that led to 
improvement. Secondly there was no measure taken of user satisfaction.
CONCLUSION
In writing this essay I have come to conceptualise people diagnosed as BPD as people 
who have problems in interpersonal relationships, not because they are impulsive, or 
difficult or cannot control their tempers, but because they have problems with the skill 
of mentalizing -  that is understanding their own and others mental states -  in these 
situations. These problems have probably arisen because of either childhood abuse or
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neglect. I realise that I need to resist the urge I have to adopt this conceptualisation as 
fact as it is presently still just a theory that needs validation.
MBT is a treatment based on this conceptualisation of BPD which seeks to enhance 
the individuals mentalizing capacity in the context of attachment relationships. I think 
this treatment approach is promising as it can be embedded in various different 
approaches and disseminated to a wide range of professionals. Moreover I am 
attracted by the ‘not-knowing’ stance the therapist is encouraged to take though I 
wonder how this would work in practice.
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INTRODUCTION
Having spent many frustrating hours trying to explain to family and friends why going 
alone to visit somebody with a diagnosis of schizophrenia in their home does not put 
me at high risk of violence; why people with a diagnosis of depression do not just 
need to stop being so wet and pull themselves together and why various other ideas 
about those with a psychiatric diagnosis of are inaccurate, the opportunity to vent 
some of these frustrations was what initially attracted me to this essay question. 
Coupled with this was the vague notion that answering the question would entail 
constructing a list of actions that I, as an aspiring clinical psychologist could 
undertake to make things better, appealing to either a practical part of me wanting 
concrete ways to help, or an arrogant vanity assuming I could - probably a 
combination of the two. What I did not anticipate was the extent to which I would be 
required to examine my own beliefs and assumptions about service users I work with 
and clarify my position on fundamental debates within the profession.
The syntactical arrangement of the question 'How can clinical Psychologists work 
with local communities to reduce the stigma and discrimination that lead to social 
exclusion?' means it can be understood in various different ways. I initially 
understood it as 'In what way or by what means are clinical psychologists able to work 
with local communities to reduce the stigma and discrimination that lead to social 
exclusion?' - in other words what can clinical psychologists actually do. Underlying 
this understanding are the assumptions that Clinical psychologists can work with local 
communities to reduce stigma and discrimination, and moreover that they have the 
right or are in a position to do so. Alternatively the question could be understood as 
'To what extent or to what degree could or should clinical psychologists be permitted
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to work with local communities to reduce the stigma and discrimination that lead to 
social exclusion? - in other words what factors would Clinical Psychologists need to 
consider and address in order to work with local communities to reduce stigma and 
discrimination leading to social exclusion, if that is they are in a position to do so at 
all. I will attempt to address both readings of the question. The question does not 
refer to any particular socially excluded group, however I will be answering it in 
relation to mental health service users since this is the group with whom I have most 
experience, contact and with whom I hope to work with in the future. ^
I will start by defining the terms social exclusion, local community and offering 
preliminary definitions for discrimination and stigma as they relate to the arena of 
mental health. I will then explore the main conceptualizations of stigma and 
discrimination found in the literature in some detail and in doing so highlight issues 
Clinical Psychologists may need to be aware of when working to reduce stigma and 
discrimination with local communities and offer some psychological explanations for 
these constructs. I will then focus attention on the local community of clinical 
psychologists and explore stigma and discrimination towards service users within the 
profession -  after all how can we work with external local communities without first 
attending to our own community. Finally, based on the theoretical conceptualisations 
of stigma outlined previously, and using evidence from previous anti stigma 
campaigns, I will attempt to construct a framework for working with local 
communities to reduce stigma and discrimination and offer some practical ideas.
Definitions
The Social Exclusion Unit defines social exclusion as follows:
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‘Social exclusion is what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination 
of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, 
high crime, poor health and family breakdown’p2 (Social Exclusion Unit 2004).
There is unanimous agreement in the literature that mental health service users 
experience social exclusion (Thomicroft 2006) and that furthermore this can be as 
damaging, if not more so than their mental health issues (Sartorius & Shulze 2005). 
For example 75% of people who use mental health services are unemployed and less 
than 40% of employers state that they would employ somebody with mental health 
problems (Department of Work and Pensions 2001, in Hayward 2007). Service users 
are four times more likely than average to have no close friend in whom they confide 
(Evans & Huxley 2000 in Hayward 2007). While there is also agreement that it is the 
stigma and discrimination associated with mental health issues that lead to social 
exclusion, they are ‘concepts which have evaded clear operational defmition’pl (Rose 
et al 2007). In their review and critique of stigma, Hayward and Bright (1997) 
defined stigma as the negative effects of placing a label on a group. Byrne (2001) 
provided various definitions found in the literature including the process of 
establishing deviant identities, prejudice based on negative stereotypes and the process 
whereby one aspect of an individual is attributionaly linked to some pervasive 
dimension of a target’s identity. Sayce (1998) discussed that the use of the term 
stigma could be seen as problematic in itself since it locates the problem within the 
individual being discriminated against. She suggested that discrimination is a better 
term since it allows attention to be directed towards those doing the stigmatizing. 
Community is another term that has evaded clear operational definition. I am going to 
use the definition proposed in the seminal work by MacMillan and Chavis (1986). 
Here a sense of community is described as consisting of four elements: membership of
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a group, being influenced by or able to influence that group, the group fulfilling 
members’ needs and a shared emotional connection between group members. My 
initial definition of discrimination is based on Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) theory of 
reasoned action in which a person’s stereotypes or prejudices leads them to engage in 
overtly discriminatory behaviour e.g. refusing to rent a room to a person because they 
have a psychiatric diagnosis. Many of the more recent attempts to describe stigma 
now include discrimination as part of their definition. Before I outline the three main 
conceptualizations of stigma, it is worth noting that much of the work published on 
stigma does not explicitly define what is meant by stigma (e.g. Crisp 2000). 
Furthermore Pinfold et al (2005) suggest that despite coming from different 
conceptual frameworks, in practice many anti-stigma programmes look fairly similar, 
the implication being the conceptual framework underpinning them is not that 
important. While I agree there is some convergence amongst different theorists about 
the most important elements of anti stigma campaigns such as contact with service 
users (Alexander and Link 2003, Corrigan et al 2001, Couture and Penn 2003), I feel 
that since anti stigma endeavours to date have not made a significant impact in 
reducing stigma (Department of Health 2007) it is important to remain aware of 
theoretical frameworks underpinning them so that they can be adequately critiqued. 
Moreover, coming from a profession which champions theoretically driven, evidence 
based, reflective practice, I feel not to pay attention to this would be somewhat remiss!
Attributional Theory of stigma
Corrigan (2000) uses Weiners (1995 in Corrigan 2000) social attribution theory to 
explain stigma about mental illness, asserting that it is dependent on controllability 
and stability appraisals of mental illness. The attributional model of human
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motivation and emotion is based on the assumption that we search for causal 
explanations of the outcomes we encounter e.g. why does that person with 
agoraphobia not want to leave the house? The causal explanation attributed to an 
outcome is thought to determine the emotional and behavioural response, with 
stability of causes and controllability of causes being found to be especially important 
(Weiner 1995 in Corrigan 2000). Controllability refers to how much influence a 
person is thought to have over the situation they are in, the more control attributed to 
somebody the more they are blamed and held responsible. Stability refers to whether 
the cause remains constant over time or if it fluctuates. Attributions of stability of the 
cause while not found to change the type of response (e.g. blame), have been found to 
effect the strength - the more stable the stronger the feeling. Applying this to mental 
health stigma Corrigan (2000) proposes a path model in which a signaling event 
(person with mental illness) leads to ones of two cognitive attributions (that the 
symptoms are uncontrollable or controllable), which leads to affective response of 
either pity or anger respectively, which leads to helping or punishing behaviour. The 
more stable the symptoms are judged to be, the stronger the affective response. Based 
on this model therefore challenging stigma entails changing the attributions of 
controllability and stability, which lead to discriminating (punishing) behavioural 
responses. Advancing biological and genetic models of mental illness is thought to be 
the best way to achieve this end, since they aim to reduce the amount of control 
attributed to service users.
Stigma as lack of knowledge
Thomicroft et al (2008) conceptualize stigma as involving three related problems: the 
problem of knowledge -  ignorance; the problem of attitudes -  prejudice; and the
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problem of behaviour -  discrimination. The theory follows that public knowledge 
about mental illness is poor (Crisp et al 2005), with misinformation and media 
representations doing little to help the situation. Due to this ignorance people then 
develop prejudicial beliefs about people with mental illness and corresponding 
affective responses. These affective responses and prejudicial beliefs then lead people 
to behave in discriminatory ways, which they feel are justified e.g. an employer may 
incorrectly think that schizophrenia is when somebody has a split personality, and 
hence hold the prejudicial belief that people with schizophrenia are unpredictable and 
inconsistent, eliciting the affective response that they are to be feared and avoided, so 
therefore decide not offer them a job. In order to combat stigma, programmes aimed 
at improving public knowledge about mental health are advocated along with using 
existing disability legislation to challenge discrimination. This conceptualization does 
not necessitate a medical model - indeed a biopsychosocial model is preferred. The 
psychiatric label on the other hand is not seen to be a problem at all, but a useful 
means of challenging discrimination through existing disability legislation.
Stigma based on a modified labeling theory
Link and Phelan (2001) base their conceptualisation of stigma on the seminal essay by 
Goffman in which based on classic labeling theory he defined stigma as an attribute 
that is deeply discrediting’ and that reduces the bearer ‘from a whole and usual person 
to a tainted, discounted one’(Goffman 1963 in Link and Phelan 2001). Taking 
account of various criticisms of the concept since then they conceptualise stigma as 
consisting of 5 inter-related components: labeling - an aspect of human difference is
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labeled; stereotyping - the label is then linked to a negative characteristics; separation 
-  labeled persons are then placed in distinct categories to establish ‘us’ and ‘them’; 
status loss and discrimination -the labeling, stereotyping and separation lead to the 
experience of status loss and discrimination for the stigmatized group; power -  a 
power balance must exist in favour of the group engaging in the labeling, stereotyping 
and separation e.g. service users may label, stereotype and separate themselves from 
their psychiatrists but the psychiatrists would still not be stigmatised as they hold the 
balance of power. Status loss and discrimination warrant further explanation here. 
The authors point to research that shows negative labeling and stereotyping lead to a 
downward placement in social hierarchy. When placed in small groups it has been 
consistently shown that people form social hierarchies, and that external status' such 
as female or black are far less likely to assume dominant positions (I am reminded 
here of how during the first week of Clinical Psychology training despite there being 
only one male in each case discussion group, three out of the four group chairs were 
male.) What is important about this is that there is generally no observable 
discriminatory behaviour by group members, rather social performance expectations 
of all parties work covertly to the disadvantage of the stigmatized person. Therefore 
somebody with a psychiatric label could consistently find themselves in the weakest 
position, despite no discriminatory behaviour being evident. Status loss itself can then 
also become a source for discrimination separate from the label - no body wants to be 
associated with the weak member of a group. The definition of stigma offered 
subsumes the definition of based on Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) outlined above, but 
expands on this to include other forms of discrimination. Structural discrimination 
occurs when a set of accumulated institutional practices work to disadvantage a 
minority group as in institutional racism. For example because schizophrenia is
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stigmatized less money and effort may be allocated. Therefore medications which can 
cause side effects such as weight gain and drooling are routinely prescribed since the 
funding and impetus to find alternatives is not available. Community Mental Health 
team bases tend to be located in less affluent areas that do not have the power to 
object, so persons with schizophrenia diagnosis may become tied to these areas. Less 
research efforts may be put into finding therapeutic treatments due to a hopeless 
prognosis. Hence the person may experience discrimination even if no one person 
commits a discriminating act. Different forms of discrimination are interchangeable 
making it very hard to eliminate since one form simply replaces another. While 
understanding the stigma and discrimination linked to persons with a diagnosis of 
mental illness through this lens does not necessitate a social constructionist 
epistemology, this is the discourse underlying the authors’ explanation. Here the 
psychiatric diagnostic labels assigned to people are not simply a way of categorizing 
naturally occurring human difference. Humans differ on a vast number of dimensions, 
but it is society that determines which differences are ascribed distinct labels e.g. skin 
colour, sex, mental distress. Once a difference has been labeled as important it comes 
to be socially accepted as the way things are. Link and Phelan (2001) use skin colour 
as an example to explain this e.g. it is accepted that there is black and white when in 
fact there are many different skin colours and no feature clearly demarks those 
categorized as black from those categorized as white. In the same way the labeling of 
psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and depression, means they are commonly 
understood as naturally existing when in fact the evidence for this is questionable (e.g. 
Pilgrim 2000). The existence of these labels however allows for negative attributes to 
be assigned, separation and discrimination. Link and Phelan (2001) assert that to
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really change stigma one must either change the attitudes and beliefs that lead to 
labeling, or take away power from those doing the labeling.
So how do these conceptualizations of stigma and discrimination help us address the 
questions about how to work to reduce them in local communities? It is probably 
evident from the amount of space devoted to each which conceptualisation I endorse. 
Based on Link and Phelan (2001) there are a number of factors I feel I would need to 
consider as a clinical psychologists before attempting to work with local communities. 
Firstly there is the debate around diagnosis and labeling. This is a debate which until 
now I have largely avoided. However based on this conceptualization it assumes 
paramount importance. In order to work with local communities to reduce stigma it 
may be necessary to abandon diagnostic categories and work on a continuum model 
(Pilgrim 2000). Secondly Clinical Psychologists may need to reconsider their position 
as experts and assume a more collaborative model working with service users as 
colleagues rather than clients.
Stigma and Discrimination within Clinical Psychology
How can clinical psychologists think about working to reduce stigma in local 
communities without first looking at ourselves and reflecting on stigma or 
discrimination which may be operating in our own community towards service users. 
Schulze (2007) reviewed literature looking at stigma within the mental health 
professions. Although much of the literature reviewed was about psychiatrists there 
were some interesting findings relating to psychologists. Cadwell & Jorm (2001) 
surveyed 2737 mental health professionals and found they held very pessimistic ideas
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about the potential for successful treatment or recovery from Schizophrenia or 
depression, with clinical psychologists found to be less negative than GP’s or 
Psychiatrists but more so than mental health nurses. All professionals felt that people 
would be discriminated against by others which could reflect awareness of public 
attitudes, or based on the ‘Perceived Stigma Scale (Link, Mirotznik and Cullen 1991), 
could be a projection of professionals own beliefs. Nordt et al (2006) presented 
vignettes of people with diagnosis of schizophrenia, depression or non-cases which 
had experienced negative life events. 1 in 4 clinical psychologists categorized the non 
cases as mentally ill. Lauber et al (2004) and Nordt et al (2006) found clinical 
psychologists to judge negative characteristics as more typical of people with mental 
illness than positive ones (though less so than psychiatrists did). Lepping et al (2004) 
looked at mental health professionals’ attitudes towards limiting the civil rights of 
those with mental illness. They found them to be against this with one exception - 
involuntary admission and treatment which most professionals endorsed, although 
psychologists were less likely to be in favour of this than other professionals. Van 
Dorn et al (2005) found mental health professionals, including clinical psychologists 
held similar attitudes to the public with regard to desire for social distance and ideas 
about violence and dangerousness. Servais and Saunders (2007) surveyed clinical 
psychologists in the US to assess perceptions of persons with mental illness. 306 
(which represented 34% response rate) clinical psychologists returned the survey in 
which they were asked to rate themselves, a member of the public, a person with 
moderate depression, a person with schizophrenia and a person with borderline 
features on six 7 point scales: effective-ineffective; understandable-incomprehensible; 
safe-dangerous; worthy-unworthy; desirable to be with-undesirable to be with and 
similar to me-dissimilar to me, with 1 representing the positive end and 7 the negative
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end of each scale. The results were analyzed by looking at both how different clinical 
psychologists rated themselves from each target for each scale and by looking at what 
percentage gave very negative (6 or 7) ratings for each item. Overall psychologist 
rated themselves more similar to a person with moderate depression than a member of 
the public, but least similar to somebody with schizophrenia or borderline features 
with the biggest differences between themselves and these targets recorded in 
effectiveness and desirability. A person with schizophrenia was given a 6 or a 7 for 
ineffectiveness by 60%, for undesirability by 34% and for dissimilarity by 69%, while 
a person with borderline features was given a 6 or a 7 by 39% for ineffectiveness, 
42% for undesirability and 60% for dissimilarity. Undesirability and dissimilarity are 
thought to be indicators of disidentification. The author describes disidentification as I 
‘the process of characterizing persons with mental illness as easily recognizable and 
different from ‘normal’ individuals while characterizing oneself as normal and not 
susceptible to mental illness’ (Servais and Saunders 2007 p214) and note how it is 
thought to be predictive of prejudicial attitudes. This description of disidentification 
reminds me of the labeling and separation components of stigma as described by Link 
and Phelan (2001). Since labeling and power are also undoubtedly present I wonder 
how hard it may be to find the final component of discrimination. None of the studies 
I have outlined above were conducted on UK clinical psychologists, in fact I was 
unable to find any literature published in the last twenty years looking at the attitudes 
of clinical psychologists in the UK towards the people with mental health problems. 
While it is possible that my literature search may have missed some studies, for not a 
single UK study to be yielded in a search that produced studies from elsewhere is a 
striking absence. I do not think however it would be unfair to assume that this finding 
could translate to the UK, especially given that surveys of UK service users have
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describe experiences of stigma and discrimination from UK mental health services 
(Pinfold et al 2005, Thomicroft et al 2008). With this in mind I have tried to reflect 
on any stigma or discrimination I have encountered or engaged in since I started 
training. The first thing that springs to mind is the practice of offering vaccinations 
against hepatitis B, tetanus, and polio to all trainees. I can understand why it may be 
offered to nurses or other health professionals whose work involves close physical 
contact, needles and dealing with bodily fluids -  indeed for these professionals it is 
compulsory, but why offer this to a trainee clinical psychologist whose only physical 
contact should be to shake a service user’s hand. I feel this practice implies that the 
clients I work with may be dangerous and I am at risk of contracting disease from 
them and undermines good work done elsewhere on the course such as involving 
service users in teaching and selection.
Evaluation of actions to reduce stigma and discrimination
As outlined above the attributional model of stigma and the idea that stigma has at its 
foundations the problem of knowledge both suggest that educational programmes 
would be the most effective way to combat stigma. The attributional approach 
suggests seeking to alter the idea that service users are in control of their situation, and 
the best way they feel to do this is by educating people on the biological and genetic 
factors. This is the approach taken by most anti stigma endeavors around the world 
(Lauber and Sartorius 2007) including the high profile ‘Changing Minds’ campaign of 
Royal College of Psychiatrists (Crisp et al 2005). However in a review of 283 papers 
from around the world on attempts to combat stigma and discrimination about 
schizophrenia, Read et al (2006) concluded that the ‘mental illness is an illness like
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any other’ approach had been ineffective, in fact they concluded that this approach 
actually increases perceptions of dangerousness, unpredictability, fear and desire for 
social distance.
They propose a range of alternatives, the first and perhaps most obvious being 
education programmes either focusing on psychosocial explanations, or giving 
psychosocial explanations at least equal weight to biological and genetic ones. They 
reason that research has shown lay people intuitively offer psychosocial explanations 
about mental distress and that other health issues such as cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes and lung cancer are already being understood as an interaction between 
biological, environmental and psychological factors. Pinfold et al (2005) report some 
success from a series of educational programmes targeting police (Pinfold et al 2003), 
school students (Pinfold et al 2003a) and community workers (Pinfold et al 2003b) 
based on these principles. Although the programmes did include some reference to 
the medical discourse they were based primarily on a social model. However since 
sessions were delivered in part by a service user and also involved personal testimony 
by a service user it is hard to say. Qualitative evaluations of the programmes did 
suggest that the most important part of the intervention was contact with service users. 
There is now a growing body of evidence which suggests contact with service users is 
a key part to successfully challenging stigma (Alexander and Link 2003, Corrigan et 
al 2001, Couture and Penn 2003).
The majority of anti stigma campaigns have been educational. While they have 
raised public awareness of mental health issues, they report only small effects in 
changing attitudes, especially desire for social distance. A survey by the Department
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of Health (2007) found that attitudes are actually getting worse. This has led some to 
question if a change of focus and direction is in order.
Alternative approaches
Based on the modified labeling theory of stigma, Link and Phelan (2001) suggest two 
principles for challenging stigma. Firstly any approach must be multi level and 
multifaceted, addressing both individual and structural discrimination. Secondly any 
intervention should either seek to change deeply held attitudes or beliefs, or change 
the power structures that allows the dominant group to act on their deeply held 
attitudes or beliefs. If we endorse these principles then it is not that previous anti 
stigma campaigns based around education and contact are wrong per se (although as 
addressed above the utility of educational campaigns based on biological and genetic 
explanations are doubtful), more that they are only a small part of what is needed. 
Perhaps there has been too much attention focused on changing the attitudes of 
individuals in communities and not enough on challenging the power structures that 
allow discrimination to occur and empowering service users in order that they regain 
status. By this I do not mean self status but status within the social hierarchies of 
community groups which is lost through the negative label. Evidently based on this 
conceptualisation any intervention should also address the way diagnostic labels are 
applied and pay attention to the way language is employed.
Esroff et al (2004) conducted a national survey in the US to find noteworthy examples 
of local community efforts to reduce stigma and discrimination. Efforts were 
evaluated by an expert panel consisting of service users and community stakeholders. 
The efforts they found exemplary were in line with the principles outlined by Link and
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Phelan (2001). They were described as demonstrating 'a shift in emphasis from 
stigma to discrimination - from a focus on stigma associated with illness per se 
towards the vocabulary and perspectives of discrimination, including an emphasis on 
human and civil rights and empowerment and self advocacy’ (p505 Ershoff et al 
2004)
The Community Psychology approach is another effective means of challenging 
stigmas from multiple directions as advocated by Link and Phelan (2001). 
Community Psychology is based on the principle that psychological distress develops 
within larger social and environmental contexts. Collaboration between service users, 
community members, local organisations and professionals is essential within a 
community psychology approach. It acknowledges that successful interventions 
include active preventative work through education, community involvement, readily 
accessible support systems, assertive outreach work, improving local environments 
and working from alternative settings (Lightbum & Sessions, 2006). But what does 
the community psychology approach actually involve in practice? Newnes and 
Holmes (2004) suggest the first step in working in this way involves actually getting 
to know the local community. This is not as easy as it sounds if the community in 
which we work does not overlap with the community in which we live. They suggest 
that one can only really get to know a community from being in it - waiting at the bus 
stop, going to the newsagents on a Sunday morning which can be difficult if the only 
time we spend in it is rushing to the office and home again. Rufus May, a clinical 
psychologist with experience of using mental health services describes how he has 
worked with his local community to establish self help groups; develop training 
programme to enable service users to work as advocate and consultants for local
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mental health services, and develop monthly public meetings where social, spiritual 
and personal approaches to mental health are discussed (Hayward et al 2007). 
However there is debate as to whether there is a role for clinical psychologists within 
this model (Holmes and Newnes 2004). As a white, middle class female who has 
enjoyed the advantages of a university education and who has not engaged with 
services from a consumer perspective is there a place for me to work within diverse 
and disadvantaged communities? If I take the advice of Clinical Psychologist Emma 
Harding and acknowledge difference and remain curious about it (Hayward et al 
2007) - 1 hope it is possible.
What could I do?
Taking inspiration from some of the initiatives I have read about in researching this 
essay, and based on the considerations and framework outlined I am going to outline 
some tentative ideas of things I could actually do in the near future. One place to start 
may be simply to ask local communities about how they experience mental health 
issues, if they feel there are any stigmatising or discriminatory practices going on and 
what they feel may help. Read et al (2006) that one must respect diversity and not 
assume what works in one area would translate to another. Another idea may be to 
make the internal debate about diagnosis and labelling external by staging some public 
debates chaired by service users.
Conclusion
The stigma and discrimination which lead to the social exclusion of mental health 
service users are complex constructs which have often managed to evade clear
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operational definition. This has resulted in work to reduce them being untargeted and 
largely ineffective. To work effectively with local communities to reduce stigma and 
discrimination therefore clinical psychologists must be clear about how they are 
conceptualising stigma and discrimination and use this theory to underpin the work. 
The modified labelling theory of stigma and discrimination offers the strongest 
theoretical basis for work aimed at reducing stigma and discrimination. Based on this 
theory stigma is thought to result from 5 inter-related components: labeling - an aspect 
of human difference is labeled; stereotyping - the label is then linked to a negative 
characteristics; separation -  labeled persons are then placed in distinct categories to 
establish ‘us’ and ‘them’; status loss and discrimination -the labeling, stereotyping 
and separation lead to the experience of status loss and discrimination for the 
stigmatized group; power -  a power balance must exist in favour of the group 
engaging in the labeling. Approaches challenging stigma therefore must be multi 
level and multifaceted, addressing both individual and structural discrimination, and 
should either seek to change deeply held attitudes or beliefs, or change the power 
structures that allows the dominant group to act on their deeply held attitudes or 
beliefs. Community Psychology is one model that could be used to challenge stigma 
and discrimination based on this conceptualization. Clinical Psychologists should also 
be aware of stigma and discrimination towards service users from within the 
profession.
40
REFERENCES
Alexander, L & Link, B. (2003). The impact of contact on stigmatizing attitudes 
towards people with mental illness. Journal o f Mental Health, 12(3) 271-289
Ajzen I., & Fishbein M.(1980). Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social 
Behaviour. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
Byrne, P (2001). Psychiatric Stigma. British Journal o f Psychiatry 178 281-284
Caldwell, T.M., & Jorm, A.F. (2001). Mental health nurses’ beliefs about likely 
outcomes for people with schizophrenia or depression: A comparison with the public 
and other healthcare professionals. Australian and New Zealand Journal o f  Mental 
Health Nursing 10 42-54
Corrigan, P. (2000). Mental Health Stigma as Social Attribution: Implications for 
Research Methods and Attitude Change. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 
7(7) 48-67
Corrigan, P., River, L., Lundin, R., Penn, D.L., Uphoff-Wasowski, K., & Campion 
J.(2001). Three Strategies for changing attributions about severe mental illness. 
Schizophrenia Bulletin 27 187-195
Department of Health (2007). Attitudes to Mental Illness survey report 2007. London: 
Department of Health .
41
Estroff, S., Penn, D., & Toporek, J. (2004). From stigma to discrimination: An 
analysis of community efforts to reducethe negative consequences of having a 
psychiatric disorder and label. Schizophrenia Bulletin 30(3) 493-509
Hayward, M. (2007) Social Inclusion. Lecture Handout.
Hayward, M., Brown, E., May, R., & Harding, E.(2007). Social Inclusion and clinical 
psychology. A life in the day. 11(2) 27-30
Haywood, P., & Bright, J. (1997). Stigma and mental illness: A review and critique. 
Journal o f Mental Health 6(4) 435-454
Holmes, G. & Newnes, C. (2004). Thinking about community psychology and 
poverty. Clinical Psychology, 38, 19-22.
Lauber, C., Anthony, M., Ajacic-Gross, V., and Rossler, W.(2004). What about 
psychiatrist’s attitudes toward mentally ill people? European Psychiatry 19 p423-427
Lauber, C., and Sartorius, N (2007). At issue: Anti-stigma endeavours. International 
Review o f Psychiatry 19(2) 103-106
Lepping, P., Steinert, T., Gebhardt, R.P., & Rottgers, H.R. (2004). Attitudes of 
mental health professionals and lay people towards involuntary treatment and 
admission in England and Germany -  a questionnaire analysis. European Psychiatry 
79 91-95
42
Lightbum, A. & Sessions, P. (Eds.) (2006). Handbook o f community-based clinical 
practice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Link, B., Mirotznik, J., & Cullen F.(1991). The effectiveness of stigma coping 
orientations: Can negative consequences of mental illness labelling be avoided?
Journal o f Health and Social Behaviour 32 302-320.
Link, B.C. & Phelan, J.C. (2001). Conceptualizing Stigma. Annual Review o f  
Sociology 27 363-385
MacMillan, D., & Chavis, D. (1986). Sense of community: Definition and theory. 
Journal o f Community Psychology 14 6-23
Nordt, C., Rossler, W., & Lauber, C.(2006). Attitudes of mental health professionals 
towards people with schizophrenia and major depression. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 32 
709-714
Pilgrim, D. (2000), Psychiatric diagnosis: More questions than answers. The 
Psychologist, 13(6), 302-305.
Pinfold, V., Huxley, P., Thomicroft, G., Farmer, P., Toulmin, H & Graham, T (2003a) 
Reducing psychiatric stigma and discrimination: Evaluating an educational
intervention with the police force in England. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric 
Epidemiology 38 337-344
43
Pinfold, V., Huxley, P., Thomicroft, G, ., Farmer, P., Toulmin, H & Graham, T 
(2003b) Reducing psychiatric stigma and discrimination: Evaluation of educational 
interventions in UK secondary schools. British Journal o f Psychiatry 182, 342-346
Pinfold, V.(2003c). How can we make mental health education work? Example o f  a 
successful local mental health programme challenging stigma and discrimination. 
London: Rethink Severe Mental Illness.
Pinfold, V., Thomicroft, G., Huxley, P., & Farmer, P. (2005). Active ingredients in 
anti-stigma programmes in mental health. International Review o f  Psychiatry 17(2). 
123-131
Read, J., Haslam, N., Sayce, L., & Davies, E.(2006). Prejudice and schizophrenia: a 
review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other approach’. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandanavia 114 303-318.
Rose, D., Thomicroft, G., Pinfold, V., & Kassam, A. (2007). 250 labels used to 
stigmatise people with mental illness BMC Health Services Research 7:97
Sartorius, N. & Schulze, B.(2005) Reducing the stigma o f mental illness. A report 
from the global programme o f the world psychiatric association. Cambridge UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sayce, 1 (1998) Stigma, discrimination and social exclusion: what’s in a word? 
Journal o f mental health 7 (4) 331-343
44
Schultze, B (2007). Stigma and mental health professionals: A review of the
evidence of an intricate relationship. International review o f  Psychiatry 19 (2) 137- 
155
Servais, L, & Saunders, S (2007). Clinical Psychologists perceptions of persons with 
mental illness. Professional Psychology, Research and Practice 38(2) 214-219
Social Exclusion Unit (2004). Mental Health and Social exclusion. Office of the 
deputy Prime Minister. London HMSO
Thomicroft, G., Brohan, E., Kassam, A., & Lewis-Holmes, E. (2008). Reducing 
stigma and discrimination: Candidate interventions. International Journal o f  Mental 
Health Systems 2:3
Thomicroft, G. (2006) Shunned: Discrimination against people with mental illness. 
Oxford, OUP
Van Dom, R.A., Swanson, J.W., Elbogen, E.B., & Swartz, M.S. (2005). A comparison 
of stigmatizing attitudes toward persons with schizophrenia in four stakeholder 
groups. Perceived likelihood of violence and desire for social distance. Psychiatry 68 
152-163
45
Relationship to Change
Problem Based Learning Reflective Account
March 2008 
Year 1
On the second day of Clinical Psychology training at Surrey University, I and the six 
other trainees in what will be our Case Discussion Group (CDG) for the duration of 
training met as a group for the first time. We had been set a Problem Based Learning 
task (PEL) -  to do a twenty minute presentation in five weeks time to the rest of the 
year, course team members, facilitators and field supervisors based around the title 
‘The Relationship to Change’. Apart from this the only information we had was a few 
pages of what seemed to me cryptic and disjointed thoughts about change from 
various people. Five weeks later we delivered a presentation which I felt very proud 
of and which received excellent feedback. So how did the group work together to get 
to this point?
We were asked this question at the end of our presentation and we replied that we 
thought we had worked together very cohesively, that we had all been very supportive 
of one another, that everyone had contributed equally and had their ideas included, 
that we had enjoyed the process and had had fun doing it. We were then asked ‘So 
where was the conflict?’ to which we responded that there was none. ‘But there must 
have been conflict came’ the reply, ‘all groups have conflict’. I remember thinking to 
myself ‘but we really didn’t have conflict’ and feeling quite angry at being told that 
we had done, especially by someone that had not been part of the group. Following 
the presentation the idea that all groups experience conflict so therefore we must have 
done was echoed to us by various supervisors, course team members and even our 
own group facilitator. We discussed this as a group and all felt that we had not 
experienced conflict.
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Therefore I am going to spend this essay reflecting on the idea of conflict within our 
group. Why must we have had conflict? Why do we collectively as a group tell our 
story as being conflict free? What was my role in shaping the group? How does all 
this relate to my clinical practice? Did we employ certain strategies which helped us 
avoid conflict? How might these strategies manifest themselves in clinical practice?
Why must the group have experienced conflict?
The first question I want to think about is why so many people seemed so sure that we 
must have had conflict when we had asserted categorically that we had not. There are 
many theories of group dynamics in the literature and whilst I am not familiar with 
many of them I have to concede that the once I am aware of include a phase of 
conflict. For example Bruce Tuckman (1965) developed the influential and widely 
applied forming-storming-norming-performing model - a four stage model of group 
dynamics which asserts all successful groups must pass through the ‘storming’ or 
conflict stage. Moreover the people who told us all groups have conflict are all 
speaking from a position of experience of running groups, both at university and in 
clinical settings. So does this mean that we should accept as ‘true’ that all groups 
experience conflict. Social Constructionists hold that reality or ‘truth’ is socially 
constructed in, and through language and interactions between people. Descriptions 
or constructions can sustain some social actions and not others and are related to 
power, as they have implications for what people can do and how they can treat others 
(Burr, 2003). Could group facilitators’ constructions of groups as always involving
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conflict be related to their position of power? Is it easier to facilitate a groups 
constructed as involving conflict?
Why do we collectively as a group tell our story as being conflict free?
Reflecting on our group process through a social constructionist lens I think we may 
have constructed our group as conflict free very early on through the language we 
used to describe the group to each other e.g. ‘I am really happy I am in this group. 
Everyone seems really laid back and nobody is dominating’, ‘It’s nice that we get on 
so well together and have a laugh’. Furthermore the way we decided to structure our 
group meetings and presentation may have allowed us to maintain this construction. 
We did not elect a permanent chair or scribe but decided to rotate each week. After 
the first meeting we all went away and found any information we could relating to the 
media and relationship to change, we shared what we had found and then each 
selected a different area to look at in more detail. We decided to do our presentation 
as a news magazine show allowing us each to present the area we had focused on for 
an equal amount of time.
What was my role in shaping the group?
Thinking back on the process of carrying out the PEL task, reading through the entries 
in my reflective journal and looking back on the way I have referred to the group so 
far in this essay, I notice that I present the group as a unit and use ‘we’ a lot. I find it 
hard to assign distinctive roles to group members and see us all as being very equal. I 
am now beginning to wonder whether that reflects a reality we constructed as a group 
and what my role in that construction may have been or if that was my personal 
construction and if other group members may have experienced the group differently.
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While I cannot know how others experienced the group I can see how I may have 
influenced the construction. Perhaps due to the fact that I come from a large family of 
fiery tempers I feel I tend to make efforts to avoid conflict whenever possible and find 
myself at times taking on the role of peace keeper in group situations. Although I 
rarely take the lead role in group situations I am not comfortable in a role which does 
not offer the opportunity to influence the group and have my ideas considered. 
Bearing these reflections in mind the group dynamic described above seems almost 
ideal for me so I think I have to consider the possibility that I could have had a 
significant part in its construction. Looking back I now realize it was me who 
suggested the format for the presentation (I know this as it was recorded in the 
minutes) and I am fairly sure it was me who suggested taking it in turns to chair 
although I may be remembering it in this way now as it fits in with the story I am now 
formulating. What I do know for sure is the strong reaction I felt at being told the 
group must have experienced conflict when I felt it had not.
How might this impact on my clinical practice?
Just as course team members, supervisors and facilitators constructed my group reality 
as involving conflict based on their knowledge of psychological theories or personal 
experiences of groups, I attempt to construct my clients internal and external realities 
through formulations and therapeutic interactions based on a combination of my own 
knowledge, assumptions and beliefs and those of my supervisors, knowledge 
assumptions and beliefs which may not take full account of difference and diversity. 
Reflecting on this exercise has enabled me to begin to move away from thinking of 
my constructions as reality to thinking of them as one possible version of reality. I am 
aware that my indignation at being presented with a construction of my group
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experience that did not match my own is probably very little in comparison with 
feelings a client may experience at being presented with a formulation or 
interpretation that does not match the way they experience their own reality.
Reflecting on my possible role in constructing the group has alerted me to be vigilant 
to behaviors I may engage in to avoid future conflict. While avoiding conflict is 
always desirable I recognise that in some clinical situations it could be necessary e.g. 
representing a psychological viewpoint to a team which thinks in a very medical way.
Did we employ certain strategies that helped us remain conflict free?
One way we may have avoided conflict was by constructing our group facilitator as 
the other. The concept of ‘constructing the other’ describes how groups or societies 
maintain an apparent unity through an active process of exclusion, opposition and 
hierarchization of other people, groups or societies (Cahoone 1996). So why may we 
have constructed our facilitator in this way and how may this have helped us to avoid 
conflict?
Certainty
Safe Unsafe
Uncertainty
Figure 1 ‘Safe Uncertainty -  the paradox of effective practice’ (Mason 1993, cited in 
lecture by Vetere 2007).
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Figure one is used to demonstrate that clinical work often involves moving out of the 
1st quadrant of safe-certainty, into the 3 rd quadrant of safe-uncertainty and in 
retrospect I see that the PEL exercise has helped me learn to feel safer with 
uncertainty. At the start of the PEL exercise I place the group in the quadrant of 
unsafe-uncertainty and I think constructing the facilitator as the other may have been a 
way of enabling us to move into the 3rd quadrant. We started the PEL in a position of 
uncertainty, of ‘not knowing’ so turned to the facilitator who we perceived as 
‘knowing’ for direction and guidance. The facilitator did not give us the kind of 
directive guidance we were familiar with -  he told us he would sit outside the group 
playing devils advocate and we were to do the rest. I felt uncertain because I did not 
‘know’ what to do, and unsafe because I was with six peers I did not know under the 
gaze of a facilitator perceived as a figure of power and authority. I wonder if the 
supportive way we reacted to each other, in what we all disclosed to each other 
afterwards we had found a very unsettling and bewildering first meeting, could have 
been our way of creating a safe space between the group members in order to cope 
with what was felt the unsafe space between the group and the facilitator. In creating 
this space did we then begin to construct the facilitator as the other, a construction 
which then grew on discovering that other group facilitators had taken a more didactic 
approach? If we did construct the facilitator in this way then one of its functions may 
have been to help us avoid conflict through uniting us against a common other and 
absolving us from taking responsibility for failure.
So how might the notion of ‘constructing the other’ have impact on my clinical 
practice?
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In trying to answer this question I have found myself quite amazed at the number of 
possible examples of ‘constructing the other’ that immediately spring to mind. 
Working in multidisciplinary teams different professional bodies regularly seem 
construct each other as ‘the other’ e.g. Psychiatrists and Psychologists; Service users 
in opposition to service providers could be seen as ‘othering’; the general population 
malign service users as ‘the other’. Reflecting on how my group may have othered 
our facilitator has given me a new understanding of this process. Although I realise 
that a construction of the other is not desirable -  our facilitators approach was to 
enable us to learn - 1 have an understanding of how a group’s construction of the other 
can function to create unity and safety amongst that group. I hope I will be able to 
bear this in mind on occasions I may need to challenge such constructions, especially 
if perceived as the ‘powerful, knowing, clinical psychologist’ I become ‘the other’.
I chose to reflect upon the apparent lack of conflict in our group processes during the 
PEL task from a social constructionist perspective. This seemed to be appropriate as 
our PEL presentation looked at the media’s relationship to change from a social 
constructionist perspective which was probably strongly influenced by our facilitator 
thinking. This is one of the multiple ways I could have understood the group story 
and is coloured by my own position as a white middle class female.
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Working with People in Later Life, their Families, and the
Professional Network
Problem Based Learning Reflective Account
March 2009 
Year 2
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At the start of my second year of Clinical Psychology training I was given details of 
my third Problem Based Learning (PEL) task. This PEL task was different to 
previous ones in that it was to be done in mixed groups of second and third year 
trainees in the absence of a facilitator. The task had the heading ‘Working with 
People in Later Life, their Families, and the Professional Network’ and was a complex 
case of a 69 year old man referred to psychology for ‘assessment of his memory 
problems and need for care’(Appendix 1 for full task details)
Group Hierarchy
After being set the tasks we separated into our assigned groups. Two of the three third 
years from my group were away so the first meeting involved me, one third year 
trainee, and two second years from my Case Discussion Group. Although we were all 
informal, friendly and talkative, almost immediately the third year was in subtle ways 
the leader. For example from time to time she would summarise what had been said, 
we looked to her for approval, her ideas were given more weight, and at the end it was 
her who summed up what we had discussed and what we would do next. So how did 
this occur? Was this a role she took upon herself or was it a role that we bestowed 
upon her-or both?
Researchers looking at the way individuals placed in small groups form hierarchies 
have reliably found a tendency for these hierarchies to be formed based on external 
status such as race or gender. (Driskell & Mullen 1990 for review). They explain the 
process that leads to this happening as an individual’s external status creating 
performance expectations among group members. These result in members with 
higher external status talking more frequently, referring to contributions of others,
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summing up, nodding, having their ideas more readily accepted by others, and being 
able to successfully interrupt. Research showing that males and whites are more 
likely to be voted the leader in small groups supports this. (Mullen et al 1989). So in 
the PEL group situation could it be the external status of year group ranking led me, 
the third year trainee, and the other second year trainees to expect the third year to be 
the leader and perform in accordance with this. We are all white British, female and 
of similar age - I wonder if the outcome would have been the same had one of us 
second years been male or if the third year had been black? What strikes me most 
about this is that at the time I was not aware of any power differential between group 
members, and moreover I am unable to identify anything anybody did to create it. It 
could be argued that the role of leader went to the third year because she had a years 
extra experience on the course and had already had teaching on older adults which 
second years had not. While this is true, I feel the immediate and automatic way it 
occurred points to a less conscious mechanism-a collective understanding of her 
external status perhaps?
Understanding the ways power may operate in small groups has implications for my 
clinical practice on many levels. Firstly working as a Clinical Psychologist in the 
NHS often involves working in a multidisciplinary team (MDT). The power and 
influence I have in a team may be determined as much by the status of ‘clinical 
psychology’ in that team as by what I actually do or say. Secondly, the way my role 
of ‘Trainee Clinical Psychologist’ is perceived by clients could influence the 
effectiveness of my work. For example, I delivered an identical training session to 
staff from two residential homes with very different results. One home regularly 
seeks help with clients from psychology, while the other used to be part of a big
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institution where the medical model dominated-did the external status of psychology 
mediate the results? I hope I will be more mindful of the fact that the way my clients 
function in social groups is not only about their own internal factors, but the external 
status they have in those groups. This could be influenced by them having a 
diagnostic label (Link & Phelan 2001) as well as factors such as their race or gender.
Process versus outcomes
During the first meeting after briefly discussing the case me and the other two second 
years immediately started suggesting ideas for the final presentation e.g. videoing 
ourselves role playing a family therapy session and discussing the video during our 
presentation as a reflecting team, or role playing an MDT meeting discussing the case. 
The third year commented that it was interesting that we seemed to be focusing 
immediately on the end point of the task and maybe we should focus on the case and 
return to the presentation later. She wondered if immediately thinking about the 
endpoint could be linked to working in an NHS culture increasingly focused on 
monitoring outcomes. We took her point and most of our time working on the PEL 
was spent thinking about the case and all the surrounding issues and theories, with 
little time spent thinking about the presentation.
Our final presentation covered issues that none of the other groups had touched on and 
we were commended for getting deeper into the case than any other group. However, 
despite getting good feedback, I do not think I am making too big an assumption to 
say that our presentation was not the most entertaining of the day. We role played a 
peer discussion group discussing the case mirroring the discussions we as a group had 
had during the task. Whilst I cannot know for certain how the audience enjoyed our
58
presentation, I suspect they would not have enjoyed it as much as the humorous 
presentation which was done in the format of Dragons Den, and moreover probably 
would not have noticed the inaccuracies in that presentation had the chair not pointed 
them out. So which is more important -  content and process or presentation and 
outcomes?
In terms of my own personal learning experience I think I learnt more from the task 
by focusing the task, rather than the presentation or end goal of the task. In previous 
PEL tasks it is mainly the aspect that I was assigned to research and focus on in the 
presentation that I remember. For this one I remember bits that other group members 
researched that provoked discussion amongst us such as differential diagnosis and the 
impact of loss and attachment in old age. I’m confident this will stay with me when I 
start my older adults placement. I wonder how open I would have been to engaging in 
these issues had I known early on what I would be required to do for the presentation? 
Research by Pham & Taylor (1999) found people tended to perform better when asked 
to think about the task itself rather than the goal of the task, which would suggest had 
I been focusing on the presentation I may have not learnt so much. But if I reflect on 
my own experience as a receiver of presentations, then the presentation itself is very 
important - great content can be lost if delivered badly. I wonder what, if anything the 
audience took from our presentation? I tried to be mindful of this in preparing a 
presentation to be delivered on placement next week.
So what about process versus outcome in my clinical practice? As a trainee I’m 
required each placement to tick various boxes in order to pass. Does this put too 
much emphasis on outcome at the expense of process? How does the current focus on
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outcomes in NHS mental health services impact on the process for service users? 
Slade et al (2006) found the use of outcome measures did not subjectively improve 
services or quality of life for service users, although they did improve cost 
effectiveness and reduce number of inpatient days. Outcomes are important, but 
should not be at the expense of process.
Conflict
A recurring theme in all my reflective accounts has been conflict, or rather the lack of 
conflict. During the first PEL task we were asked by a facilitator where was the 
conflict in the group to which we replied there was none. The response was ‘there 
must have been, all groups have conflict’, indeed most influential models of group 
process include a component of conflict (e.g. Tuckman 1965). However, I would say 
none of the groups I have been part of, including the one for this PEL task, have 
involved any conflict. So why is this? Are the models of group process wrong? Have 
I simply been involved in uncharacteristically amicable groups? Or is it there 
something about me which either prevents conflict or refuses to recognize it?
I have reflected on the lack of conflict in my previous groups elsewhere so will focus 
my reflections on this particular group, but think it is important to consider my 
perceived lack of conflict here in the light of my experiences in previous groups.
So was there really no conflict in this group-would the other group members describe 
it as conflict free? The only situation that I think could be labeled conflict was 
deciding on the format of the presentation. The original idea was to improvise a peer 
group discussion of the case so it would mirror as closely as possible the discussions 
we had had between us which we felt were valuable and interesting. One of the group
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members said she would not feel comfortable improvising a role play and wanted to 
script and rehearse it. Another group member felt reluctant to script it feeling this 
would lose the enthusiasm and freshness of our discussions, but said on the other hand 
she would not want to make anyone feel uncomfortable. I suggested we could have a 
peer group chair with scripted prompt questions while everyone else improvised the 
ensuing discussion. In the end the group member worried about improvising said she 
would feel comfortable if we had a rough running order and she could script her bits 
to which we all agreed. This all took place within a few minutes and I was aware of 
no raised voices or negative feeling, so on reflection would still not label it conflict. 
However I now notice that it was me who first suggested a compromise that would 
keep all parties happy. I am also struck by how easily I and my two second year 
colleagues, with whom I have worked with in other groups, were willing to drop our 
ideas for the presentation. I first explained this to myself as being a result of me not 
being particularly passionate about any of the ideas-could it be that what I am most 
passionate about is avoiding conflict and my ideas come second to this? Whilst 
avoiding conflict and helping groups remain conflict free has obvious benefits in 
clinical practice, I think my probable tendency to prioritise this is something I should 
be alert to. My ideas and point of view may often be more valuable than avoiding 
conflict e.g. I could be the only voice in and MDT arguing for psychological factors to 
be considered.
Final Words
Reading back over my reflections I was struck by how what felt a cohesive, 
supportive, enjoyable group reads as being split along year group lines. Two thoughts 
occurred to me. Firstly, since Greek historian Plutarch introduced the Ship of Theseus
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paradox, philosophers have debated the extent to which constituent parts of something 
can capture the essence of the whole (Deutsch 2008)-just as focusing on parts of the 
group experience does not equate to the actual experience, the snapshot of a person I 
see in therapy does not equate to that person. Finally I notice that even down to my 
final words I am compelled to reiterate that however it may read, the group had no 
conflict!
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Appendix 1
Title: Working with People in Later Life, their Families, and the Professional 
Network
Problem Based Learning Exercise
What is the problem? Who has the problem? What might happen?
Mr Nikolas is 69, and has been referred to the psychology department for assessment 
of his short term memory problems, and his needs for care. The allocated social 
worker thinks Mr Nikolas is not looking after himself properly -  his fridge has out of 
date food, his clothes are not well washed, and his toilet and bedding are unclean. His 
GP thinks he is managing well. During the period of assessment, Mr Nikolas’ son 
Alexander, accused Mrs Edwards of financial abuse against his father. Social services 
invoked the Court of Protection and his divorced wife agreed to manage his financial 
affairs. Mrs Edwards, his new non-residential partner, was asked by the family not to 
visit their father/ex-husband any more, in an angry doorstep confrontation at her home 
by the older son. Mrs Edwards contacted the same psychology service and asked for 
their help. Mrs Edwards gave her version of events to Mr Nikolas’ two older sisters, 
who both live abroad.
Some Background Information
Mr Nikolas is the son of a Russian Jewish émigré who married a white English east 
end Londoner. His father left his mother when he was seven and he had no subsequent 
contact. He was raised within the CofE tradition of Christianity, and holds a faith 
base. It was not until he was a mature adult that he learned of his father’s origins at the 
time of his mother’s death. He had always been told his father was an Englishman.
When he was 33, Mr Nikolas married a white English woman who was 15 years 
younger than him, from a Catholic background. She is not practising. They divorced at
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her instigation 6 years ago. She had spent the majority of their marriage in receipt of a 
diagnosis of major depression, with bouts of counselling, prolonged anti-depressant 
medication use, and so on. Following the divorce, she was able to cease prescription 
medication use, took up local employment, and developed a new friendship circle. Her 
older son called her a ‘whore’ when he discovered she was seeing another man, 
romantically.
So, Mr and Mrs Nikolas had two sons, Alexander and James, both now in their 
thirties. James lives abroad and does not keep much in contact with his father. 
Alexander is local, runs a small business and is married to a woman who struggles 
with eating distress and fears of contamination, such that she does not allow their two 
small children to play in the garden. The family do not discuss these matters.
Mr Nikolas has two older sisters, both of whom live in Australia and are not well 
enough to travel to the UK, but wish to be involved in decision making about the 
future care of their brother.
Mr Nikolas was devastated by the divorce and the need to sell the family home for the 
divorce settlement. He moved to a small property nearer his older son and two 
grandchildren. He spent a few years on his own, walking miles every day, and 
shunning company. Eventually a friend persuaded him to join a local history society 
and he became involved in escorting visitors and tourists around museums. There he 
met Mrs Edwards, a while English divorced woman, 2 years older than him. She is 
financially independent and owns her own home. She has PT employment with a 
stately home in the area, and was a children’s nanny most of her life. She has a 
chronic debilitating health condition that results in joint pains. She has no children and 
no living relatives. She has an active friendship group.
Mrs Edwards and Mr Nikolas became friends and then their relationship became 
romantic and sexually intimate. They have been together for 3 years. They kept their 
separate houses, and spent time in each other’s home. Mr Nikolas asked Mrs Edwards 
to marry him at the time the police instigated the removal of his driving licence. He 
had been struggling with short term memory problems, and when stopped at a police
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blockade where police were redirecting traffic, he refused their instructions and tried 
to drive on. The police officer recognised a ‘psychological’ problem and reported his 
behaviour to social services. The same police officer advised Mrs Edwards that Mr 
Nikolas needed medical attention. Mrs Edwards was uncertain and informed his older 
son who contacted social services. This resulted in the withdrawal of his licence and 
the confiscation of his car by his older son. His ex-wife was observed to drive this 
vehicle subsequently by Mrs Edwards.
Prompt questions:
Who/what/where is the problem?
How to define the professional network? How might professional roles be defined 
under these circumstances?
How is leadership shown/to be shown within the professional network, and what 
might collaborative practice look like under these circumstances?
What is the role of the psychologist with respect to Mr Nikolas, his close family 
members, Mrs Edwards and the professional network?
What ethical issues need to be considered?
How is financial abuse to be defined?
The relationship between memory and depression?
The role of life events?
Impact of divorce on grown up children?
The Academic Tutor Team 
September, 2008
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How will we know if  Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies (IAPT) is working?
Problem Based Learning Reflective Account
February 2010 
Year 3
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At the beginning of my third year of Clinical Psychology training we were set our 
fourth Problem Based Learning (PEL) exercise entitled ‘How do we know if 
Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) is working?’(See Appendix 1 
for full details). We were split into small groups comprising of a mixture of second 
and third year trainees. Each group had seven weeks to prepare a twenty minute 
presentation inspired by imagining we had the task of preparing a consultancy report 
about how the effectiveness of IAPT could be assessed.
The main theme of my reflective account will be leadership. I feel this is an important 
professional issue for me to consider as I prepare to move from the role of trainee into 
the role of qualified clinical psychologist, particularly since Clinical Psychologists are 
now explicitly encouraged to undertake leadership roles. (Department of Health 
2007). As I reflect on leadership I will be looking at how the group approached the 
task, how the group worked together, how my personal characteristics influenced the 
process, the implications for my clinical practice and the impact of issues of difference 
and diversity.
Leadership
I was placed in a group with the two third year colleagues whom I have worked with 
on all previous PEL exercises plus four second year trainees. My second year PEL 
exercise had also involved second and third years working together and afterwards I 
reflected on the process by which one of the third years had emerged as group leader. 
However, when I came to reflect on this years PEL task I was unable to identify a 
group leader. I discussed this with my third year colleagues who also felt that nobody 
had emerged as the leader. As we reflected on the process of doing the task we felt
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that the three of us as the third year unit had shared leadership of the group. This 
feeling was echoed in the comment of one of the second year trainees afterwards who 
said ‘I think we just followed you lot’. Researchers looking at the way individuals 
placed in small groups form hierarchies have reliably found a tendency for these 
hierarchies to be formed based on external status such as race or gender. (Driskell & 
Mullen 1990 for review). In the case of my both my PEL group exercises in groups of 
mixed year group, it seems that year group rank was the salient external status. 
However, instead of one third year emerging as leader, as happened last year, this year 
the three of us with senior year group rank felt we shared leadership. Why may this 
have been?
Shared Leadership
Carson et al (2007) define shared leadership as ‘a team property whereby leadership is 
distributed amongst team members rather than focused on a single designated leader’ 
p i217. Based on their research on the functioning and performance of fifty nine 
teams Carson et al (2007) identified three internal factors which led to the 
development of shared leadership: a shared goal or purpose that is well understood; 
high levels of interpersonal support and encouragement and high levels of 
participation and involvement from leading team members. Interestingly they found 
that teams with greater shared leadership performed better as rated by the team itself, 
but more importantly as rated by the client. So were these factors present between 
myself and my third year colleagues?
Why did we share leadership?
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My third year colleagues and I have worked together on PEL tasks many times before 
and have developed a shared and understood goal. This goal, which we have 
discussed with one another, is to get the task done as efficiently and amicably as 
possible. We share the view that the course is demanding enough without us creating 
unnecessary demands and stress when working on self directed tasks such as the PEL. 
We have become friends outside of the course context so have an understanding of 
each other personally as well as professionally. This means there is a high level of 
interpersonal support and encouragement between us. Since we have now worked 
together many times we respect and appreciate each others abilities which I feel has 
enabled us to move to a position of safe-certainty with one another (Mason 1993). I 
think feeling safe with one another enabled us each to fully participate and hence 
become very involved in the exercise. So it could be said that the factors identified 
by Carson et al (2007) as facilitating shared leadership were present, but does the 
presence of these factors and our external status as third years adequately explain why 
we shared the role of leader? I wonder if there is also something about our personal 
styles that meant we elected to share leadership rather than one of us take the role on 
individually? We are unique in the cohort as being the only trainees that have not 
been involved in a group where there has been easily identifiable conflict which 
makes me wonder whether avoiding conflict may be something we do more than 
others? I cannot speak for my colleagues but would certainly say this is true as far as I 
am concerned. While this is a personal quality that in the most part I am comfortable 
with, I feel it is important that I continually reflect on how it may be impacting my 
clinical practice. My personal style may be to avoid conflict but for some of my 
clients (and colleagues), conflict, and here I mean non-violent, non-abusive conflict, is 
a functional way of resolving issues and relating to others. Therefore I should ensure
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my personal style does not influence me to label conflict an issue when in fact it may 
not be. Furthermore there will be times when representing the psychological 
viewpoint within a team may entail conflict. It is important that I do not avoid 
conflict in these situations.
So how did we approach leadership?
During the first meeting of the group the third year unit shared our goal to get the task 
done efficiently and amicably, talked confidently of our past successes in working this 
way and suggested that we go and think about the task individually and pool ideas 
next meeting. We then suggested the whole group go for coffee and we had an 
enjoyable time getting to know one another. In the second meeting we encouraged all 
group members to share the ideas they had and any relevant experiences. What I find 
interesting reflecting back on this part of the process is that despite all being white, 
middle class females we bought a wide range of different perspectives on the same 
issue. In a similar way when considering diversity of clients I think sometimes the 
importance of differences within particular demographic groups can be obscured by 
the focus on respecting and understanding differences between demographic groups. 
I hope this will enable me to be mindful of differences within as well as differences 
between groups. During this second meeting we also devised the concept of our 
presentation-an episode of challenge Aneka in which Aneka had to gather views from 
IAPT stakeholders and service users on what they wanted from IAPT and how they 
would know if it had been achieved. This meant that each group member (except 
Aneka) could choose the parts of two stakeholders to play and hence independently 
research and play the parts they were interested in. It was also fun idea that we were 
able to get everybody excited about. In our third and final meeting we came with our
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prepared parts and spent the afternoon laughing a lot at each others acting skills! The 
leadership model which I think best fits with the way the group ran is transformational 
leadership (Northouse 2004). We took an outcome focused approach to the task 
which is interesting to think about given that a criticism of IAPT is that it is too 
narrowly focused on specific outcomes. This approach meant we produced an 
entertaining presentation that received good feedback. We were commended for 
representing a broader range of views than other groups but I would say we did so in 
less depth. Had we been less focused on the outcome would we have come to 
understand the issues in more depth? Or would we have lost direction and produced a 
less coherent presentation which caused us more stress?
How may the other group members have experienced the group?
Assuming my subjective perception that the third year unit shared leadership of the 
group, how may this have been experienced by the second year trainees? I cannot 
know how the other trainees experienced the group and I am aware that group 
members are thought to be reluctant to disagree with one another, particularly in the 
early stages (Bolton 2001) so it is likely I would be unaware of any negative 
experiences. However there are several indications that the group was experienced 
positively by the second year trainees. On completion of the task one of the second 
years trainees sent an email to the group saying what a positive experience she had 
had and suggesting that we try and stay in touch, sentiments that were subsequently 
echoed by all other group members. Subjectively group meetings were always a 
pleasant experience and objectively our final presentation received excellent feedback.
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One of the second year trainees had a lot of knowledge of IAPT having worked within 
an IAPT service. Would we have functioned better if she had led the group? How 
may she have felt being led by people with less knowledge about the topic? Taylor’s 
(2007) updated version of the ‘Conscious Competence’ model (see figure 1) may offer 
an explanation as to why the second year trainees, including the trainee with IAPT 
experience, appeared to feel comfortable being led by the third year trainees. With an 
extra years experience on the course it may be that as third years we were feeling 
‘consciously competent’ whilst the second years were not quite at that stage. If I 
reflect on my own development I remember feeling excited this year when my new 
supervisor told me she would be expecting me to work quite autonomously and I 
could choose to work in the way I felt best fit my personal style and the context and 
she would support me in my choice. If my supervisor had said that to me last year to 
say I would have felt anxious would have been a vast understatement. I realise that 
just because I felt this way does not mean that all second years would feel this way. 
Nonetheless I think it is important to hold this model and my own developing feelings 
of competence in mind, both with regard to supervising trainees in the future and in 
working with clients. Somebody may have the knowledge and ability to undertake a 
task but if they are not emotionally ready then without adequate support could feel 
very unsafe.
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Figure 1: Conscious competence (expanded model) (Taylor, 2007)
So how has this affected my clinical practice? Prior to starting the course I was a 
manager in a hierarchical team structure. I hated it and had felt that I did not want to 
lead again. This has been a difficult position for me to hold during training due to not 
only the present focus on leadership within clinical psychology but also my own belief 
that I have the ability to make a positive difference in certain areas. Therefore 
experiencing a style o f leadership that is consistent with my values and personality has 
helped ease my resistance to leadership. Since the PEL task I have taken on a 
supervisory role o f an assistant psychologist and taken a lead in launching a joint 
community project between my service and a local school. I realise that this style o f
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leadership will be more challenging when working in more diverse teams of people 
whose goals and purpose do not converge so easily. However empirical evidence and 
my personal experience suggest it is a style of leadership worth striving for.
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Appendix 1 -  The PBL Task
Year 2/3 PBL 
‘The Problem’
How do we know if IAPT is working?
The Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) programme was 
commissioned in response to the economic arguments of Lord Layard. The 
Department of Health have committed funding rising to £173 million to the 
programme which has one principal aim: to support Primary Care Trusts in 
implementing National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines 
for people suffering from depression and anxiety disorders. At present, only a quarter 
of the 6 million people in the UK with these conditions are in treatment, with 
debilitating effects on society.
The programme began in 2006 with Demonstration sites in Doncaster and Newham 
focusing on improving access to psychological therapies services for adults of 
working age. In 2007, 11 IAPT Pathfinders began to explore the specific benefits of 
services to vulnerable groups. These pilot services, through routine collection of 
outcome measures, showed the following benefits for people receiving services:
• Better health and wellbeing
• High levels of satisfaction with the service received
• More choice and better accessibility to clinically effective evidence-based 
services
• Helping people stay employed and able to participate in the activities of daily 
living
On World Mental Health Day 2007, Health Secretary Alan Johnson announced 
substantial new funding to increase services over the next three years:
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£33 million for 2008/9
A further £70 million to a total of £103 million in 2009/10 
A further £70 million to a total of £173 million in 2010/11
This funding will allow:
• In 2008/09 34 Primary Care Trusts to implement IAPT services, with more to 
follow in the next two years
• Regional training programmes to deliver 3,600 newly trained therapists with 
an appropriate skill mix and supervision arrangements by 2010/11
• 900,000 more people to access treatment, with half of them moving to 
recovery and 25,000 fewer on sick pay and benefits, by 2010/11.
Adapted from the NHS IAPT webpages - http://www. iavt. nhs. uk/
You have been asked to prepare a consultancy report on how the effectiveness of 
IAPT can be assessed.
You might want to consider:
. . .something about the questions that need to be asked about IAPT
...something about the designs, methodologies and analyses that could be utilised to 
address these questions
.. .something about the training and competencies of the IAPT workforce 
.. .something about the outcomes that will be valued by different stakeholders 
...something about the translation of findings into policy and practice
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Case Discussion Group Process Account One
September 2008
Year 1
Summary of Case Discussion Group Process Account One
The Case Discussion Group (CDG) was introduced by the Surrey University Clinical 
Psychology Training programme ‘as a way of creating safer and more intimate spaces 
within the academic programme where clinical practice could be reflected upon’. 
Unfortunately, by the end of year one, the CDG had become for me an uncomfortable 
and unsafe space. Talking about this with other group members and observing group 
processes suggested the rest of the group shared this feeling. Drawing on models of 
group dynamics, I used this process account to reflect on some of the possible reasons 
for this. I focused in particular on the relationship between the group and the 
facilitator which I perceived to be characterized by misunderstanding and mistrust. 
Reflecting on this relationship allowed me to identify ways that it could have been 
managed differently by the group as a whole and myself in particular. I then applied 
this thinking to my clinical practice and reflected on how similar situations may arise 
within multidisciplinary teams and between therapist and clients and how I may 
manage them as a result of reflecting on this experience.
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Case Discussion Group Process Account Two
September 2009
Year 2
Summary of Case Discussion Group Process Account Two 
This process account reflects on the how in contrast to year one, the CDG group 
became a space where the group felt safe and comfortable and were able to discuss 
some sensitive issues. I reflected on the process of group development throughout the 
year, my contributions to the group and the ways in which my learning from the 
process of the group was applied to my clinical practice. Particular attention is paid to 
facilitation -  models of group facilitation, how the facilitator enabled the group to 
progress from the previous year, and the experience of facilitating the group which we 
were all given the opportunity to do.
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Overview of Clinical Experience
Year 1
Placement Type: Adult Mental Health 
Duration: 1 Year
Location: Split between South West London & St Georges Mental Health Trust 
specialist psychotherapy department and South West London and St Georges Primary 
care psychology service.
The Placement included:
• Psychodynamic therapy with a range of clients including a young female with 
a diagnosis of borderline personality disorder and a young male experiencing 
trauma following sexual abuse throughout childhood.
• Co-facilitating a cognitive therapy group for clients diagnosed with depression.
• Cognitive therapy with a range of clients from primary care services.
• Carrying out neuropsychological assessments with clients with psychosis.
• Delivering a days teaching on guided self help for the Improving Access to 
Psychological Therapies (IAPT) low intensity workers summer training 
school.
• Conducting a service related research project looking at ethnicity, referral 
pathways and outcome.
• Attending workshop on adult attachment patterns.
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Year 2
Placement Type: Learning Disabilities
Duration: 6 months
Location: Epsom, Ewell and Banstead Community Team for learning disabilities.
The placement included:
• Working with a client with a learning disability, a diagnosis of schizophrenia 
and a history of physical and sexual abuse, focusing on exploring family roles 
and relationships which had become confused and enmeshed.
• Running a 'Keeping Safe Group' for women with learning disabilities who had 
been in sexually vulnerable situations.
• Joint working with the clinical nurse specialist to assess a man with autism and 
challenging behaviour and advise the care home on management strategies.
• Various functional and behavioural assessments involving neuropsychological 
assessments, observation, functional analysis and interviewing clients, carers 
and schools.
• Conducting an assessment and writing a report to assist social services in 
clients housing applications
• Presentation to care home staff on autism and management strategies.
• Cognitive therapy with a girl with a mild learning disability and anger 
management problems.
Placement Type: Child & Adolescent Mental Health
Duration: 6 months
Location: Sutton Child and Adolescent Mental Health Service (CAMHS).
The placement included:
• Providing cognitive therapy to children and adolescents with a range of 
difficulties including phobia, depression, OCD, and anxiety
• Indirect work with families.
• Carrying out neuropsychological assessments.
• Academic presentation on mentalisation.
• Becoming familiar with child protection policies and procedures
• Writing relapse prevention plans in language appropriate to the clients
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Year 3
Placement Type: Older Adults 
Duration: 6 months
Location: Kingston Community Mental Health Team for Older Adults 
The Placement included:
• Running a memory support group for men with Alzheimer’s disease.
• Neuropsychological Assessment to determine if clients had a cognitive profile 
consistent with dementia.
• Providing education and advice on management of dementia to clients and 
carers.
• Psychological therapy with clients with a range of difficulties including 
depression, anxiety and trauma.
• Designing and writing a service development community project which 
involved joint working with local schools.
• Supervising an assistant psychologist to begin implementing the above 
proposal’
Placement Type: Advanced Competencies - Forensic 
Duration: 6 months 
The Placement included:
• Providing individual therapy to clients with psychosis.
• Integrating a range of psychological models to formulate client’s complex 
difficulties.
• Carrying out extensive risk assessments using various tools including HCR-20, 
SVR-20 and PCL-R
• Assessing clients needs on admission to the hospital
• Cognitive assessments of clients with psychosis and personality disorder.
• Personality Disorder Assessment
• Involvement in setting up a Mentalisation Based Therapy Group
• Attending training on implementing the Recovery model in secure settings.
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Brief psychodynamic work within a primary care setting with a 
woman experiencing low mood and stress due to problems at
home and health anxieties.
Case Report One
April 2008 
Year 1
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This is a report of brief psychodynamic therapy with Adowa, a 55 year old female 
nurse from Ghana presenting with low mood and health anxieties. The therapy was 
conducted in a GP’s surgery as part of the Psychology in Primary Care service.
Adowa was married with three children -  a 12 year old son and two grown up 
daughters. She described her marriage as having broken down many years ago due to 
unacceptable behaviour by her husband and her children as disrespectful, particularly 
her son. She had one sister and her upbringing was split between Ghana and the UK. 
She described good attachment relationships with both her parents but said home life 
had been difficult as her father was emotionally abusive to her mother and had 
numerous affairs, eventually leaving her mother for a girl Adowa’s age. Adowa’s 
mother had suffered with depression and ill health and died of a heart attack when 
Adowa was 16.
The therapy initially focused on her hypothesised repressed anger at all the injustices 
she had endured and the way she was treated by her son. The focus switched mid way 
through to Adowa’s difficulty in accepting help from people and her feelings that she 
is the only person that could be relied on.
All measures showed an improvement. Adowa reported feeling happier and more 
assertive and better able to put herself first, and said her relationship with her son had 
improved.
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Cognitive Behaviour Therapy work within a primary care setting 
with a young woman with generalised anxiety, panic symptoms,
and a nose picking phobia
Case Report Two
September 2008
Year 1
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This is a report Cognitive Behaviour Therapy with Saana, a 26 year old female from 
Saudi Arabia presenting with generalised anxiety, features of panic and a nose picking 
phobia.
Saana moved to the UK in after marrying a British man she had met at university. She 
first started experiencing panic attacks in Saudi Arabia while she was at university, 
shortly after her father had died. Each time she had a panic attack in Saudi Arabia she 
was rushed to hospital and administered sedatives intravenously. She stopped 
experiencing panic attacks around the time she met her husband but described still 
feeling feature of panic which she controlled by walking with her husband.
Work initially began by applying cognitive behavioural techniques to her general 
anxiety. However it soon became apparent that what was driving her anxiety and 
feelings that she was unable to cope if she saw anybody pick their nose was a core 
belief the T am not normal’. This had developed in childhood from her ideas about 
being bom to her parents who were first cousins and comparisons of her and her elder 
sister, and become reinforced by the reaction to her panic attacks. Various techniques 
were applied to tackle this belief and by the end of therapy Saana held the belief 
‘Nobody is normal and I am no more abnormal than anyone else’. Once she had 
modified her belief little work was needed in order for her anxiety and nose picking 
phobia to reduce significantly.
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An extended psychometric assessment to determine the level 
of support needed for a man in his forties with learning 
disabilities to live independently of his parents
Case Report 3
April 2009 
Year 2
91
This is a report of an extended assessment with James, a man in his forties with 
moderate learning disabilities. The purpose of the assessment was to determine the 
level of support he would need to live independently. Although there was no 
immediate need for him to move, his parents were in their seventies and a recent 
health scare had prompted them to start making him arrangements for him to move so 
they could support him through the transition.
An adaptive functioning assessment suggested James would need to live in fully 
supported accommodation. Despite being rated as fully independent in most areas of 
self care and domestic abilities, James was found to have little or no independence in 
many areas of community living such as handling money, orientation and time. It was 
also found that despite having the ability to do many things for himself, James did not 
initiate undertaking these tasks and needed constant prompting.
An assessment of his intellectual functioning showed James level of intellectual 
functioning to be lower than expected. It was concluded that the support and 
‘scaffolding’ he had received from his parents and keyworker along with his inclusion 
in the local community had allowed him to function at the peak of his abilities and 
develop good social skills, masking the extent of his learning disabilities.
Recommendations based on these findings were made to social services regarding the 
kind of accommodation and level of support that would be necessary for James’s 
optimal functioning.
92
Neuropsychological Assessment with a 76 year old 
presenting with reported memory difficulties.
Case Report Five
April 2010 
Year 3
This is a report of work with Mr Bright, a 76 year old man referred for memory 
difficulties. Mr Bright himself felt he had no difficulties with his memory, but his 
daughter was worried that he had become more forgetful recently.
Within the year before the assessment Mr Bright had moved from a large flat quite 
distant from his daughter to a small bedsit close to his daughter. Mr Bright kept 
himself busy and had a lively and energetic social life. Mr Bright presented as 
slightly disinhibited talking openly about matters of a personal nature and being 
mildly flirtatious. Later discussions with his daughter however suggested that he 
was likely to have also been quite open in this way.
Assessment of Mr Bright’s general intellectual functioning, his memory 
functioning and his executive functioning suggested that Mr Bright was likely to 
be functioning within the expected range for someone of his age with his 
premorbid level of intelligence, and that there was unlikely to be any form of 
dementia present.
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Oral Presentation of Clinical Activity
Case Report Four
September 2009
Year 2
Summary of Oral Case Report Information 
Presenting Problem, history and development
David was referred to the service due to problems with his eating. Following an 
incident early 2008 when he almost choked on some bacon, David began restricting 
his diet to a small variety of foods he felt posed the least risk of choking, eating very 
slowly and finding it difficult to finish a meal.
Family Background
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Colin David Kemy 
(Aspergers 
diagnosis)
David’s older brother Colin has a diagnosis of Aspergers Syndrome. The family has 
been engaged in family therapy to address challenges presented by Colin’s behaviour 
since June 2007. David and Colin have a very rivalirous relationship. David 
describes feeling resentful that Colin receives differential treatment to him despite 
saying he understands why this occurs. Tommy and Vicky recognise that a 
disproportionate amount of their attention is devoted to Colin and that David has a 
number of extra responsibilities than other boys his age due to Colin (e.g. walking 
Colin to school.)
Both Tommy and Vicky described themselves as coming from working class 
backgrounds and spoke of how they were striving to give their children opportunities 
they did not have. There is no history of mental health problems within either family 
although both described their fathers as having alcohol problems in the past. Tommy 
described his father as a worrier. Vicky said her side of the family was ‘chilled out’.
Developmental and Personal history
David’s birth was described as normal and he reached all developmental milestones at 
the appropriate age. Vicky reported that he was always close to her but was not clingy
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and there were no problems with separation when he went to nursery or school. He 
had a period between the ages of 5 and 6 when he experienced frequent bad dreams 
and night terrors and could not sleep without the light on. David said he now has no 
trouble sleeping although Vicky said he does still like the landing light on. Vicky 
described David as being a bit of a worrier although David himself denied this.
David is doing well at school and he is in the top sets for Maths, Science and French. 
PE is his favourite subject while English is his least. He likes school though feels he 
gets too much homework. David is very sporty and is particularly good at football. 
David has a large group of friends he has known since primary school.
Impact of the Problem
David’s eating has a significant impact on the family. Tommy described mealtimes as 
always having been like World War III due to Colin’s behaviour and said David’s 
eating compounds this. David often takes up to 90 minutes to finish half a meal which 
angers Colin as he then has to wait for his after dinner treat. Sometimes David is 
allowed to leave the table early without eating much but then often becomes hungry 
later in the evening and Vicky will prepare a snack or reheat his leftovers. The foods 
David finds it easy to eat are foods Colin dislikes so Vicky prepares multiple meals.
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ABSTRACT
Title
An evaluation of the ethnicity of referrals to a specialist psychotherapy service and a 
primary care psychology service and a comparison of the pathways for Asian, Black 
and White clients.
Rationale
Research suggests inequalities between the treatment of different ethnic groups in 
mental health services. The Department of Health has published a number of 
documents aimed at addressing ethnic inequalities in mental health and in response the 
trust produced a Race Equality scheme. Therefore an evaluation of referrals based on 
ethnicity builds on previous research and is in line with trust policy.
Aims
1) To obtain the ethnicity of referrals to the Psychotherapy Service and the 
Primary Care Service psychology service and determine if this reflects the 
population served.
2) To determine if ethnicity is a factor influencing whether people opt in to the 
services and their pathways thereafter.
3) To determine if ethnicity is a factor associated with the duration of therapy and 
the severity of referrals
Method
The study is a process focus service evaluation done by retrospective analysis of 
departmental service records.
Results
Compared to local population estimates Black and Asian referrals were slightly lower 
than expected for the specialist service and Black referrals were slightly higher than 
expected for the primary care service.
No association was found between ethnicity and pathway through either service.
Black clients rated themselves as more severe than white clients on referral to the 
primary care service.
Discussion
Implications for the services and limitations of the study are discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Background and Rationale
Following the Race Relations Amendment Act (Commission for Racial Equality, 
2002), the Department of Health (DH) published Inside Outside which highlights the 
need for a national strategy addressing the mental health needs of black and minority 
ethnic (BME) groups in the UK (DH. 2003). Delivering Race Equality in Mental 
Health Care (DH, 2005) is a 5 year action plan for addressing ethnic inequalities in 
mental health. A key part of this plan is improving the monitoring of ethnicity in all 
areas of service delivery, which has previously been far from adequate (Aspinal, 
2006).
In a systematic review of ethnic variations in pathways to and use of specialist mental 
health services in the UK, Bui et al (2003) found data to suggest that Black people are 
overrepresented among in-patients, and that Asian patients use in-patient facilities less 
often than White patients. This finding is supported by the one day 'Count me in' 
census carried out by the Healthcare Commission in 2005. The survey of 32 023 
inpatients on mental health wards in 238 NHS and private healthcare hospitals 
reported 21% of patients were from BME groups, although they represent only 7% of 
the population. Rates of admission were lower than average in the white British, 
Indian, and Chinese groups, but three or more times higher than average in black 
African, black Caribbean, and white and black Caribbean mixed groups (Healthcare 
Commission, 2005).
Bhui et al (2003) also found some evidence of variations in pathways to specialist 
mental health care, with Black people having more complex pathways. They believe 
the ethnic differences could be explained by variations in primary care assessments or 
primary care involvement but state since the literature in this area is sparse no firm 
conclusions can be drawn.
Patients from BME groups are frequently cited as being more likely than white 
patients to be prescribed drugs and electroconvulsive therapy rather than talking
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treatments (Raleigh et al., 2007) One study showed that people of Caribbean origin 
with psychosis were less likely to receive psychotherapy and be treated for depression 
(McKenzie et al, 2001). Lawson & Guite (2005) found despite 23% of the population 
of Greenwich coming from a BME group, only 15% of the client group for the 
primary care counseling service were from BME groups, although BME groups made 
up 47% of private sector clients and 40% of voluntary sector clients. However, this 
again is an under researched area. There are a number of studies which have found 
differences in perceptions of psychological problems (Gonzalez et al 2005, Yeh et al 
2005) and attitudes to seeking help (Ayalon & Young 2005, Lawrence et al 2006) 
between ethnic groups.
An evaluation of the ethnic breakdown of referrals to the trusts specialist 
Psychotherapy service and Psychological Therapies in Primary Care (PTIPC) service, 
and a comparison of the pathway from referral to therapy or discharge for different 
ethnic groups therefore addresses gaps in the literature outlined above. Moreover the 
Trusts Race Equality Scheme in 2002, 2006 sets out the Trusts commitment to ensure 
BME groups have equal access to therapies, with one of the key objectives outlined 
being to improve monitoring of ethnicity. Therefore it is in line with trust policy and 
important to both services for an evaluation based on ethnicity to be conducted.
Study Aims
1) To evaluate the ethnicity of referrals to the Psychotherapy Service and the 
PTiPC service for the period 1st April 2007 -  31st March 20081 and determine 
if this reflects the ethnic breakdown of the population served.
2) To determine if ethnicity could be a factor influencing whether 
clients/patients2 opt in to the services and their pathways thereafter.
3) For PTIPC to see if ethnicity is a factor associated with the duration of 
therapy.3
1 This period was chosen for two reasons a) The Psychotherapy department went live on the new trust 
wide database so data on ethnicity is more likely to be available b) The PTiPC service reporting cycle 
is 1st April -  3 1st March so records are updated.
2 The Psychotherapy department refers to their caseload as patients while the PTIPC use the term 
clients. I will therefore use the term patients when writing about the Psychotherapy department and 
clients while writing about the PTiPC. When writing generally I will use clients as it is the more 
widely used term.
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4) For PTiPC to see if there is any difference in severity of referrals between 
ethnic groups4
3 It wasn’t feasible to do this for the psychotherapy department with the available data since both the 
time on the waiting list and the duration o f  therapy often exceed 12 months
4 Psychotherapy is a specialist service so all referrals are severe.
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METHOD
Design
This study is a process focussed service evaluation -  that is it aims to evaluate service 
delivery rather than the structure or the outcomes (Barker et al, 2002). Barker et al 
(2002) distinguish two main targets of monitoring delivery: coverage or 
implementation. This study mainly looked at coverage and was done by analysis of 
service records. Some analysis of implementation in terms of duration of therapy was 
done for PTiPC.
Measures
The ethnic breakdown of the population served is taken from the latest estimate from 
the Office of National Statistics (ONS) which puts the Asian group at 9% and the 
Black group at 10%. Severity of referrals in PTIPC are measured using the self report 
General Health Questionnaire (GHQ) (Appendix 1) and the clinician rated Global 
Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAP) (Appendix 2).
Settings
Psychotherapy Department
This is a specialist department taking referrals from internal and external agencies 
throughout the borough. When someone is referred to the service, if considered an 
appropriate referral, they are sent an opt-in questionnaire (Appendix 3). If they return 
this they are then sent a letter inviting them to contact the service to arrange an 
assessment appointment (Appendix 4). After completing assessment patients are 
either offered a place on the waiting list or discharged.
PTiPC
PTiPC provides individual psychological therapy for adults in the borough with mild 
to moderate common mental health problems. The service is structured so that each 
GP practice is assigned a named therapist to whom the GPs refer clients directly. If 
the clients return the opt in form then the therapist attached to their GP practice will
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conduct the initial assessment, and if the client is considered appropriate for therapy in 
primary care that therapist will also provide the therapy within their preferred model. 
Exceptions to this would be if the preferred therapy model of the therapist is not 
considered suitable for the client, or the client expresses a preference for a different 
model of therapy in which case they will be offered therapy at another GP practice in 
the borough. If not considered suitable for therapy in primary care they are referred 
elsewhere or discharged back to the GP (see fig 1 for Ecomap).
PtiPC
Service
CMHT
Specialist Services (e.g. 
family therapy, 
psychotherapy, addictions) 
Social Services
GP Practice GP Practice GP Practice GP PracticerP Practice GP Practice GP Practice GP Practice
CAT
Therapist
CBT
Therapist
CBT
Therapist
Figure 1. Eco-map showing structure ofPTiPC. Arrow denotes possible patient referral pathways.
Service Records
Psychotherapy
The department logs all new referrals on an excel database. This database is used to 
track when questionnaires and contact letters are sent and returned, who will carry out 
assessments and when they are due to take place. Ethnicity is not recorded at this 
stage. After patients have been assessed their details are transferred on to the trust 
wide database which prompts for ethnicity.
PTiPC
Referrals are initially sent to therapists. Each week therapists must return a contact 
sheet which details client activity that week. (Appendix 5). Data from these sheets are 
collated to form the service records.
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Procedure
Psychotherapy
Firstly the ethnicity was obtained for as many patients as possible. For patients who 
had been referred from within the mental health trust this information was obtained by 
accessing their record from the trust database. For patients referred form primary care 
their GP surgery was telephoned and their ethnicity requested. Data were coded and 
sorted into inappropriate referral, opt-in questionnaire not returned, assessment 
arranged, assessment completed and therapy offered. This data was then analysed in 
excel and SPSS.
PTiPC
PTiPC does not assign any code to clients or record any personal identifiers it is 
impossible to track individual clients through the service. However it was assumed 
that clients would only be discharged or referred on once so records coded as being 
discharged or referred on were extracted and analysed in excel and SPSS. A 
discharge on session 0 was assumed to mean clients did not return their opt-in 
questionnaire.
GHQ and GAF scores were analysed when they were available for session 1 or 2 only 
as it was not possible to tell if scores included later than this were initial scores. Due 
to the lack of coding system outcomes could not be evaluated.
Ethical and Professional Considerations
Since this was a service evaluation ethical approval was not required. All data was 
password protected and any personal identifiers removed.
Ethnic Categories
Due to numbers different ethnic classifications, groupings were collapsed to give three 
broad categories -  Asian, Black and White (see appendix 6 for what is included in 
each category)
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RESULTS
Psychotherapy
A im  1
Ethnic Breakdown of Referrals to 
P sychotherapy serv ice  April 2007 - 
March 2008
0).Q
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Figure 1 -  Bar chart showing ethnicity o f referrals to the Psychotherapy service
Figure 1 shows a total o f 242 patients were referred to the Psychotherapy service 
during the evaluation period. The largest ethnic group was White accounting for 64%, 
followed by Black at 7%, Asian at 6% and other at 5%. The ethnicity o f 17% of 
referrals is unknown. Excluding the unknowns the percentage o f patients referred to 
psychotherapy o f Black and Asian ethnicity at 9% and 7% are slightly lower than the 
ONS estimates of 10% and 9% respectively.
A im  2
Table 1 -  The ethnic breakdown o f patients lost at each stage o f the referral pathway 
into the service.
Ethnicity Unsuitable
referral
Opt-in Q not 
returned
Initial Assmt 
not attended
Assmt not 
com pleted
Therapy not 
offered
Asian 0 0% 2 14% 0 0% 1 7% 1 7%
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Black 1 6% 5 10% 2 11% 2 11% 0 0%
Other 0 0% 1 8% 2 15% 1 8% 1 8%
White 6 4% 32 21% 13 8% 11 7% 3 2%
A 2 x 2 Chi2 was carried out to discover whether there was a significant relationship 
between ethnicity and whether patients are offered an assessment for therapy. Asian, 
Black and White patients were grouped together to give two ethnic categories -  white 
and BME, unknowns were excluded. The Chi2 value o f 0.701 had an associated 
probability value o f 0.401, DF — 1 suggesting no association between ethnicity and 
whether patients are offered an assessment for therapy. The number o f patients from 
the BME group not completing the assessment once offered was too small for any 
statistical analysis to be done, as was the number o f patients from all groups not 
offered therapy.
PTiPC
A im  1
Graph S h ow ing  the Ethnic 
Breakdown of referrals to the PTiPC 
April 2007 - March 2008
Asian Black Unknown White 
Ethnicity
Figure 2 -  Bar chart showing ethnicity o f referrals to the PTiPC service
Figure 2 shows a total o f 2096 clients were referred to the PTiPC service during the 
evaluation period. The largest ethnic group was White accounting for 53%, followed
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by Black at 8% and Asian at 6%. The ethnicity of 33% of referrals is unknown. 
Excluding the unknowns the percentage of Asian referrals at 9% is what is expected 
from the ONS statistics while the Black referrals at 12.4% are a bit higher than 
expected.
Aim 2
Table 2 -  Client ethnicity by session of discharge
Session of 
discharge
Asian Black White Unknown
0 (No opt-in) 14 11.0% 19 10.9% 137 12.4% 526 76.2%
1 30 23.6% 31 17.8% 259 23.4% 132 19.1%
2-6 44 34.6% 61 35.1% 306 27.7% 21 3.0%
6+ 39 30.7% 63 36.2% 403 36.5% 11 1.6%
A 2 x 4 Chi2 was carried out to discover whether there was a significant relationship 
between ethnicity and session at which clients were discharged. Asian and Black and 
patients were grouped together to give two ethnic categories -  white and BME. 
Clients whose ethnicity was unknown were excluded. The Chi2 value of 6.074 had an 
associated probability value of 0.108, DF = 3 suggesting there is no association 
between ethnicity and session at which clients are discharged.
Aim 3
Table 3 -  Ethnicity by mean number of sessions completed
Ethnicity Mean Number of Sessions
Asian 5.9
Black 6.7
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White 6.1
A Kruskal-Waliis test was performed on the data in Table 3 as assumptions for 
ANOVA had been violated. Number of sessions completed was not found to differ 
significantly between ethnic groups (H(2) =1.158, p=.560).
Aim 4
Table 4 - GAF and GHQ scores on referral
Ethnicity Mean GHQ score Mean GAF score
Asian 8.4 6.8
Black 8.5 6.7
White 7.8 6.7
A Kruskal-Wallis test was performed on the data in table 4 as assumptions for 
ANOVA had been violated. GHQ scores were significantly affected by ethnic group 
(H(2) = 7.504, p=.023), while there was no association found between ethnic group 
and GAF score (H(2) = 1.363, p=.506). Mann-Whitney tests were used to follow up 
the significant finding. A Bonferroni correction was used so effects are reported at a
0.0167 level of significance. Comparison between the Black and Asian groups, and 
Asian and White groups did not show any significant results. A result approaching 
significance was found between the Black and White groups, but the effect size 
extremely small U=71,905, p=.02, r=-.O7.
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DISCUSSION
Psychotherapy
Analysis and limitations o f findings
The percentage of Black and Asian clients referred to psychotherapy was found to be 
slightly lower than expected for the local population. This apparent disparity should 
be interpreted cautiously for two reasons. Firstly the ONS local population 
percentages are a projected estimate for 2005 based on the 2001 census, using a yet to 
be validated methodology so the actual figure for 2007 could be somewhat different. 
Secondly with the ethnicity of 17% of referrals unknown the accuracy of the ethnic 
breakdown of referrals is also questionable.
Once referred to the service the ethnicity of patients does not seem to have any 
bearing on a) if the referral is considered appropriate, b) if patients return their opt-in 
questionnaire, c) if people respond to attend appointment, d) if patients are assessed, 
e) if patients are offered therapy.
Recommendations
Currently ethnicity of patients is only recorded once people have returned their opt-in 
questionnaire and been offered an assessment. This means not only that ethnicity of 
referrals and those not opting in cannot be routinely monitored, but also the possibility 
of obtaining ethnicity data is much reduced. Therefore my main recommendation is 
that ethnicity should be requested and recorded at point of referral.
Although far from conclusive the data suggests that BME groups may be slightly 
under represented in referrals to the department. Considering this along with the 
previous research outlined which suggests BME groups are less likely to be offered 
talking therapy some promotional work with referrers may be useful.
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Feeding findings and Recommendations back to the service 
I have had an informal conversation with the ethnicity lead for the psychotherapy
department and I will the complete report to the departmental business meeting on
September 9th 2008.
PTiPC
Analysis and limitations o f Findings
Based on the ONS statistics referrals from the Black group are a little higher than one 
would expect. However, as for psychotherapy this result should be interpreted with 
caution due to the ONS data and the ethnicity of a third of referrals to the service 
being unknown. Of the clients with unknown ethnicity 76% did not opt-in to the 
service and 19% were seen only once.
Although from the data available ethnicity does not appear to be a factor as to whether 
people opt in to the service or not I am reluctant to draw any conclusions on this since 
the ethnicity of 75% of clients not returning opt in questionnaires is unknown. The 
results from the psychotherapy service would suggest that ethnicity is not a factor, as 
would a recent survey by the graduate mental health workers which finds the main 
reasons given for clients not returning the opt in questionnaire were not receiving it 
and changes in circumstance or priorities (internal survey by graduate mental health 
workers).
Once people have been seen by the service the number of clients for whom ethnicity is 
unknown falls to 12%, with this falling further to 3% for clients seen more than once, 
so more confident conclusions can be drawn. There was no significant association 
found between ethnicity and whether therapy was offered, point of discharge or mean 
number of sessions completed.
While the therapist rated GAF scores were not significantly different between ethnic 
groups, the self report GHQ scores were slightly higher in the Black and Asian groups 
than the white group, the difference between black and white being almost statistically 
significant. This could be because clients from the Black group are more severe, 
although this is not reflected in the GAF scores, or it could reflect differences in the
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way different groups view their own difficulties, which fits in with previous findings 
(Gonzalez et al 2005, Yeh et al 2005, Ayalon & Young 2005, Lawrence et al 2006). 
However the effect size was extremely so this result should again be taken with 
caution.
Recommendations
My first recommendation is aimed at improving the ethnicity data at point of referral. 
This could be done by adding a tick box to the referral form that includes ethnicity and 
potentially not accepting referrals without this information. The majority of referrals 
come from GP’s who have a governmental target to record the ethnicity of 95% of 
clients so this information should be available.
My second recommendation is to introduce a coding system so that individual clients 
to be tracked through the service. This would enable more detailed analysis to be 
done.
Feeding findings and Recommendations back to the service 
I have had an informal conversation with the Head of Department and I will feedback
the complete report to the departmental business meeting on September 16th 2008. 
Other related areas to be investigated
It was not feasible within either service to look at the impact of ethnicity on drop outs 
or outcomes as in psychotherapy waiting lists and duration of therapy both frequently 
exceed the 12 month period under investigation, and in PTiPC clients are not 
individually coded.
Research also shows patients express a preference for a therapist of a similar ethnicity 
to them (Coleman et al 1995) although Dunkle and Friedlander (1996) found clients 
rated ethnicity of therapist as less important than factors such as age, gender and level
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of experience. Therefore future evaluations of the services could look at whether 
ethnic matching of therapists and clients has an effect on drop outs or outcome.
Overall Limitations
I have already outlined various limitations above but I believe there is a more 
fundamental limitation to this research. Due to numbers I have analysed ethnicity 
using three broad categories -  Asian, Black and White. Ethnic categorization of this 
kind not only places people of very different ethnic groups under the same umbrella, it 
also fails to inform us of many important factors related to ethnicity such as migrant 
status and whether the individual is of first or second generation descent. Therefore 
the finding that ethnicity does not appear to be a factor in either service could be 
because these broad categories do not allow for full enough investigation of what 
these categories subsume, and hence be masking issues that do need addressing.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Global Assessment of Functioning Scale
The Genera] Health Questionnaire
::V/e :sboWd'M  ^ had any medical rompiaints and how ywr health hns teen
la geoeraî, over the last fa* ■weeks. Please answer ALL the questions sunpiy by underlining the 
answer which you think oost early applies to you. Remember that wc want to know about 
prcscot and rcccm: complaints, tsot those that yon bad ia the past.
It is important that you try to answer AIL the questions.
Thank you very moch for your oopcraxioa
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APPENDEX
GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF FUNCTIONiNG SCALE (GAF)
level DESCRiFTTON EXAMPLE
9
Superior
Absent or minimai symptoms 
Good functioning in all areas 
i.e. occupational, social and 
leisure time
A woman who is enjoying her 
work, has good relationships 
and enjoys a range of 
hobbies
8
>
* Very Good
Transient symptoms relating 
to psychosocial stressors. 
Only slight impairment in 
functioning i.e. occupational 
social and leisure time
A man who finds it difficult to 
concentrate after a family 
argument with a slight reduction 
in his work performance
7
Good
Some mild symptoms GR • 
Some difficulties in social, 
occupational functioning but 
generally functioning well, 
has meaningful interpersonal 
relationships
A man with depressed mood or 
insomnia, who feels he is not 
performing up to his capabilities 
at work but finds his relationship 
satisfying
6
Fair
Moderate symptoms OR 
moderate difficulty in social or 
occupational functioning
A woman with frequent panic 
attacks Or who has few friends or 
who has frequent arguments with 
work colleagues
5
Poor
Serious symptoms OR serious 
impairment in social or 
occupational functioning
A woman with suicidal ideation 
or severe obsessional rituals OR 
who has no friends or is unable to 
keep a job
4
Very Poor
Some impairment in reality testing 
or communication OR major 
impairment in several areas Le. 
work, family relations, judgement 
thinking or mood
A man whose speech is at times 
illogical, obscure or irrelevant OR 
who is markedly depressed, 
avoids friends, neglects his family 
and is unable to work
3
Marked
Impairment
Behaviour is considerably 
influenced by delusions, 
hallucination Or serious impairment 
in communication or judgement OR 
inability to function in almost all 
areas
A woman who acts grossly 
inappropriately, has suicidal 
preoccupation OR with no job. 
friends or home
Pig-. ' '
Extreme 
- Impairment
Some danger of hurting self or 
others OR occasionally fails to 
maintain minimal personal hygiene 
Or cross impairment in 
communication
A woman who makes suicide 
attempts without dear expectation 
of death or who has manic 
OR who smears faeces OR is mute
'
1 ‘"ramirM
Persistent danger of severely 
hurting self or others OR 
cersistent inability to maintain 
minimal personal hygveno OR
An elderly man who is persistently 
violent OR cannot maintain any 
personal hygiene and is usually 
inocherent
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Appendix 3 -  Psychotherapy Opt in Questionnaire
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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
OUT OF HOURS CRISIS LINE: 0800 
(Between 5:00pm-9:00am Mon-Fri and all Weekend)
Tel:
PRIVA TE & CONFIDENTIAL Fax:
Date Typed: 
(Date Dictated: ) 
Our Ref:
Dear
You have been referred to our department for an assessment for psychotherapy.
Enclosed is a registration form and questionnaire, which we would ask you to 
complete as best as you can. We appreciate that there may be some questions you 
feel you would rather not answer, if so, please leave them blank. All information 
given is treated as confidential.
Please return the questionnaire to the Department of Psychotherapy in the enclosed 
envelope within two weeks. When we receive your questionnaire, we will write to 
offer you an assessment appointment. If you do not return the questionnaire within 
the two weeks, we will take it that you no longer want to be seen and we will 
discharge you from the clinic.
We regret that our service cannot see people in emergencies. The process 
from initial referral and first assessment appointment to being taken on for 
treatment will be a few months. If you need support during this time, please 
ask your GP to refer you to your local catchment area psychiatrist or to a 
specialist at the practice.
Yours sincerely
Team Secretary 
Department of Psychotherapy
Ce: Referrer 
Enel: Questionnaire
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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY
In order that your registration form may be processed before your attendance, it is 
essential that all sections are completed accurately and the form returned as soon as 
possible.
PLEASE COMPLETE IN BLOCK CAPITALS
SURNAME
Mr
Mrs
Miss
Ms
FORENAMES
MAIDEN NAME OR PREVIOUS NAME MALE
FEMALE
MARRIED
SINGLE
WIDOWED
SEPARATED
ADDRESS IN FULL TELEPHONE NO
WORK..................
HOME..................
OCCUPATION........................................
RELIGION..............................................
DATE OF BIRTH
COUNTRY OF
BIRTH.....................................................
AGE.....................
GP NAME & ADDRESS NEXT OF KIN 
RELATIONSHIP
GP TELEPHONE NO.
ADDRESS/TEL
Have you previously attended 
Or any of the following hospital?
Please state name of doctor who saw you, 
if known:
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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 
This form is designed to enable you to record some preliminary information which is 
relevant to your application for treatment. The information you give will be helpful in 
understanding your present difficulties. Please fill in as much as you can.
NAME............................................................................................. DOB..................
ADDRESS................................................................................................................
TELEPHONE N O   ................................................................................................
DATE........................................................................................
1. It will help in understanding your present difficulties to know something of your 
earlier experiences.
PLEASE GIVE THE FOLLOWING DETAILS:
Age If not now living, 
Your own age when 
He/she died
Occupation, current 
or previous
Father
Mother
Brothers & sisters & 
yourself, in order of 
age (please include 
Step and half 
siblings)
Children Age School
(if appropriate)
Name of GP 
(if different from 
your own)
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Any other important people in your life? e.g. grandmother
Could you tell us something about your childhood -  please mention any changes or 
separations you experienced.
2 Give a brief summary of your schooling and any later education, including part- 
time or evening classes.
Age
From
To
Kind of school or 
Institution
Subject & activities 
preferred
Standard or exams 
taken
Please try to recall:
a. The things you like best about your school days
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b. The things you liked least about your school days
c. How you got on with other children and with the teachers
3. What is your present employment?
Please give some ideas of your responsibilities in it and prospects for the future.
Give a brief summary of your previous employment since leaving school.
Age
From To
Employment Reasons for leaving or any 
other comments
Please mention any particular satisfaction or difficulties you have experienced in your 
work life.
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4. Please comment on your physical health in general. Have you had any serious 
illnesses or accidents at any time in your life?
5. Are you:
single/married/cohabiting/divorced/widowed?......................................
If you are married/cohabiting, please state:
For how long................................no. of children..............  age of partner,
Occupation of partner...........................................................
If separated, divorced or widowed, please state when..............................
a. Do you experience any unhappiness in your home or family life?
b. Do you have any particular difficulties with intimate/sexual relationships?
c. In what ways do your difficulties affect your life generally at the present time?
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6. What aspects of your life give you satisfaction?
7. Have you had any psychotherapy/counselling before? Please give details (when, 
where, with whom?, and any comments.
8. Have you had any psychiatric treatment/antidepressants? Please give details.
9. In what ways do you expect treatment to help you?
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The Trust needs to know the ethnic group, religion and first language, if not 
English, of patients for the purpose of planning. This is to make sure that all 
sectors of the community have equal access to the services provided. Ethnic 
group describes how you see yourself, and is a mixture of culture, religion, 
skin colour, language, the origins of yourself or your family. It is not the same 
as nationality. The information will be treated in the strictest confidence and is 
to be used only by National Health Service staff. It will not be passed on to 
other agencies, or used for any other purpose.
1. Please indicate with a tick the ethnic group to which you feel you belong.
White
British 
Irish
Any other White background 
Mixed
White and Black Caribbean 
White and Black African 
White and Asian 
Any other mixed background
Asian or Asian British Not Stated
Black
Caribbean
African
Any other Black background 
Other Ethnic Groups 
Chinese
Any other ethnic group
Indian
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Any other Asian background 
What is your faith or religion, if any?
Christian
Baptist
Church of England 
Church of Scotland 
Free Church 
Greek Orthodox 
Methodist 
Moravian 
Pentecostal 
Catholic
Salvation Armyist 
United Reformed 
Other Christian Religions
Other Religions
Buddhist
Hindu
Jehovah’s Witness 
Jewish
Moslem/Muslim/Islam
Quakers
Rastafarian
Sikh
Other
Atheist
Agnostic
None
Not stated
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Appendix 4 -  Psychotherapy Assessment Confirmation letter
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DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY 
OUT OF HOURS CRISIS LINE: 0800 
(Between 5:00pm-9:00am Mon-Fri and all Weekend)
Tel:
PRIVA TE & CONFIDENTIAL Fax:
Date : 
Our Ref :
Dear
Thank you for returning your questionnaire and registration form.
I write to confirm that we are able to offer you an appointment as follows:-
Date of Appointment:
Time of Appointment:
Appointment With:
If you would prefer to arrange an alternative appointment please contact us on 020
This appointment is for new patients, and will help us to see whether therapy from this 
Department could be helpful. If therapy is offered, it will be with a different therapist and at a 
time to be agreed with you at the outset of treatment.
Your appointment will be held in the Department of Psychotherapy, based on the ground floor 
of xxxxx on the xxxx Hospital site. In order to enter the department, please come to the side 
entrance of xxxx House (opposite the entrance from xxxxx Road), and press the buzzer 
marked ‘Psychotherapy’. When you enter the building, please turn immediately left and inform 
the Psychotherapy secretary that you have arrived. Please bring this letter to your 
appointment.
Please contact the Department within 5 working days upon receipt of this letter to 
confirm vour attendance.
If we do not hear from you within this time we will assume that you no longer wish to 
pursue psychotherapy at this time and will discharge you from our Department.
Kind regards,
Yours sincerely
Office Manager 
Department of Psychotherapy
c.c GP and/or Referrer
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Appendix 6 -  PTiPC contact sheet and codes of data
recorded
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Appendix 7 -  Ethnic Category Contents
Asian
Includes: Asian Indian, Asian Pakistani, Asian Bangladeshi, Asian Other, Asian 
Chinese and Mixed White and Asian.
Black
Includes: Black African, Black Caribbean, Black Other, Mixed White and Black 
African and Mixed White and Black Caribbean, Mixed White and Black other.
White
Includes: White British, White Irish and White other.
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Confirmation that findings of SRRP have been presented to 
services involved
From: Golynkina, Katya [katya.golynkina@swlstg-tr.nhs.uk]
Sent: 18 September 2008 10:49 
To: Smith GL Miss (PG/R - Psychology)
Subject: RE: SRRP
Thank you, Gina. I will not be including anything for Primary Care, it's just for my information. 
But I will let you know if I use your data for the dept's Governance Group report. I can confirm 
that you have presented the findings of your SRRP report to both services involved.
best wishes
Katya
141
Major Research Project Report
An exploratory study looking at the way people with Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder conceptualise self and significant others
By 
Gina Smith
Research Supervisor: Dr Laura Simonds
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey
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ABSTRACT
Background and Rationale
Recently researchers have been looking at a possible link between an ambivalent self- 
concept and OCD. Although there are some encouraging results and interesting 
theories emerging form this work, it is in its early stages. Self-concept is related to 
concept of others but there is very little research on the way people with OCD 
conceptualise significant others. Therefore this study set out to explore the 
conceptualisation of self and significant others in people with OCD.
Method
This study used a multiple sorting procedure. Participants were asked to sorts cards 
with the names of their friends, their family, and descriptions of different self­
constructs into groups based on aspects of character or personality. Their descriptions 
of their sorts were content analysed and the relative positioning of different cards was 
analysed using multiple scalogram analysis.
Results
There was little difference between people with OCD and people without OCD on the 
categories they decided to sort on. Contrary to expectation there was also no 
difference in the way people with OCD and people without OCD saw their feared self 
in relation to their actual self. However there did appear to be a conflict between the 
ideal self and the ought self in people with OCD that was not evident in people 
without OCD. One or both parents in OCD tended to be associated with the ought self 
when there was a conflict between ideal and ought self. There appeared to be little 
difference in the way people with and people without OCD conceptualise others.
Discussion
These results are discussed in relation to previous work with further explanatory 
theories put forward. Implications for treatment and future work are also discussed.
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INTRODUCTION
Research Aims
The main aims of this research study are to explore the conceptualisation of self and 
significant others in people with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD).
Rationale
Cognitive Behavioural therapy (CBT) is currently recommended by the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2005) as the frontline treatment 
for OCD and there is good empirical evidence of its effectiveness in relieving OCD 
symptoms. However full remission is unusual and relapse rates are high (Eisen, 
1999). Moreover while the cognitive model of OCD offers a good description of the 
mechanisms underpinning OCD symptomatology it does not offer a fully developed 
account as to the etiology. In an attempt to address this several researchers (e.g. 
Ferrier & Brewin 2005, Bhar & Kyrios 2007) have recently been focusing on self- 
concept in people with OCD and some interesting hypotheses concerning possible 
etiologies of OCD have emerged. While this line of inquiry is promising, it is in its 
early stages and there is little empirical evidence. Therefore the primary aim of this 
study is to explore some of the emerging hypotheses concerning self-concept in 
people with OCD.
To my knowledge there is no research which focuses on the way people with OCD 
conceptualise others, an important gap which needs addressing. Many of the 
obsessive thoughts of people with OCD implicitly or directly involve the possibility of 
harm coming to others while magical thinking and many compulsions are focused 
around protecting others. Therefore knowledge of how people with OCD 
conceptualise significant others promises to further our understanding of the function 
and meaning of obsessions and compulsions, their maintenance and treatment.
Furthermore if the way people with OCD conceptualise themselves is different to the 
way people without OCD conceptualise themselves, then theories on the way self- 
concept develops would suggest that conceptualisation of significant others may also 
differ between people with OCD and people without OCD. For example attachment
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theory (e.g. Bowlby 1991) understands relationships with primary caregivers as being 
highly important in the development of self-concept, and self-concept is thought to 
develop simultaneously with concept of others. Therefore in exploring self-concept in 
people with OCD it seems relevant to also explore concept of others as a) 
relationships with others may have been influential in development of self-concept 
and b) the development of the concept of others is likely linked to the development of 
concept of self.
What is OCD?
‘OCD is characterized by the presence of either obsessions or compulsions or more 
commonly both’ (NICE 2005, p4). An obsession is defined as an unwanted thought, 
image or urge which intrudes frequently into a persons mind (e.g. a thought about 
harming a loved one or an obscene pornographic image). While finding these 
thoughts, urges or images distressing and uncontrollable, the person is able to 
acknowledge that they are internally generated. A compulsion is a repetitive act that a 
person feels compelled to perform. This could take the form of an outward observable 
behaviour such as hand washing or ordering belongings in a rigid way, or an internal 
mental act such as counting or silently repeating certain phrases. Compulsions are 
understood to serve two main functions. Firstly, they neutralize or counteract 
obsessions (e.g. an obsessive thought about harming a loved one could be neutralized 
through a compulsive behaviour based on protection such as checking things are 
switched off). Secondly, compulsions provide an escape or distraction from the 
obsessions (e.g. one cannot be thinking obsessive thoughts if one is focusing on 
performing a compulsive act, Salkovskis & Kirk 1989). OCD is an extremely 
disabling condition, compared with people with other anxiety or unipolar mood 
disorders, people with OCD are less likely to be married, more likely to be 
unemployed and more likely to report impaired social and occupational functioning 
(Torres et al 2006).
As with most mental health problems, OCD is likely to be an interaction between 
biological, neuropsychological, psychological and social components. This study will 
be focusing on some of the possible psychological components. For an overview of
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biological and genetic factors readers are referred to Abramovitz et al (2009) and for a 
review of the neuropsychology of OCD readers are referred to Griesberg and Mckay 
(2003).
Psychological conceptualisation and treatment of OCD
OCD is not a modem day phenomenon and many examples of people with OCD type
symptoms appear in the history books and past fictional writings. For example Lady 
Macbeth, Charles Darwin and John Bunyan could all conceivably meet today’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for OCD (Salkovskis & Kirk, 1989). What has 
changed is the way the symptoms of OCD are understood. During the 17th and 18th 
centuries, the symptoms of OCD were thought to be due to possession by the devil or 
an evil spirit (Aardema & O’Connor, 2007), whilst during the 19th century they were 
included under the old notion of insanity, that is an emotional, intellectual or 
volitional impairment (Berrios 1989). The first psychological conceptualisation of 
OCD came around the turn of the century with Freud’s case study on the ‘Rat man’ 
(Freud 1909, in Esman 2001) and then later his essay ‘The Disposition of Obsessional 
Neurosis’ (Freud 1913, in Esman 2001). However despite Freud’s early interest, the 
psychoanalytic community subsequently paid very little attention to OCD. 
Psychoanalytic treatments were seen even in the psychoanalytic community to be 
ineffective in the treatment of OCD and until recently psychoanalytic ideas added 
little to our understanding of the nature of the disorder. (Esman 2001).
Major progress in the psychological understanding and treatment of OCD came in the 
1960’s when behavioural learning theory was applied to the treatment of OCD. The 
behavioural learning theory of OCD holds that obsessions develop when neutral 
objects, thoughts or images become associated with distressing events or experiences, 
and as a result exposure to these neutral triggers leads to feelings of intense anxiety. 
Compulsions then develop as a way to avoid or escape from these feelings of anxiety, 
and then become reinforced as an anxiety management strategy (Lam & Steketee 
2001.) Treatments based on this model involve a combination of exposure and 
response prevention. Exposure involves the individual literally being exposed to the
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anxiety provoking objects, thoughts or images (e.g. being left alone with a child if the 
individual has intrusive thoughts about harming children). Response prevention 
involves the individual being prevented from engaging in their anxiety reducing 
ritualistic behaviours (e.g. not washing their hands, Lam & Steketee 2001). Although 
the conceptualisation of OCD based on the behavioural model is now considered 
overly simplistic, treatments based on this model show consistently good results in 
empirical studies (Steketee & Lam 1993 for review) and exposure and response 
prevention are retained as central tenets in current cognitive behavioural treatments 
for OCD.
Current conceptualisation and treatment of OCD - Cognitive Model
Currently the most influential psychological model for understanding OCD is the
cognitive model (e.g. Clark 2004, Salkovskis et al 1995). The central premise of this 
model is that it is not the intrusive thoughts themselves which cause distress but the 
negative appraisals that people make of their intrusive thoughts. This is based on a 
robust finding that the majority of the general population experience intrusive 
thoughts (e.g. Rachman & Da Silva 1978, Harrison & Salkovskis 1984). These 
intrusive thoughts are generally judged to be no different in content to the intrusive 
thoughts of people with OCD (Rachman & Da Silva 1978, Salkovskis 1985), although 
a recent study (Rassin et al 2007) provides some empirical evidence to the contrary. 
This study found that a non-clinical sample were more likely to report having had 
intrusive thoughts similar to those provided by people without OCD than people with 
OCD. Despite this finding, Rassin et al (2007) reported that the themes of the clinical 
and non-clinical groups were the same at face value and concluded that the nature of 
the differences in content were ‘somewhat mystical’ (Rassin et al 2007, p2803.) 
What is undoubtedly different is that for the general population these thoughts cause 
little or no distress, are easily dismissed and go largely unnoticed, while for people 
with OCD they are deeply disturbing. In trying to explain the low rate of OCD 
relative to the high rates of intrusive thoughts it has been proposed that people with 
OCD make negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts which cause them to find the 
experience of such thoughts very distressing. For example, a transitory thought about 
harming a screaming baby might be taken by someone with OCD to signify that they
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may really be a hateful person who actually wants to and is capable of harming a 
baby. The individual is then thought to undertake various strategies to relieve the 
distress caused by these intrusive thoughts such as thought suppression, neutralizing 
and avoidance. Thought suppression describes the act of trying to stop thinking the 
distressing thoughts. However, it is well documented that the more one tries to 
suppress a thought the stronger it becomes (e.g. Wells, 2002). Neutralizing involves 
trying to counteract or rebalance the obsessive thoughts through mental acts or 
compulsive behaviours. For example, a thought about harming a loved one could be 
neutralized by repeatedly checking everything was switched off to protect them. 
Avoidance involves literally avoiding situations or stimuli which could trigger the 
obsessive thoughts or need to perform a compulsion.
Cognitive behavioural treatments based on this model involve ‘deliberate exposure to 
avoided situations; direct exposure to feared stimuli; and prevention of neutralizing 
behaviours (i.e. response prevention) as well as exploration of the cognitive thinking 
errors in the appraisal of intrusive thoughts and compulsive acts’ (Salkovskis & Kirk 
1989; p i48). Various CBT techniques such as anxiety management and thought 
challenging are employed to enable this to be achieved. There is good empirical 
evidence that treatments based on this model are effective in reducing OCD symptoms 
(e.g. Abramovitz 1997), are more effective than pharmacological treatments 
(Abramovitz et al 2009) and hence CBT is currently the only psychological treatment 
for OCD recommended by NICE (NICE, 2005). Despite the considerable progress 
made over the last forty years in treating and understanding OCD more progress is 
needed. CBT is not effective for everyone, complete remission of symptoms is rare, 
and there is a high rate of relapse amongst those successfully treated (Baer & 
Minichiello 1998). Moreover, the cognitive model may not account for all 
presentations (e.g. people that feel compelled to perform particular compulsions such 
as washing their hands without any identifiable accompanying dysfunctional belief, 
Taylor et al, 2006). Until recently the cognitive model also included little to explain 
the etiology of OCD although some researchers have now begun to address this.
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Etiology of OCD
In order to extend the cognitive model outlined above to offer an account for the 
etiology of OCD the question which needs to be answered is why people with OCD 
make negative appraisals of their intrusive thoughts while the rest of the population 
barely pay them any attention. One explanation put forward for these negative 
appraisals is that they are the result of maladaptive cognitive-affective schemas. 
‘Cognitive schemas’ are a psychological construct used to describe an interlinked set 
of key beliefs and assumptions somebody is believed to hold about themselves, the 
world and others, and are thought to be formed in childhood (e.g. Young 2003, 
Padesky 1994). An international group of OCD researchers named the Obsessive 
Compulsive Cognitions Working Group (OCCWG) proposed six key schemas they 
thought may be associated with OCD: overestimation of danger, inflated 
responsibility, perfectionism, strong need to control, overemphasis of thoughts and 
intolerance of uncertainty (OCCWG 1997). The group then designed a questionnaire, 
the Obsessive Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ) (OCCWG 2001) in order to detect these 
schema. They validated the OBQ in several studies with factor analysis suggesting 
that perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty should be collapsed into one factor 
(OCCWG 2003, 2005). Several studies using the OBQ have shown these schema to 
be highly correlated with OCD symptoms. High correlations have also been found 
between all the schema (OCCWG, 2003) suggesting there may be some sort of 
overarching system or meta-schema linking them all together. The identification of 
these schemas adds to our understanding of the cognitive systems underpinning OCD, 
but since correlation does not imply causality, the questions of how and why these 
schema develop and how they link together still need addressing.
Self-concept in OCD
Some of the more recent cognitive literature on OCD has begun to address the 
questions of how and why the maladaptive schema identified by the OCCWG may 
develop in people with OCD by looking at self-concept (see O’Connor & Aardema 
2007 for overview of special issue on dimensions of self). Two parallel lines of 
thinking have emerged based on self-concepts which aim to explain what it could be 
about the self-concepts of people with OCD that leads them to make negative self
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appraisals from their intrusions. This is contrary to research which shows that most 
people are motivated to interpret information in a way that enables them to maintain a 
positive self-image (Sherman & Cohen 2002)
The first line of thinking, as outlined by Terrier and Brewin (2005), draws on Higgins 
(1987) self-discrepancy theory. Higgins (1987) theorizes that there exist different self 
state representations -  the actual self which describes an individual as they actually 
are, the ideal self which describes the way an individual wishes they were and the 
ought self which describes an individual as they think they should be. He suggests 
that discrepancies between these different self-states lead to different types of 
pathology (e.g. a discrepancy between actual self and ideal self would lead to 
depressive type symptoms, while a discrepancy between actual self and ought self 
could lead to anxiety type symptoms). His theory on the consequences of actual-ideal 
and actual-ought discrepancy is supported by a number of empirical studies (e.g. 
Higgins et al 1986, Higgins 1987, Higgins 1996). Other theorists have suggested that 
there exists another self structure, the feared self, which is how the person does not 
want to be but fears they may be or may become (Oglivie 1987, Carver et al 1999). 
No suggestion has been made as to the psychological consequences of the feared self 
and the actual self being experienced as close together but, drawing on the work of 
Rachman (1997, 1998), Terrier and Brewin (2005) hypothesise that a small 
discrepancy between the feared self and the actual self (i.e. if the feared self is seen as 
to be similar to the actual self) may be linked to an OCD type presentation. Rachman
(1998) suggested that negative appraisals of intrusive thoughts arise because the 
intrusive thoughts are understood as revealing an abhorrent part of the self. Research 
by Rowa & Purdon (2003) and Rowa et al (2005) showing that the intrusions that 
people with OCD found distressing were the intrusions which contradicted valued 
aspects of the self is also relevant to consider in relation to this study.
Terrier & Brewin (2005) investigated the hypothesis that intrusions are distressing for 
people with OCD as they represent an unwanted part of self, the feared self, which 
people with OCD experience as too close to their actual self in a sample of people 
with OCD, people with anxiety disorders and non clinical controls. They used the 
Selves Questionnaire (Carver et al 1999) in which participants are given a description
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of the three different selves -  the ideal self, the ought self and the feared self - and 
asked to list 7 traits which characterise each of the selves for them. They are then 
asked to rate how close their actual self is to each of the traits listed on a 7 point Likert 
scale ranging from T am just like this trait’ to T am the total opposite of this trait’. 
They found that the discrepancy between the actual self and the feared self was 
smaller in people with OCD than non-clinical controls, but no different in people with 
OCD than in people with other anxiety disorders. What they found that was different 
in each group was the nature of the feared self. Content analysis of feared self traits 
suggested that in people with OCD the feared self was characterised as dangerous 
(bad, immoral or insane), whereas in anxious people the feared self was related to 
symptoms such as tearfulness or hopelessness and in non-clinical controls it was 
related to general negative personality traits such as selfishness or pride. The cross- 
sectional design of this study means inferences cannot be made about the cause or 
possible etiology of the feared self though Terrier and Brewin (2005) suggest early 
child rearing practices. This study only used a small sample size (24 participants with 
OCD, 21 participants with other anxiety disorders and 16 non-anxious controls) and 
the results have yet to be replicated.
The fundamental basis of the actual self, feared self discrepancy theory of OCD as 
proposed by Terrier & Brewin (2005), is that OCD develops because people perceive 
their actual self to be potentially too close to their feared self. Taking a slightly 
different angle on the basic idea of two irreconcilable senses of self, Bhar & Kyrios 
(2007) draw on work by Guidano & Liotti (1983) to propose that high levels of self­
ambivalence in people with OCD could explain why intrusive thoughts cause such an 
assault on self-identity. In this second line of research looking at self-concept in 
OCD, Bhar & Kyrios (2007) also suggest that self-ambivalence could be seen as a 
kind of meta-vulnerability for the development of the maladaptive schema identified 
by the OCCWG. Guidano & Liotti (1983) define self-ambivalence as simultaneously 
holding two opposing beliefs about oneself (e.g. I am moral and I am immoral.) If 
one does not have a stable set of beliefs about oneself then Bhar & Kyrios (2007) 
argue that negative intrusions would carry more significance as they may be 
understood as providing evidence for the negative beliefs one holds about ones self- 
identity. As a result of the activation of these negative beliefs by negative intrusions a
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person may then feel compelled to do something in order to once again restore their 
positive beliefs about the self (e.g. engaging in restorative compulsive acts which 
neutralize the beliefs such as checking). Furthermore Bhar & Kyrios (2007) argue 
that self ambivalence would explain why a person may develop five of the original six 
schema identified by the OCCWG (1997). They hypothesise that a person with high 
levels of self-ambivalence might subscribe to high levels of perfectionism as anything 
‘not just right’ would be seen as evidence for the negative self; that they might over 
emphasise their personal responsibility as they fear the negative part of them is the 
real part so therefore need to privilege their positive part; that they may have a strong 
need to control since it would be very easy to activate the negative beliefs which they 
find distressing; they may overemphasise thoughts since thoughts are easier to control 
than emotions, and they would be intolerant of uncertainty. Therefore they suggest 
self ambivalence could result in a meta-vulnerability for the schema associated with 
OCD.
To test their hypothesis that self-ambivalence is linked to OCD, Bhar & Kyrios (2007) 
devised a measure of self-ambivalence and compared levels of self-ambivalence in 73 
people with OCD, 50 people with other anxiety disorders, 223 undergraduate students 
and 34 community controls. They found that people with OCD were more self- 
ambivalent than non clinical controls and that self-ambivalence was positively 
associated with OCD related dysfunctional beliefs and OCD phenomena after 
controlling for self-esteem, depression and anxiety. However people with OCD did 
not differ from anxious controls on measures of self-ambivalence. Bhar & Kyrios 
(2007) suggested that the lack of differentiation between their OCD group and their 
other anxiety disorder group, could be due to sampling error since their other anxiety 
disorder group held high levels of OCD related dysfunctional beliefs which they state 
is not usual for anxious samples. Nonetheless Bhar & Kyrios (2007) concluded their 
results are consistent with self-ambivalence theory and, at the very least, support the 
notion that self-ambivalence is relevant to OCD, even if not specific.
In order to extend their understanding of the nature of self-ambivalence, one of the 
researchers involved in the above study was part of a group looking at whether people 
with OCD were sensitive in particular domains of self concept. Based on research by
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Harter (1982) and Harter and Whitehall (2003) which found differing individuals 
valued different aspects of self, Doron et al (2007) and Doron et al (2008) investigated 
sensitivity in certain domains of self. In the first study Doron et al (2007) investigated 
sensitivity in five domains of self in a student sample and their relation to obsessive 
compulsive beliefs and symptoms. They found that sensitivity in the self domains of 
morality, job competence, and social acceptability was associated with higher levels 
of obsessive-compulsive cognitions. Doron et al (2008) followed this up in a study 
investigating sensitivity of self beliefs a clinical sample of people with OCD, a clinical 
sample people with other anxiety disorders and community controls. They selected 
three domains of se lf- jo b  competence, morality and social acceptability that they felt 
may be of relevance in OCD. They then classified participants as sensitive in these 
domains if they rated them as important but did not rate themselves as competent in 
these domains. These domains were selected based on previous research or theory 
suggesting they may be of relevance (Rachman (1993) for morality, Salkovskis et al
(1999) for job competence and Newth & Rachman (2001) for social acceptability). 
They found sensitivity in the domains of job competence and morality differentiated 
people with OCD from the other two groups but that only the self domain of morality 
was associated with higher levels of OCD symptoms and OCD related beliefs. This 
led them to hypothesise that people with OCD could be self ambivalent in certain, 
sensitive domains of self which would account for why they were not differentiated 
from anxious controls by Bhar & Kyrios (2007). This is supported by the different 
nature of the feared self found by Terrier and Brewin (2005) in different populations. 
Doron & Kyrios (2005) also suggest that people with OCD may have less self 
domains that they value than non-clinical controls. They hypotheise that having fewer 
valued domains of self would heighten sensitivity in these valued self domains. This 
could then result in a positive self-concept becoming overly dependent on feelings of 
competence in a small number of valued domains whereby anything contradicting 
competence in one of these domains (e.g. an immoral intrusive thought) would pose a 
serious threat to maintaining a positive self-concept.
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Summary of Self-Concept research in OCD
Ferrier & Brewin (2005) found that the discrepancy between the constructs of feared 
self and the actual self is smaller in people with OCD than non clinical controls. They 
also found that the nature of the construct of feared self in people with OCD seems to 
be different to the nature of the feared self in non clinical controls and people with 
anxiety, in that people with OCD are more likely to describe their feared self as bad, 
immoral or insane. Bhar & Kyrios (2007) found people with OCD to be more self 
ambivalent than non clinical controls though no difference was found between people 
with OCD and people with other anxiety disorders. Doron et al (2007) found 
sensitivity in the specific self domains of morality and job competence was associated 
with OCD, which when considered alongside the research by Bhar & Kyrios (2007) 
suggests people with OCD may be self ambivalent in specific domains of self. So 
there is an emerging body of evidence to suggest that OCD could be related to a 
distorted self-concept, or more specifically that people with OCD have an ambivalent 
concept of self in certain self domains, simultaneously experiencing themselves as 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ in these areas. However research into this area is in its early stages 
and some of the research findings and conclusions drawn require further exploration. 
Firstly, the idea that people with OCD are sensitive in certain domains of self which 
may be different to those in which other people are sensitive is based on asking people 
to rate themselves on a limited range of self domains that researchers felt may be 
important. It is possible that rather than sensitivity in these domains being the cause 
of OCD, that OCD causes people to rate themselves more negatively on these 
domains. Are the domains of self that researchers chose to investigate actually 
important to people with OCD or would people with OCD list other areas of personal 
characteristics as being important?
Secondly, Ferrier & Brewin (2005) found that people with OCD were more likely to 
describe their feared self under the theme: ‘A ‘dangerous self involving the
possibility of harm coming to others or being out of control’ (Ferrier & Brewin 2005, 
pi 368) and concluded that the nature of the feared self may be different in people with 
OCD than in people with other anxiety disorders or controls. However, given that one 
of the features of OCD is having intrusive obsessive thoughts with themes of being 
bad, immoral or insane then it would be surprising if people with OCD described their
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feared self in any other way. Moreover, since the distress experienced in people with 
OCD is thought to be a result of the negative appraisals they make of themselves due 
to these obsessive thoughts it is also not surprising that the discrepancy between actual 
and feared self elicited in this way is small. Were Ferrier & Brewin (2005) when 
asking people with OCD to describe their feared self and how close they think this is 
to their real self simply asking people to describe their symptoms? Or is this 
difference in construction of feared self a more pervasive part of the self structure in 
people with OCD which underlies the development of these symptoms? This study 
aims to explore this further.
People with OCD and Significant others
The most widely accepted theory in clinical psychology on the way self concept 
develops is Bowlby’s attachment theory (Bowlby 1991). Most models of therapy and 
psychopathology in clinical psychology incorporate some form of attachment theory 
and there is little dispute in any field that parent-child interactions have a role in self 
development. The two parallel research streams into self concept in OCD, outlined 
above, have both based their hypotheses as to how an ambivalent self-concept may 
develop in people with OCD on attachment theory and child rearing practices of 
parents of people with OCD (Ferrier & Brewin 2005, Doron and Kyrios 2005). 
According to Bowlby (1969), the foundations of an adult’s social and psychological 
functioning are largely determined by their early relationships with their primary 
caregivers, which for most people is their early relationship with their parents. 
Bowlby hypothesised that infants construct internal working models which are 
internal representations of themselves and others, based on their interactions with their 
primary caregivers. Doron and Kyrios (2005) summarise internal working models as 
follows ‘internal working models have been conceptualised as a set of conscious or 
tacit expectations and attitudes with respect to ones attachment figures and oneself. 
These eventually become the basic components of an individual’s self worth and
subsequently regulate the individual’s expectations of others In short child-
caregiver interactions are believed to be fundamental in the development of an 
individual’s view of self, others and the world’ (Doron & Kyrios 2005, p418). If 
primary caregivers adequately understand and respond to an infant’s needs, then the
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infant develops an internal working model of themselves as lovable and effective and 
of others as caring, protective, dependable and available. However if the primary 
caregiver does not understand the infant’s needs adequately, does not respond to their 
needs adequately, or both, then distorted internal working models develop. The exact 
nature of the distorted internal working model is related to the nature of the inadequate 
responding or understanding of their caregiver, that is, it is related to the kind of 
attachment relationship an infant has with their primary caregiver. Therefore, based 
on this theory, the ambivalent sense of self thought to be found in people with OCD 
could be said to be strongly influenced by early attachment relationships.
What kind of attachment relationship might lead to the ambivalent 
self-concept associated with OCD?
Research by Mary Ainsworth (Ainsworth et al 1978, in Bowlby 1991) and later by 
Main & Solomon (1990) identified four different attachment patterns (see Table 1 
below). Numerous studies have broadly supported the existence of these four 
attachment styles (Cassidy 1999) and distinct internal working models of self and 
others are thought to be related to each different attachment pattern (Liotti 2007).
Table 1: Brief description of the four main attachment patterns and related internal 
working models.
Attachment
Style
Carer-infant
relationship
Internal working 
model of self, and 
resulting adult 
behaviour
Internal Working 
Model of others
Secure
Attachment
Associated with a 
carer who is sensitive 
and responsive to 
child’s needs.
Induces feelings of 
support and security
Lovable, effective, 
sense of self worth 
and acceptance by 
others
Caring, protective, 
dependable, 
available. Seeks 
intimacy with 
others.
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Avoidant
Attachment
Carer experienced as 
rejecting, intrusive 
and controlling. 
Consistently 
unresponsive to 
negative emotion.
Unlovable, of little 
worth
As adults: avoids 
intimacy, task 
orientated, emotions 
intellectualised, 
thoughts more 
reliable than 
feelings
Not available,
intrusive,
interfering,
controlling,
consistently
unresponsive.
Hostile & rejecting.
Ambivalent
Attachment
Associated with a 
caregiver who 
responds in an 
inconsistent manner. 
Both overprotective 
parenting style and an 
under-protective 
parenting style are 
thought to produce 
this kind of 
attachment pattern. 
Induces anxiety, 
vigilance and anger
Unlovable, of little 
worth, ineffective 
As adults: 
preoccupied with 
relationships, 
jealous, possessive, 
and coercive. Low 
self-reflexivity, 
ambivalent feelings 
dealt with by 
splitting -  
oscillating between 
viewing others as 
all good or all bad. 
Feelings not 
thought through but 
acted out.
Unreliable, 
unavailable, not 
interested, 
insensitive, 
inconsistent
Disorganised
Attachment
Carer is frightening -  
dangerous or 
alarming parental 
behaviour. Following 
frightening behaviour 
does not repair 
damage.
Unworthy of care, 
powerful but bad 
As adults: Fear 
anger, violence. 
Can’t understand 
emotions in self or 
others. Anxious 
and inattentive. 
Controlling, avoids 
intimacy.
Frightening and 
unavailable
The attachment style that is most often proposed to be associated with OCD is the 
ambivalent attachment style. In their literature review Doran & Kyrios (2005) 
highlight the work by Guidano & Liotti (1983, 1987) in this area. Guidano and Liotti 
(1983) describe how an ambivalent attachment pattern could be related to an 
ambivalent self-concept. They define an ambivalent attachment pattern as when a 
child is unsure of extent to which he or she is loved. This, they propose, causes a 
concurrent experience of validation and rejection which they reason could lead to 
difficulty in integrating opposing self perceptions. If one does not have a concurrent
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unified view of oneself Guidano & Liotti (1983) theorise one may begin to chronically 
self monitor and ruminate about one’s relation to others. As a result of this chronic 
self monitoring and rumination one may begin to exhibit high levels of perfectionism 
and compulsive behaviours to secure approval and unity self perceptions.
Empirical studies looking into attachment and OCD have mainly looked for links 
between an overprotective parenting style and OCD symptomatology with 
inconclusive results. A number of studies using student samples have reported 
correlations between high scores on obsessionality scales and overprotective and 
rejecting parenting styles (Ehiobuuche 1988 and Cavedo & Parker 1994). However 
results in clinical samples have been somewhat inconclusive. Parker et al (1997), 
Merkel et al (1993), Vogel et al (1997) and Mhyr et al (2004) found no link between 
OCD and abnormal parenting patterns. Turgeon et al (2002) found parenting styles of 
parents of OCD were more overprotective than controls but no different to other 
anxiety groups. Yoshida et al (2005) investigated perceived parental rearing styles in 
people with OCD, people with depression and severe obsessive traits, people with 
depression and mild obsessive traits and non clinical controls. They found that 
overprotective parental rearing style was higher in those with OCD and people with 
depression and severe obsessive traits than in people with depression and mild 
obsessive traits and non clinical controls. Interestingly this link was more marked in 
relation to fathers, although it was significant in both parents. Alonso et al (2004) on 
the other hand found no difference in perceived parental overprotection in people with 
OCD and non-clinical controls, although they did find higher levels of perceived 
rejection and lower levels of perceived emotional warmth in fathers of people with 
OCD.
The mixed evidence of empirical studies looking into a possible relationship between 
parenting style and attachment relationships of people with OCD are likely due to a 
number of methodological difficulties. Lennertz et al (2010) highlight some of these 
and report on their study which they feel eliminates some of these issues. Firstly, all 
measures used in research to date are retrospective measures which ask either the 
parent of the person with OCD, or the person with OCD themselves, to recall 
particular aspects of the parent-child relationship, hence there is the possibility of
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unreliability of results due to recall bias (Brewin et al 1993, Gerlsma et al 1990). 
Secondly, since 50% of OCD cases develop in childhood, it is hard to distinguish if 
adverse parenting causes OCD or if it is caused by the distress to the family due to the 
child’s disorder. Using the German short version of the Egma Minnen Befraffande 
Uppfostram (EBMU; translated as Own Memories of parental rearing experiences in 
childhood) (Perris et al, 1980) they found people with symptoms of OCD perceived 
their parents to be less warm and more rejecting and controlling than non-clinical 
controls. They corroborated the way people with OCD had recalled their parenting 
experience by also assessing non affected siblings which they felt reduced the chance 
of recall bias. They also found this difference existed in both childhood onset OCD 
and late onset OCD, suggesting this type of parenting style was a risk factor for OCD, 
rather than simply a families’ reaction to their child’s OCD.
It is also possible, as suggested by Doron & Kyrios (2005) that the measures used in 
many of the research studies are not adequately investigating the factors relevant to an 
ambivalent attachment style which are important in OCD. The measure most 
commonly used which was used in the studies by Turgeon et al 2002, Alonso et al 
2004, Yoshida et al 2005, Vogel et al 1997, Merkel et al 1993 and Mhyr et al 2004 is 
the Parental Bonding Instrument (PBI) (Parker et al 1997) which measures parental 
protection and care retrospectively, with low levels of protection and high levels of 
care being considered optimal. In a 25 year review of adult attachment measures, 
Ravitz et al (2010) found that while the PBI was reliable in detecting secure 
attachment relationships there was evidence to suggest it may be less reliable in 
detecting other types of attachment. They point to a study by Manassis et al (1999) 
which examined the convergent validity between the Adult Attachment Interview AAI 
(found by Ravitz et al 2010 to be the most reliable, valid and comprehensive measure 
of attachment in adult clinical and non clinical populations). Manassis et al (1999) 
found the PBI did not show sensitivity in detecting relationships where there may be 
unresolved anger towards or idealization of the primary attachment figure. Therefore 
they advised caution in using it in clinical samples where an unresolved attachment 
pattern of this type was suspected. The EMBU used by Lennertz et al (2010) and 
Turgeon et al (2002), and the MOPS used by Parker et al (1997) were not reviewed by 
Ravitz et al (2010) and there appears to be no research which examines their
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convergent validity with the AAI. However since they both assess broadly the same 
factors as the PBI and are loosely based on the PBI, it is likely that, like the PBI, they 
are not sensitive in detecting unresolved anger or idealization of the primary 
caregiver.
Unresolved anger and idealization of the primary caregiver are important in 
psychoanalytic theories on how OCD may develop from ambivalent early attachment 
relationships. O’Connor (2007) explains how within a psychoanalytic understanding 
not only overprotective parenting, but also under-protective parenting, could lead to 
two irreconcilable parts of self resulting in the development of OCD. The 
overprotective parent not only shields the child from the physical external realities but 
also limits their experience of the internal emotional world. The child then develops a 
fantasy of the world as a dangerous yet intriguing place and a sense that certain 
emotional impulses are to be avoided. The child becomes overly devoted and 
dependent on the family and any anger or resentment the child experiences as a result 
of not being allowed the full range of childhood experiences becomes buried and 
unresolved. On the other hand a parent can also under shield the child from the world. 
O’Connor (2007) observes this is often the case when there is a death in the family or 
some kind of trauma to which the child is exposed, both its external physical reality 
and the internal emotional consequences. O’Connor (2007) draws on research 
findings indicating that children make sense of traumatic events in their lives and 
regain control by assuming a level of responsibility for the event. Fairburn (1949 in 
O’Connor 2007) suggests that children internalise such events as a way of protecting 
those around them but then also internalise a sense that they are capable of damaging 
those around them. This also leads to an idealisation of primary caregiver and a 
repression of angry or aggressive emotions. Overprotection and under-protection can 
also occur concurrently (e.g. a parent may tell their child in detail about paedophilia in 
order to encourage the child to stay vigilant to the risks and to motivate the child to 
follow rules devised to protect them from the risk, yet in the process of doing this the 
parent gives the child too much to digest and make sense of).
Kempke & Luyten (2007) also use psychoanalytic theory to suggest how an 
ambivalent sense of self in OCD could develop from an ambivalent attachment style.
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They base their hypothesis on object relations theories which focus on mental 
representations or cognitive affective schemas of self and others which are 
hypothesised to develop from early attachment relationships. Kempke & Luyten 
(2007) characterise people with OCD as having ambivalent mental representations of 
self and others resulting from ambivalent attachment relationships. This leads to 
mental representations of the self and other which are based on separate, unintegrated 
part properties. The internal drive to avoid the activation of the negative parts leads to 
strong need for control and rigidity. Therefore, controllable intellectual aspects of self 
are emphasised and uncontrollable parts such as feelings and interpersonal 
relationships are avoided. As Kempke & Luyten (2007) highlight, this theory is very 
similar to that based on internal working models outlined by Doron & Kyrios (2005). 
However, they believe the key difference is that Doron & Kyrios (2005) see all 
representations of self and others as being within conscious awareness whereas 
Kempke & Luyten (2007) understand many of the representations to be hidden within 
the unconscious.
In summary, there is some empirical evidence that an ambivalent sense of self in 
people with OCD could develop from an ambivalent attachment pattern in early 
childhood. Cognitive interpretations (Doron & Kyrios 2005) and contemporary 
psychoanalytic interpretations (Kempke & Luyten 2007) of the process that underpins 
this development both suggest that, as well as developing an ambivalent mental 
representation of self, people with an ambivalent attachment would also develop an 
ambivalent mental representation of other people. Neither Doron & Kyrios (2005) nor 
Kempke & Luyten (2007) make any suggestion as to how an ambivalent mental 
representation, or internal working model of others may manifest itself in people with 
OCD but, based on their theories of the ambivalent self, the following hypotheses may 
be proposed. Following Doron & Kyrios (2005) line of thinking, one may theorise 
that as with self-concept, people with OCD have a dichotomous view of others -  
either they are good or they are bad and they are constantly switching between the 
two. Just as a negative intrusion is thought to confirm the negative self concept of 
people with OCD, a negative comment or act could confirm the negative concept 
people with OCD have of others whilst a positive comment or act could restore the 
positive concept. Therefore, people with OCD would have a very dichotomous view
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of people in their lives, viewing each person as either all good or all bad and 
constantly switching between the two. On the other hand, following Kempke & 
Luyten (2007) and O’Connor (2007) one may hypothesise that the negative part of the 
representation of significant others is split off out of conscious awareness so that 
people with OCD would have an idealized, overly positive view of others.
Conceptualisation of Significant Others in OCD
It would seem that there is no research which looks directly at how people with OCD 
conceptualise significant others. A literature search of Psycinfo, Medline, Embase 
and Web of science using the search terms “OCD or obsess* or compuls*” AND 
“family or friend or spouse or partner or mother or father or brother or sibling” AND 
“Relationship” NOT “Gene*” limited to the English language, from 1960 to 2009 
yielded 227 results after de-duping. Most of these were excluded mainly because 
they were about treatment packages or other disorders and none looked directly at 
how people with OCD viewed others, although there were some that offered some 
indirect insight.
Fontelle et al (2009) investigated empathy in people with OCD compared to people 
without OCD. They describe research investigating the neurobiological system 
underpinning social attachments or bonding in both animals and humans, as 
demonstrating strong links between the neurobiological systems underpinning 
attachments and bonding with the neurobiology of empathy. People with OCD have 
been shown to have excessive bonds or ‘hyper attachments’ to off spring (Leckman 
and Herman 2002), God (Nelson et al 2006) and inanimate objects (Frost et al 1995). 
Fontelle et al (2009) used the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis 1983) to 
measure empathy in 53 people with OCD and 53 controls. The IRI has 4 subscales: 
‘perspective taking’ which evaluates the ability to try and take the psychological 
point of view of another person, ‘fantasy’ which evaluates the tendency to identify 
with fictitious characters, ‘empathie concern’ which measures feelings of compassion 
or concern for others and ‘personal discomfort’ which measures the level anxiety and 
discomfort experienced in emotional situations. They found people with OCD had 
significantly higher levels of empathie concern and personal discomfort than non
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clinical controls but did not differ on fantasy or perspective taking. This difference 
disappeared after controlling for depression and anxiety which the authors point out 
could be because depression and anxiety increase personal discomfort and empathie 
concern, or could be because personal discomfort and empathie concern increase 
depression and anxiety. It could be hypothesised that high levels of ‘empathie 
concern’ may be a reflection of the idealisation of the primary caregiver described by 
O’Connor (2007), and that ‘personal discomfort’ could be due to the avoidance of 
uncontrollable emotional aspects of self outlined by Kempke & Luyten (2007) and 
Doron & Kyrios (2005).
Chambless et al (2007) investigated expressed emotion (EE) in interactions between 
OCD patients and their relatives. Chambless et al (2007) describe EE as 
‘a multifaceted construct concerning relatives’ feelings about and reported behaviour 
toward a psychiatric patient, including criticism, hostility, and emotional over 
involvement (EOI)’ (Chambless et al, 2007, p574). EE is measured by coding verbal 
and non-verbal behaviours of the relatives during the Camberwell Family Interview 
(Vaughn and Leff 1976). For the purpose of their study, Chambless et al (2007) 
coded relatives on the hostility scale of EE only as their previous work had shown this 
scale to be the most highly correlated with overall EE and the best predictor of 
treatment outcome. They then videotaped a ten minute interaction between people 
with OCD or Panic Disorder and Agrophobia (PDA) and their relatives in which they 
were asked to try and solve some real life problems. Chambless et al (2007) found 
that relatives classified as hostile were significantly more critical towards their OCD 
or PDA relative but that this criticism was not reciprocated by either group. However, 
both groups demonstrated more negative affect as the criticism by their relative 
increased. This study therefore offers a tenuous suggestion that people with OCD 
may idealize significant others, or at least find it difficult to be negative towards them. 
However this was also true for people with PDA.
Study Aims
This study sets out to explore the conceptualisation of self and significant others in 
people with OCD. There is an emerging theory that people with OCD have an
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ambivalent self-concept which is proposed to develop in part due to an ambivalent 
attachment pattern. However, this theory is in its early stages so presently there is 
little empirical support. There is no established theory on the way people with OCD 
conceptualise significant others, although one can hypothesise that they may also have 
an ambivalent conceptualisation of others. The Multiple Sorting Procedure (MSP) is 
recommended as a way of exploring people’s conceptual systems where there is no 
clear established theory (Barnett, 2004). Unlike other methods in which the 
researcher ‘imposes a view of the likely structure and content of an individual’s 
conceptual system’ (Canter et al, 1985, p86) the multiple sorting procedure allows 
participants the freedom to work within their own system of explanation, while at the 
same time, allowing systematic analysis of individuals and/or groups. In this study, 
participants were asked to sort cards marked with the names of their friends and 
family and the descriptions of four self constructs - actual self, ideal self, ought self 
and feared self into groups based on aspects of character or personality. The 
categories they sort on were analysed in order to show the aspects of personality and 
character that are important to them (Canter et al 1985) and the way different cards are 
grouped together was investigated to show how different or similar participants 
perceive their different self structures, their friends and their families, to be to one 
another. Questions explored were as follows:
1) Will people with OCD sort on fewer categories than people without OCD as 
suggested by Doron & Kyrios (2005)?
2) Will people with OCD be more likely to sort on self domains related to 
morality or job competence than people without OCD as suggested by Doron 
et al (2007, 2008)?
3) Will people with OCD demonstrate more sensitivity in domains related to 
morality and job competence than people without OCD?
4) Will people with OCD describe their feared self differently to people without 
OCD as suggested by Ferrier & Brewin (2005)?
5) Overall will people with OCD place their feared self closer to their actual self 
than people without OCD as suggested by Ferrier & Brewin (2005) and Bhar 
& Kyrios (2007)
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6) Will people with OCD demonstrate a difference to people without OCD in the 
way they sort significant others? One hypothesis is that they may show greater 
idealisation of significant others than people without OCD by always sorting 
them into a positive group. Another hypothesis is they may have a 
dichotomous view of significant others which may be demonstrated by always 
sorting certain people into negative groups and certain other people into 
positive groups.
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METHOD
Multiple Sorting Procedure
The MSP is based on the premise that in order to understand the conceptual systems 
people use to make sense of their experiences and the world around them, it is 
necessary to understand the different constructs and categories each individual uses 
within these conceptual systems and the way these constructs and categories are 
linked together (Canter et al, 1985, Barnett, 2004). MSP does this by asking 
participants to sort a set of ‘elements’ into groups. Elements are usually cards with 
something relating to the area of investigation written on them (e.g. names of 
celebrities, holiday destinations, descriptions of different political ideologies), but 
elements could be many other things including photographs, drawings, objects (e.g. 
foods, perfumes) or video clips. Canter et al (1985) recommend the optimum number 
of elements in an MSP to be 15-20. In the present study the elements were cards 
which had the names of the participant’s friends, family and descriptions of the actual 
self, ought self, ideal self and feared self written on them.
Participants are asked to sort the elements into groups so that all elements in one 
group are similar in some important way, and different to the elements in the other 
groups. Apart from the requirement for elements to be sorted into groups there is 
flexibility in the way an MSP can be conducted. The researcher can leave the 
participant free to specify the categories under which they are going to group 
elements, the number of groups in each category and the description of each group. 
This is called a free sort. An MSP using free sorts is generally recommended for 
exploratory studies when the researcher does not have strong preconceptions on the 
way participants may conceptualise the area under investigation (Barnett 2004). For 
example, a researcher interested in investigating how adolescents thought of 
celebrities could provide a group of adolescents with a set of photographs of 
celebrities and simply ask them to sort the photographs into groups. The participant 
may initially choose to do their first sort on ‘the reason people are famous’ and sort 
the photographs into the groups ‘sports stars’, ‘TV stars’, ‘pop stars’ and ‘politicians’. 
They may then choose to conduct their second sort on ‘attractiveness’ and have the 
groups ‘attractive’ and ‘unattractive’, and so on. Researchers can limit participants to
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a specified number of free sorts, or allow them to continue sorting until they run out of 
things to sort on. Throughout the sorting process participants are asked to verbalise 
their descriptions of the basis on which they are sorting the cards into groups (the 
overall category) and how they are grouping the cards within it (the group 
description). These descriptions are recorded verbatim for later analysis. 
Alternatively researchers can specify the categories on which they wish participants to 
sort. This is known as a structured sort and is generally used when testing an 
established hypothesis or answering a specific question (Barnett 2004). For example 
if someone was interested in the effect of celebrity endorsement on consumer 
behaviour they may ask participants to sort photographs of celebrities based whether 
their endorsement of a product would influence them to buy it. The researcher could 
either specify groups such as ‘would definitely buy a product endorsed by this 
celebrity’, ‘endorsement by this celebrity would have no influence on me’, and 
‘endorsement by this celebrity would deter me from buying the product’ or leave 
participants free to specify their own groupings. Since there does not exist an 
established evidence base on the way people with OCD conceptualise themselves and 
significant others it was decided to use a free sort MSP for the present study. Free sort 
MSP also reduces the possibility of confirmatory bias which could have been 
problematic in the studies of Doron et al (2007, 2008) and Ferrier & Brewin (2005).
If an MSP has used free sorts then the initial part of the analysis involves describing 
this data. The most common method for doing this is through a content analysis of the 
category descriptions provided by participants (Barnett 2004). The next part of the 
analysis involves looking at the relationships between elements sorted. This can be 
done using Multiple Scalogram Analysis (MSA). MSA is based on work by Guttman 
(1941) and Linoges (1968, cited in Canter et al, 1985) and is part of a package of 
statistical procedures developed to examine categorical data. MSA represents data 
spatially by plotting elements as points on a scatter plot, the physical proximity of the 
points depicting conceptual similarity (Hammond 2006). In order to perform MSA 
the data must first be transformed into a data matrix. Each row in the matrix must 
represent an element. The columns in the matrix represent overall category sorts and 
could represent the sorts of one particular participant (Table 2), or particular sorts of 
different participants (Table 3). The number in each cell of the matrix represents the
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group that each card has been assigned to for each sort. In order for MSA to work the 
elements in the matrix must be the rows and the number of columns must not exceed 
the number of rows.
Table 2: Example of part of an Individual Participants data matrix
Sort 1 
Kindness
Sort 2 -  Can get 
things done quickly
Sort 3 -Good at 
forming relationships
Card 1- Actual Self 1 2 2
Card 2 -  Ought Self 1 1 1
Card 3-Ideal Self 1 1 1
Card 4- Feared Self 2 2 2
Card 5-Mum 1 1 2
Card 6-Dad 1 1 1
Key to cell numbers: Sort 1, 1-Kind, 2=not kind, Sort 2 -  l=do better at getting things 
done, 2=can’t get things done quickly, Sort 3 -  l=good at forming relationships, 
2=Not good at forming relationships
Table 3: Example of part of a data matrix looking at the 1st sorts of different
participants
Participant l - l st 
Sort, Kindness
Participant 2 -  1st 
Sort, Happiness
Participant 3-1st Sort, 
How caring people 
are
Card 1- Actual Self 1 2 2
Card 2 -  Ideal Self 1 1 3
Card 3- Ought Self 1 2 1
Card 4- Feared Self 2 3 4
Card 5-Mum 1 2 3
Card 6-Dad 1 1 1
Key to cell numbers: Participant 1 -  l=Kind, 2=not kind, Participant 2 -  l=always 
cheerful, 2=up and down, 3=down a lot of the time, Participant 3 -  l=Most caring 
possible, 2=really caring, 3=A bit less caring, 4=Not caring at all.
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The main output of MSA is a top plot, which is a scatter plot showing the overall 
relative positioning of elements across all sorts analysed (e.g. all the sorts of one 
participant or particular sorts from a number of participants). There then follows item 
plots for each sort analysed showing the group into which each element was placed for 
each individual sort. The top plot is then inspected by overlaying the item plots and 
can then be partitioned to show why certain elements were grouped together. For 
example an MSA could (in an ideal world!) produce a top plot that looked like Figure 
1, followed by item plots looking like Figures 2 and 3. The original plot in Figure 1 
could then be partitioned to show the reasons for placements as in Figure 4.
Mum Feared Self
Dad Actual Self
Ought Self Ideal self
Responsible Irresponsible
Responsible Irresponsible
Responsible Irresponsible
Figure 1 : Imaginary MSA top plot Figure 2: Imaginary MSA item plot
Unsympathetic Unsympathetic
Sympathetic Sympathetic
Sympathetic Sympathetic
Mum
{Responsible but 
unsympathetic)
Feared Self 
(Irresponsible and 
unsympathetic)
Dad
(Responsible ana 
sympathetic)
Ought Self
Actual Self 
(Irresponsible but 
sympathetic)
Ideal Self
Figure 3: Imaginary MSA Item plot Figure 4: Partitioning of top plot tfigure
1) using item plots (figures 2 and 31
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MSA is considered one of the best methods for analysing relationships between cards 
in a multiple sorting procedure (Barnett 2004, Hammond 2006). The strength of MSA 
is that it treats the data as categorical without assuming any order or similarity of 
meaning between the categories (Canter et al 1985) and is therefore is not subject to 
the restrictions and assumptions made by more conventional statistical procedures. 
Canter et al (1985) summarise these restrictions as follows:
1) Traditional statistical methods generally require that data has a clear linear 
relationship so researchers are limited to describing categorical data using 
scales such as the Likert scale.
2) The procedures limit data so that each participant must work within the same 
set of variables (e.g. very much like this, a little bit like this, not at all like this) 
and it is assumed that the meaning of each variable is the same for each 
participant.
3) The explanatory models generated by traditional statistical procedures are 
generally dimensional, rather than categorical.
Ethical Approval
The study received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Arts and Human 
Sciences ethics committee (Appendix 1). Although it was felt the study was unlikely 
to cause any distress the committee requested that a comprehensive de-brief sheet be 
provided to participants including details of local support organisations.
Participants
A sample of five people with OCD and five people without OCD took part in the 
study. A sample size of ten was selected as MSA requires that the number of columns 
(e.g. sorts) is equal to or less than the number of cards used, which in this study was 
twenty. Therefore since it was impossible to predict how many sorts participants
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would produce, and which how many of these sorts one may want to compare across 
participants ten was selected to allow for flexibility in analysis. Barnett (2004) 
suggests ten to be an adequate sample size when comparing groups using MSP. The 
OCD sample was recruited through an advertisement on the website of an OCD 
charity and through the research stand at an OCD charities annual conference. The 
non OCD sample (NOCD) were recruited by asking friends, colleagues and family to 
suggest people that were a reasonable match to the OCD participants on age, gender, 
ethnicity and highest educational attainment. Prior to their involvement in the study I 
had never met any of the OCD participants or four out of the five NOCD participants. 
The fifth NOCD participant worked in my university department but although I had 
met him due to this role I did not know him personally in any way. Participation in 
the study was on a voluntary basis and participants did not receive any payment or 
incentive. In order to be eligible for inclusion in the study participants had to be over 
18, have English as their first language and be able think of 8 family members and 8 
friends or acquaintances. OCD participants also had to meet the criteria for a DSM IV 
diagnosis of OCD as determined by the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM IV 
(SCID) (First et al 1996). NOCD participants had to have no mental illness as verified 
by self report. Demographics of the sample are shown in Table 4 in their matched 
pairs.
Four of the five OCD participants had previously received psychological treatment for 
OCD. None of the OCD participants were currently receiving treatment although one 
was on a waiting list for further CBT and two regularly attended self-help groups. All 
described distressing intrusive thoughts and exhibited a range of compulsive 
symptoms (See Table 5 below).
Table 4: Sample demographics
OCD Age Gender Ethnicity Highest
Education
Employment
status
PI Yes 42 F White
British
O-levels, 
Diploma (OU)
Employed
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P8 No 45 F White
British
O-levels.
Diploma
(College)
Employed
P2 Yes 34 M White
British
A-levels Employed
P10 No 30 M White
British
A-levels Employed
P3 Yes 58 M White
British
Technical
College
Employed
P6 No 64 M White
British
A-levels Employed
P4 Yes 72 F White
British
Postgraduate Retired
P9 No 71 F White
British
Postgraduate Retired
P5 Yes 56 F White
British
Further education 
college
Employed
P7 No 53 F White
British
Further education 
college
Employed
Measures
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV fSCID) (First et al 1996s)
The SCID is one of the most widely used methods for determining a diagnosis of
OCD and is considered a reliable and valid way to ascertain if people meet the DSM- 
IV criteria for OCD (First et al 1996). In this study it was used to ensure that 
participants met clinical criteria for OCD and hence could be described as a clinical 
sample.
Obsessive compulsive Inventory (OCD (Foa et al 1998)
The OCI is a 42 item self report measure which in its original format was designed to 
assess the frequency of a wide range of OCD symptom and the distress they cause.
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Participants are asked to indicate how often each of the 42 symptoms have occurred 
over the past month and how much distress they have caused using a five point likert 
scale The OCI has been shown to have good reliability and validity (Simonds, Thorpe 
& Elliot, 2000). However the distress scale and the frequency scale have been found 
to be highly correlated (Foa et al 2002). The distress scale has been found to be more 
predictive of OCD (Foa et al 2002) and better able to discriminate between clinical 
and non clinical populations. Therefore in order to reduce the burden on participants 
only the distress scale was administered. The OCI was used in this study to ensure 
that NOCD participants did not exhibit unusually high levels of OCD symptoms and 
provide a further measure of the symptoms of OCD participants. Participant’s scores 
on the OCI are shown in Table 5.
Table 5: Participant scores on the OCI.
OCI
Subscale
score
PI P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
OCD Participants NOCD Participants
Washing 7 5 8 0 0 0 0 1 2 4
Checking 6 5 0 10 6 0 3 1 0 0
Doubting 3 1 1 5 2 0 1 0 0 1
Ordering 5 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 1
Obsessions 18 6 13 6 6 0 1 0 0 0
Hoarding 0 3 2 11 12 1 5 2 0 3
Neutralising 11 4 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1
Total 50 25 25 37 29 1 11 5 4 10
Procedure
Pilot Study
Since this methodology was unfamiliar to the author a mini pilot study was conducted. 
Initially an MSP was carried out by the author in order to gain some experience of the 
process of completing an MSP and identify any problems which may arise. The MSP
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was then conducted with two of the author’s colleagues to obtain alternative 
perspectives on the experience of undertaking the task and enable the author practice 
in the administration of the task. The data from the pilot was not retained as it was 
used for practice purposes and to highlight any modifications that needed to be made. 
The small sample in the pilot all conducted a number of sorts on people’s physical 
attributes, as well as aspects of their personalities and characteristics. While 
investigating the way people view themselves and others physically would be an 
interesting study in itself, it was decided that since it was not the focus of this study 
participants in the main study would be instructed not to sort on people’s physical 
characteristics.
Main Study
All participants were provided with an information sheet at least 24 hours prior to 
completing the sorting procedure and asked to sign the consent form. OCD 
participants were also contacted by telephone in order for the SCID to be conducted to 
ensure they met diagnostic criteria. Each participant was then met at a venue of their 
choice to complete the MSP. Five participants (two OCD and three NOCD) chose to 
be interviewed at their workplace, one NOCD participant chose to be interviewed at 
her home, one OCD participant chose to be interviewed at a library and the remaining 
three participants were interviewed in a coffee shop.
All participants were sent the OCI to complete prior to meeting for the research 
interview. However one participant from each group was unable to find the 
opportunity to do this so these two participants completed it immediately prior to 
beginning the MSP. Demographic information was formally collected from 
participants prior to commencing the MSP, although since NOCD participants were 
demographically matched to OCD participants this information had already been 
obtained informally in the recruitment process.
Participants were first asked to provide names of six family members in addition to 
their parents, their best friend, friend they see the most often, their oldest friend, a 
friend of the family, a friend they know in a more formal capacity, and three other
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friends. If the friend that best fitted the description on one card was also the friend 
that best fitted the description on another card (e.g. if best friend was also their oldest 
friend) then they were asked to provide the name of the person that next best fit that 
description (e.g. their second oldest friend). These names were then written onto 
numbered cards along with ‘Actual self -  me as I actually am’, ‘Ideal self -  me as I 
wish I was’, ‘Ought self -  me as I think I should be’, ‘Feared se lf -  me as I am scared 
I might be’, Mother and Father giving the participant a total of twenty cards. Table 6 
shows the card descriptions. It was decided to use twenty cards as it was within the 
optimum range recommended by Canter et al (1985), and with a sample of ten 
participants allowed flexibility for MSA analysis.
Table 6: Description of what was written on the twenty cards participants were asked 
to sort.
Card Number Description
1 Actual Self -  me as I actually am
2 Ideal self -  me as I wish I was
3 Ought self -  me as I think I should be
4 Feared self -  me as I am scared I might be or might become
5 Mum
6 Dad
7 Family Member 1 (FMI)
8 Family Member 2 (FM2)
9 Family Member 3 (FM3)
10 Family Member 4 (FM4)
11 Family Member 5 (FM5)
12 Family Member 6 (FM6)
13 Best friend
14 Friend I see the most frequently (freq friend)
15 Friend I have known the longest (old friend)
16 Friend of the family (Family Friend)
178
17 Friend I know through work or in a more formal capacity (Formal 
friend)
18 Other friend 1 (OF1)
19 Other friend 2 (OF2)
20 Other friend 3 (OF3)
Participants were then asked to sort the cards into groups based on aspects of 
personality or personal characteristics. They were told they could sort into as many 
groups as they wanted and as many times as they were able for up to an hour. They 
were asked not to sort on physical characteristics but an example of different ways 
they could sort was provided using the physical characteristic of height (see Appendix 
2 for task instructions given to participants). They were asked to explain each time 
the overall category on which they were sorting the cards and to describe the different 
groups into which they were placing cards under each category. Their response was 
recorded verbatim along with which cards had been sorted under each group heading. 
For example the first sort of Participant 1 was recorded as follows:
Sort 1
Kindness, how kind people are to other people 
Kind-1,2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
Not Kind -  4
This process was repeated until participants were no longer able to think of anything 
to sort on as no participant was able to continue sorting for longer than an hour. 
Participants were then provided with a debrief sheet and then asked if they would like 
to receive a summary of the main findings. Finally participants were thanked for their 
time and their participation.
Analysis
Content analysis o f participant sorts
Firstly the participants’ descriptions of their sort information was transcribed and a 
table of the overall description of each participant’s sorts was constructed (Appendix
3). Content analysis was then performed on the overall description of all participants
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sorts which produced nine category descriptions which it was felt covered the majority 
of sorts produced.
Reliability Check One
A number of psychologists independent of the study were emailed the table 
‘Reliability Check One’ (Appendix 4) and asked to indicate which category best 
described participants sorts. They were instructed to only select one category where 
possible but if they felt a sort fit equally well under more than one category then they 
were instructed to select more than one category. A total of 13 people returned the 
first table. If more than 10 of the 13 people had placed a sort under one particular 
category then the sort was deemed to reliably fit under that category. This accounted 
for 62% of the independently rated sorts. Since there were a large number of 
participant sorts to be rated on this first reliability only a very brief description of each 
category was provided and a single word heading was used to describe each. 
Examining the participant sorts which 10 or more people had not placed in the same 
category suggested that this could be due to ambiguity caused by the overly brief 
category descriptions.
Reliability Check Two
A second table, ‘Reliability Check Two’ (Appendix 5) was then emailed to a different 
group of psychologists, all of whom were also totally independent of the study. This 
table included only the participant sorts which had not been reliably classified in 
reliability check one. This time a fuller description of each category was included and 
the raters were asked to mark the description or descriptions they felt best described 
each sort. No instructions were given as to how many categories could be ticked for 
each sort. Six people returned reliability check two. If a category sort was endorsed 
by five of these six raters then it was deemed to reliably fit under that category. There 
were a number of sorts that overall at least seventeen of the nineteen reliability raters 
in reliability check one and two had classified as one of two categories. It was 
decided that these sorts could be included in both categories. This left thirteen sorts 
for which agreement was not reached, which were classified as ‘uncodeable’.
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Reliability Check Three
Finally, a table ‘Reliability Check three’ (Appendix 6) which included all the sorts as 
described by participants along with the nine full category descriptions was sent to a 
person who described herself as having OCD who had expressed interest in taking 
part in the study but for various practical reasons had been unable to. Inter-rater 
reliability between this rater and the categorizations arrived at through the method 
outlined above was 91%.
Comparison o f feared self descriptions with feared self representation found by 
Ferrier & Brewin (2005)
A list of the description of the group that feared self had been placed in for each sort 
by both groups was then compiled. Five independent raters were then asked to 
indicate on a table sent to them by email (Appendices 7 and 8) which (if any) of the 
four feared self themes generated by Ferrier & Brewin (2005) they felt applied to the 
feared self group descriptions provided by participants in the present study. These self 
themes were: ‘A “ dangerous se lf ’ theme involving the possibility of harm coming to 
others or of being out-of-control, (bad immoral or insane); a “ depressed/anxious se lf ’ 
theme reflecting symptom-related self-perceptions (e.g., fearful or hopeless traits); a 
“ rejected s e lf ’ theme involving self-perceptions of being lonely or unloveable; and a 
“ flawed se lf ’ theme involving traits that are perceived as undesirable but not 
inherently dangerous to self or others (e.g., selfish, proud)’ (Ferrier & Brewin, 2005, 
pl368).
Multiple Scalogram Analysis
MSA was used to examine the relationships between each of the cards sorted by 
participants and the categories they sorted on. The MSA was conducted using the 
Psychometric Analysis Package (PAP) developed by Dr Sean Hammond for analysing 
multivariate data which is available to download free of charge from the internet at 
http://www.pbarrett.net/cfa-facet.htm. As described above, the first step involved in 
performing MSA is to transform data into a matrix in either excel or SPSS so that 
rows in the matrix represent the cards and columns represent sorts. Instructions of 
how this data must then be formatted to be compatible with PAP and the steps
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involved in running an MSA using PAP can also be found at 
http://www.pbarrett.net/cfa-facet.htm.
An MSA was completed for all sorts of each individual participant. The feared self 
was a clear outlier for most participants so MSA was completed again for these 
participants excluding the feared self. MSA was then completed for the first sort of 
each participant (excluding feared self), standard practice in MSP as it is considered 
most salient (Canter et al 1985). This revealed a clear difference between groups on 
the positioning of ideal self and ought self. Therefore an MSA was completed on all 
sorts where this difference was evident. MSA was then completed on the categories 
for which there was a suggestion people with OCD may be sensitive. Finally, MSA 
was completed for all participants excluding their four self structures in order that 
attempts could be made to partition the plots to ascertain if any patterns could be 
detected in the way people with OCD sorted significant others which were different to 
the way that people without OCD sorted significant others.
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RESULTS
Overview of the way sorts were described
The most striking difference in the way people with OCD and people without OCD 
approached the task of sorting the cards into groups was the level of explanation 
provided for each sort. While people without OCD tended to provide a general 
description and used fairly abstract concepts, people with OCD tended to use very 
specific descriptions and reduce abstract concepts to the level of an operational 
description. For example, an OCD and a NOCD participant both sorted on 
intelligence. The NOCD participant described the sort as ‘Intelligence’ and grouped 
the cards by ‘Intelligent’, ‘Average Intelligence’ and ‘Less than average intelligence’. 
The OCD participant described the sort as ‘Intelligence, by that I am talking about 
whether I could have an intellectual conversation with them about politics or science 
or something like that’ and grouped the cards by ‘Those I perceive as particularly 
intelligent and could have an intellectual conversation with about most topics’, ‘Those 
not so intelligent, would find it more difficult to have conversation about more 
intellectual topics’ and ‘Those not particularly intelligent at all, I wouldn’t try to talk 
about intellectual things with them’. So although both participants sorted on the 
concept of intelligence the OCD participant operationalised it to make it into 
something quite concrete whereas the NOCD participant left it at an abstract level, 
more open to interpretation. In order to gain an objective measure of this observation 
I performed a word count on the transcripts of each participant and divided it by the 
number of sorts they produced in order to get an average word count per sort. Table 7 
below shows the average number of words used per sort by the OCD and NOCD 
groups.
Table 7: Average number of words used by each participant to describe their sorts.
Participant Pairs Average words OCD Average words NOCD
PI, P8 53 42
P2, P10 70 38
P3,P6 76 38
P4, P9 64 42
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P5,P7 78 58
Total 68.2 43.6
An independent t-test was carried out on the average words per sort for each group. 
The mean difference between conditions was 24.6 with the 95% confidence interval 
for the estimated population mean difference estimated to be between 11.1 and 38.1. 
An independent t-test revealed that if the null hypothesis were true, such a result 
would have been unlikely to have arisen (t(8) = 4.07, p=.003). Therefore it can be 
said that the OCD group used significantly more words per sort than the NOCD 
group.
Number of Sorts produced
Doron and Kyrios (2005) suggested people with OCD may have fewer domains of self 
they value than people without OCD so the first research question was ‘Will people 
with OCD sort on fewer categories than people without OCD?’ When using free sorts 
in a multiple sorting procedure the number of sorts produced is thought to represent 
the important aspects of the topic on which people are sorting (Canter et al 1985, 
Barnett 2004). Although there was wide variation between participants on how many 
sorts they were able to perform, overall each group sorted an identical number of 
times. Therefore the OCD sample in this study, do not have less domains of self 
which are important to them than the NOCD sample. Table 8 shows the number of 
sorts performed by each participant.
Table 8: Number of sorts performed by each participant
Participant Pairs Number of sorts OCD Number of sorts NOCD
PI, P8 8 7
P2, P10 16 10
P3,P6 6 13
P4, P9 9 7
P5, P7 4 6
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Total 43 43
Thematic Analysis of Sorts Produced
Table 9 shows the overall category descriptions that participant sorts were classified 
under. The totals add up to more than the total number of sorts for each group as 
some sorts were classified under more than one category. For example ‘Funniness, 
good sense of humour, people you can have a laugh with’ was classified as being both 
an interpersonal skill and a quality that made somebody unique, ‘Religious faith’ was 
classified as being uniqueness and a virtue.
The symptom related category refers to sorts which were clearly related to people’s 
symptoms. For example an OCD participant who had the compulsion to report 
anything that could be deemed a hazard to the police (e.g. a crack in the pavement) 
sorted on ‘If somebody saw a hazard how likely they would be to report it to the 
police’. The NOCD participant sort I included as symptom related was on ‘People 
who worry about health’, and groups were split by ‘people who worry with reason’, 
‘people who worry for no reason’, and ‘people who do not worry at all.’ Some of this 
participant’s family members as well as the participant were experiencing some 
serious health problems at the time of the interview so I decided to include this as a 
symptom related sort. This category was not included in the reliability check as to 
ascertain if sorts were related to symptoms it would have been necessary to provide 
reliability-raters with each participants SCID interview or other biographical details 
which I felt was inappropriate both ethically and practically.
The inappropriate category included sorts which were not really aspects of personality 
or personal characteristics. These sorts were ‘People I would like to call right now’, 
‘How often people visit’, ‘Parenting skills’ and ‘People I would like to be like’.
The unclassifiable group refers to sorts that could not be reliably said to fit into any 
category as there was no consensus between independent raters. On reflection I feel 
that five of these sorts, all carried out by participants in the NOCD could be grouped
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into a separate category ‘Job related competence skills’. These sorts were ‘Driven’, 
‘Leadership skills’, ‘Competitiveness’, ‘Opinionated’ and ‘Entrepreneurial’.
Table 9: Category descriptions of Participant Sorts
Category Number of sorts by 
people with OCD
Number of sorts by 
people without OCD
Benevolence -  trait which describes a 
persons ability to show externally 
focused caring/ concern
9 8
Competence/ efficacy -  trait which 
describes a person’s ability to 
function practically/ achieve
6 4
Interpersonal skill -  trait which 
describes a persons ability to interact 
with others
5 6
Egocentricity -  trait which describes 
how internally focused somebody is
2 3
A virtue -  a fundamental trait linked 
to a person’s value system -  goodness 
and righteousness.
7 6
Uniqueness/ individuality -  a trait 
which could set people aside from 
others
4 9
Anger -  a trait which describes a 
person’s ability to manage anger or 
aggression
2 3
Symptom related 5 1
Inappropriate 3 1
Unclassifiable 4 10
Total 47 51
Differences between categories of sorts of OCD and NOCD 
participants
Doron et al (2007, 2008) suggested people with OCD feel the self domains of morality 
and job competence are particularly important so the second research question was 
‘Will people with OCD be more likely to sort on self domains related to morality or 
job competence than people without OCD ? Overall there was little difference on the 
categories that OCD and NOCD participants sorted on. The most striking difference 
as outlined above was level of detail people used to describe their sorts rather than the 
nature of the categories of the sorts.
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The main difference to note is in the category of ‘Uniqueness’ with NOCD 
participants producing more than double the amount of sorts under this category than 
OCD participants. Sorts included under this category were attributes which make 
people individual such as ‘How artistic people are’, ‘Sportiness’ and ‘Eccentricity’. 
Unsurprisingly OCD participant sorted on symptom related topics more often than 
NOCD participants. It could be argued that OCD participants symptoms are in fact 
what makes them unique at the time of testing and adding these categories together 
eliminates this difference.
The second difference to note is in the ‘unclassifiable’ category. As noted above five 
of the NOCD participants sorts under this category all seem to be linked on the basis 
of ability to do well in the workplace or job competence. Interestingly Doron et al 
(2008) found job competence to be associated with OCD, however in this study it was 
an area that seemed to be more important to NOCD participants than OCD 
participants.
The final difference is in the larger number of NOCD sorts which were classified 
under two category headings. This is likely to be explained by the fact that NOCD 
participants were more abstract in their sort descriptions hence giving more room for 
interpretation as to their precise meaning.
Feared self description
Ferrier & Brewin (2005) found that people with OCD described their feared self 
differently to people without OCD so the fourth research question was ‘Will there be a 
difference in the way OCD and NOCD participants describe their feared self? The 
descriptions of the group feared self was placed in for each sort were compared to the 
different category descriptions for feared self found by Ferrier and Brewin (2005). 
Independent raters were asked to place the feared sort description under the 
description they felt matched it best and were also given the option of placing it in an 
‘Other’ category in which they were asked to specify what other would be. The 
majority of specifications for other were ‘normal’. Table 10 shows the average
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number of times sorts were placed for each group under the five feared self 
descriptions. As can be seen there was no real difference in the way either group 
described feared self.
Table 10: Showing the wav feared self was described by each group
Dangerous Anxious/
Depressed
Rejected Flawed Other
OCD 4 6 6 18 5
NOCD 5 6 5 17 4
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MSA analysis
First Sorts
MSA analysis was carried out on each participant’s first sort. The top plots for each 
group are shown in Figures 5 and 6.
1st Sort OCD
♦  Other friend 3
FM3
♦  Ideal S e lf*  ♦  FM2
Actual self, b e s t friend,
OF2
♦  ♦
Formal friend
♦  Freq friend
♦  PM e& old  friend 
O ther friend 1 
♦  FM5
Ought Self 
♦  Mum 
♦ ♦  Dad
* ...
. F M i  ♦  Feared  se»
vs.:
Figure 5: Top plot o f the first sort of people with OCD
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1st Sort NOCD
♦  FM6 +  Prim ai1 Friend
♦  OF2
♦  FM5 OF1 
♦  Feared  Self +  Family Friend ♦  +  ideal & ought self
FM2
♦  OF3 *  ♦ Dad
FM4
♦ ♦  Mum & Old F 
Freq Friend
♦  B est friend
♦  A ctual self
Figure 6: Top plot o f the first sort o f people without OCD
Feared  S e lf  d iscrepancy
Ferrier & Brewin (2005) found there was a smaller discrepancy between actual self 
and feared self in people with OCD than people without OCD so the fifth research 
question was 6 Will people with OCD sort their feared self closer to their actual self 
than people without OCD? The first point to notice when examining the top plot o f 
first sorts for each group is that the feared self is an outlier and the distance between 
actual self and feared self is similar for each group. Overlaying the item plots for each 
group revealed that no participant from either group sorted their actual self and their 
feared self in the same group on their first sort. However, on the first sort participants 
in the NOCD group were more willing to sort friends and family into the same group 
as their feared self than in the OCD group. An overlay o f the item plots shows that 
only one participant in the NOCD group sorted feared self in a category which 
included no other cards whereas in the OCD group three participants did this. 
Examining the top plots for each all sorts o f each individual participant revealed that 
feared self and actual self were only sorted into the same group by two participants,
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one from the OCD group and one from the NOCD group. The top plots for these 
participants (Figure 7 and Figure 8) show that for the OCD participant actual self is 
the closest card to feared self and then there is increasing movement away across the 
plot o f the other cards. However, for the NOCD participant there are a number of 
friends and family closer or equally close to the feared self than the participant’s 
actual self is.
Participant 1
♦  FM4 
♦  FM5
♦  Mum
♦  Freq  friend♦  B es t friend
♦  A c tu a l s e lf
♦  FM3
Ideal & O ught se lf  ♦  ♦  *  Dad
FM6
♦  Old friend
♦  F e a re d  se lf
♦  FM1
Figure 7: Top plot o f Participant 1
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Participants
♦ FM1
♦ O F 2  + Fami|y friend
♦ Ideal & Ought self 
.F re q  friend .  Formal friend ♦ F M2
♦ OF3
FM6 
*♦ FM5
♦ FM3
♦ Best friend
♦ Dad
Actual self* 
♦ Old friend*
♦ Feared self
♦ FM4
♦ Mum
Figure 8: Top plot o f Participant 6 
D iscrepancy  betw een ought s e lf  and Ideal se lf
An interesting and unexpected result from analysing the top plots o f the first sorts is 
the discrepancy between ideal self and ought self that exists in the OCD group that 
does not exist in the NOCD group. All participants in the NOCD group sorted ideal 
and ought self in the same group hence they are plotted on the same point on the 
scatter graph. However overlaying the item plots for each participant in the OCD 
group revealed four out o f five participants sorted ideal and ought self in separate 
groups. Inspecting the sorts o f all participants revealed that there was a discrepancy 
between ideal self and ought self on 28% sorts performed by OCD participants 
compared with 5% o f sorts by NOCD participants. Table 11 shows the sorts for both 
groups for which the ideal self and ought self were sorted in different groups and the 
category each sort has been classified as.
Related to this finding two o f the NOCD participants asked for clarification as to what 
was meant by the ‘ought se lf  and expressed difficulty in understanding how it was
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different to their ideal self. A further NOCD participant expressed difficulty in 
placing the ought self when sorting cards.
Table 11 : Descriptions of sorts where ideal and ought self were grouped differently
Participant Sort Category
P2 (OCD) Happiness Unclassifiable
P2 (OCD) People I’d like to be Inappropriate
P2 (OCD) People I’d like to call right now Inappropriate
P2 (OCD) People who would correct a hazard Symptom
P3 (OCD) How caring people are Benevolence
P3 (OCD) Funniness Interpersonal Skill/ 
Uniqueness
P3 (OCD) Caring for animals Benevolence
P3 (OCD) Understanding of peoples problems Benevolence
P4 (OCD) Disclosing of feelings, ability to 
express emotions
Interpersonal skill
P4 (OCD) Ability to stand up for beliefs Unclassifiable
P5 (OCD) Tidiness Symptom
P5(OCD) Anger Anger
P7 (NOCD) Worry about health Symptom
P9 (NOCD) Gossipy Unclassifiable
MSA was carried out on the first two sorts where there was a discrepancy between 
ideal and ought self for people with OCD. It was decided not to do the MSA on all 
sorts as this would have meant over representation of participants 2 and 3 in the plot. 
The first MSA revealed the feared self as a definite outlier which meant the remaining 
points were clustered closely together. Therefore the MSA was conducted again 
removing the feared self from analysis. The top plot is shown in Figure 9.
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Ought/ Ideal discrepency in OCD group excluding feared self
...
♦  Best friend
Actual self
I
♦  OFi
♦  FM4 *  FM6 *  ♦  Freq Friend
♦  FM1 *  Fanily friend 
♦  Dad ♦  Ought self
♦  Old Friend
♦  Mum ♦  FM5 ♦  FM3
♦  Formal friend 
♦  OF3 
♦  FM2
Figure 9: Top plot o f first two sorts o f OCD participants where there was a
discrepancy between ideal and ought self.
It can be seen that the actual self is positioned between the ideal and ought self. 
Inspecting the item plots o f each participant revealed that participants would 
sometimes place their actual self in the same group (or closest group) to ideal self and 
sometimes in the same group to ought self. However all participants placed either 
Mum or Dad, often both, in the same group or closest group to ought self on all sorts 
where there was a discrepancy between ideal and ought self. Examination o f the 
descriptions o f the groups OCD participants placed their ideal and ought selves 
offered a revealing insight into the struggle between these two self structures. When 
there was a discrepancy between the ideal self and ought self, one o f the self structures 
was described as an unobtainable, extreme position. This was bi-directional in that for 
some sorts it was the ought self that was unobtainable, while for others it was the ideal 
self. Participant’s descriptions o f these positions suggested they recognised that they 
were extreme or unobtainable. For example, Participant 3 sorted on ‘How caring 
people are’. He placed his ought self in the group ‘M ost caring possible, higher than
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is necessary’, his actual self in the group ‘Really caring’ and his ideal self in the group 
‘A bit less caring, still quite caring though’. His feared self was in the group ‘not 
caring at all’. However, for the sort ‘How much people like and care about animals’ 
he placed his ideal self in the group ‘Way above and beyond in how much they care 
about animals, e.g. working in a wildlife park in Africa on conservation projects, 
animal protection and well being would be their life’. He placed his actual self in the 
group ‘Really like and care about animals a lot, passionate about them’. He placed his 
ought self in the group ‘A bit less, care about animals but they have their place and 
there are other equally important things to care about’. His feared self was in the 
group ‘No interest whatsoever in animals’.
The two NOCD participants who sorted ought and ideal self in different groups did so 
as follows. Participant 7 had sorted on ‘How much people worry about their health’. 
Both her parents and her ought self were in the group ‘Worry about health but with 
good reason’, her ideal self was in the group ‘Don’t worry about health at all’ and her 
actual self was in the group ‘worry about health but not too much’. Participant nine 
had called her sort ‘Gossipy’. She placed her ideal self in the group ‘moderately 
gossipy’ and her ought and actual self in the group ‘less gossipy’. Her father was in 
the group ‘Not gossipy at all’, while her mother and her feared self were in the group 
‘Fairly gossipy’.
Sensitivity in category sorts o f virtue and competence
Doron et al (2008) found people with OCD to be more sensitive in the self domains of 
morality and job competence than people without OCD so the third research question 
was ‘Will people with OCD demonstrate more sensitivity in domains related to 
morality and job competence than people without OCD?’ It was decided that the 
categories of virtue and competence were related to morality and job competence so 
MSA of participant sorts on these categories was conducted. It should be noted that 
only three participants from each group sorted on virtue and three participants from 
each group sorted on competence, so these plots are not representative of the whole 
sample. The feared self was an outlier for each group on both categories so was
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excluded.
Virtue OCD
♦  FM6
♦  Freq friend
♦  FM1 ♦  Dad
♦  FM2
♦  FM5 
♦  Mum
♦  FM4
Ideal & ought self 
♦  ♦  OF2
♦  Actual self
♦
FM3 & Formal 
friend
♦  Best friend
Figure 10: The top plot for OCD participants sorts on categories relating to virtue 
excluding feared self.
♦  F o rm a l fr ien d Virtue N O C D
♦  A ctual s e l f
♦  O F 4
♦  O F2 ♦  O F 3
M u m , o ld  fr ien d  & ♦  ld e a l & o u g h t  s e l f
F o rm a l fr ien d  ♦  F req  friend
FM1 ,FM 3,FM 5 & FM6
♦  D ad  & FM2
♦  B e s t  fr ien d  a n d  OF1
Figure 11: The top plot tor NOCD participant sorts on categories relating to virtue 
excluding feared self.
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It can be seen from examining the top plots for virtue sorts (Figures 10 & 11) that the 
actual self in OCD participants was slightly closer to ideal and ought self than it was 
for NOCD participants which would suggest contrary to Doron et al (2008) OCD 
participant are slightly less sensitive in the virtue domain, although this difference is 
small. OCD participants placed their parents further from their ideal and ought selves 
than people with NOCD.
Competence OCD
-
♦  Mum
♦  Fam ily friend
.
+  OF5 . F o r m a ,  friend
OF3 »  ™
♦  FM3
♦  Freq friend
♦  FM6 ♦ F req lr ,e n d  B es t f r ien d *
♦  Ideal & o u g h t s e lf  
D ad
♦  FM1 ♦  0 F 2
♦  Actual s e lf
Figure 12: The top plot o f OCD participant’s sorts related to competence excluding 
feared self.
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Competence NOCD
♦  Old friend
♦  Actual s e lf
♦  OF3
^  FM2 ♦  Ideal S o u g h t  s e lf
♦  OF3
♦  0 F 2  ♦  Form al friend 
Fam ily friend  .  ♦  F req friend
Figure 13: The top plot o f NOCD participant’s sorts related to competence excluding 
feared self
Examining the top plots o f competence sorts (Figures 12 & 13) shows that the actual 
self in people with OCD is twice as close to the ideal and ought self than people 
without OCD, again suggesting that contrary to Doron et al (2008), people with OCD 
are much less sensitive than people without OCD in this domain. However, 
overlaying the item plots demonstrated that two thirds o f the competence sorts of 
people with OCD were performed by the same participant. This participant sorted his 
actual self in the same group as ideal and ought self on all o f his sorts which accounts 
for much o f the difference between groups.
H ow  fam ily and friends w ere positioned
The final research question was ‘Will people with OCD demonstrate a difference to 
people without OCD in the way they sort significant others?’ In order to investigate 
how participants in both groups positioned their family and friends in relation to each 
other it was decided to try and partition the top plot o f each participant using their 
item plots to determine any patterns. It was not possible to partition the top plot of 
any participant in a meaningful way using all item plots simultaneously as all 
participants grouped quite different people together on different categories. Therefore
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the four self structures were excluded and top plots were output for each participant’s 
friends and family. These top plots were then partitioned separately for each sort and 
can be found in Appendix 10. One hypothesis was that people with OCD may show 
idealisation of significant others and always sort them into a positive group. 
Inspection of the plots in Appendix 10 shows this is not the case as people with OCD 
did not always sort significant others into positive groups. Another hypothesis was 
that people with OCD may have a dichotomous view of significant others which may 
be demonstrated by always sorting some people in negative groups and other people 
always in positive groups. Again this was shown not to be the case as people with 
OCD all used groups described as ‘average’ or in the middle and significant others 
were often place in these groups. Overall there was no clear difference between 
groups. Although both groups tended to view certain people in their lives in a more 
positive way than others, both groups seemed able to recognise strengths and 
weaknesses in all the significant people in their lives.
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DISCUSSION
This study set out to explore some of the emerging theories regarding the possibility 
that an underlying ambivalent self concept is a contributing factor to OCD. Bhar & 
Kyrios (2007) define self-ambivalence as simultaneously holding conflicting beliefs 
about one’s self worth such as T am moral’ and T am immoral’. Using a specifically 
developed self-report measure they found people with OCD to be more self- 
ambivalent than non-clinical controls. Doron et al (2008) found people with OCD to 
be more sensitive in the self domains of morality and job competence than non- 
clinical controls. Taking these two studies together, and drawing on previous work by 
Guidano & Liotti (1983), Bhar & Kyrios (2007) hypothesised that people with OCD 
have an ambivalent sense of self particularly with regard to the self domains of 
morality and job competence. Similarly Terrier & Brewin (2005) found the 
discrepancy between the feared self and the actual self to be smaller in people with 
OCD than non-clinical controls. Furthermore they had found the nature of the feared 
self in people with OCD to be different to non-clinical controls in that it was more 
likely to be described as ‘Dangerous -  bad, immoral or insane’. The results of the 
present study suggest that an ambivalent self-concept could be a contributory factor in 
OCD. However the results suggest a new way of conceptualising this self­
ambivalence in OCD, and do not support the findings about sensitivity in specific self 
domains.
Feared Self-Actual Self Discrepancy
One hypothesis was that there would be a smaller discrepancy between feared self and 
actual self in people with OCD, reflecting the two conflicting beliefs they are thought 
to hold about themselves. Within the context of MSP, this would be indicated by 
proximity between actual and fear self. However, contrary to the findings of Terrier & 
Brewin (2005), this study found no difference in the distance between the feared self 
and the actual self in people with OCD and people without OCD. For the majority of 
participants their feared self was never placed in the same group as their actual self 
and the distance between these two self constructs was large, in fact for most people 
regardless of whether they had OCD or not, their feared self was a clear outlier.
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Ferrier & Brewin (2005) found that the feared self tended to be characterised as 
dangerous to self or others by virtue of being bad, immoral or insane in people with 
OCD, while the feared self in people without OCD tended to be described as flawed, 
an undesirable characteristic but not dangerous or harmful. This study however found 
no difference in the way people with OCD described their feared self to the way it was 
described by people without OCD. A possible reason for this is the design used by 
Ferrier & Brewin (2005) may have been investigating the nature or severity of OCD 
symptoms, rather than a more pervasive self-construct contributing to the cause of 
these symptoms. The most widely held psychological model of OCD (e.g. Clark 
2004, Salkovskis 1995) suggests that the reason intrusive thoughts, which are 
experienced by the majority of the population, cause such distress to people with OCD 
is because they misinterpret them as meaning they are bad, immoral or insane. 
Therefore in asking people with OCD to describe their feared self it is possible that 
Ferrier & Brewin (2005) were eliciting a description of their OCD participant’s 
misinterpretation of their intrusive thoughts, in other words their symptoms. The 
‘dangerous’ feared self found by Ferrier & Brewin (2005) may be a phenomenological 
description of OCD rather than a causal factor. The present study on the other hand 
elicited a description of what individuals fear they may be in a broader, more 
everyday sense and in relation to others. Rather than being directly asked to describe 
their feared self as a stand alone entity, participants were asked to sort their feared 
self, together with their ideal self, ought self, actual self, their family and friends on 
aspects of personality or character traits. This meant they were describing their feared 
self on aspects of personality they felt important in a relational context. As such they 
were more likely to be describing their feared self as experienced in everyday 
interactions, rather than their feared self as it pertains specifically to their obsessive- 
compulsive concerns.
There was one person in each group for whom their actual self was closer to their 
feared self than it was to their ideal or ought selves. For the person without OCD 
many of his friends and family were also closer to his feared self than to his ideal or 
ought self, and some of his friends and family were closer to his feared self than his 
actual self was. This suggests a generally more critical view of people in his life as 
well as himself, rather than a particularly negative experience of himself. The OCD
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participant on the other hand placed herself in the same group as her feared self on 
over half of her sorts and her actual self was closer to her feared self than any of her 
friends or family by a clear margin. She was also the only participant that had never 
received any treatment for her OCD and she scored much higher on the OCI than the 
other participants. This further supports the hypothesis that a small discrepancy 
between feared self and actual self is potentially a measure of the severity of OCD 
symptoms rather than an underlying causal factor. Perhaps for this participant her 
obsessive thoughts were so intrusive the feared self of everyday interactions was the 
feared self of her obsessive thoughts. Her lack of exposure to a therapy such as CBT 
possibly meant she had not been exposed to alternative ways of thinking about her self 
and interpreting intrusive thoughts.
Ideal self -  Ought self Discrepancy
It appears that self discrepancy research to date has primarily focused on the 
discrepancy between the actual self and each of the other self constructs (e.g. actual- 
ought, actual-ideal and actual-feared) This is perhaps because the experimental 
paradigm for self discrepancy research, which asks participants to rate on a likert scale 
how alike their description of each of the different self constructs is to their actual self, 
does not allow for discrepancies between the other self constructs to be investigated. 
However, the multiple sorting procedure used in this study enabled examination of 
how the four self constructs were understood in relation to each other and to 
significant others in participant’s lives. This revealed a discrepancy between the ideal 
self and the ought self in participants with OCD which was not evident in participants 
without OCD. On their first sort every participant without OCD sorted their ideal and 
ought self in the same group. However, in participants with OCD, only one 
participant sorted her ideal and ought self in the same group. Overall more than a 
quarter of sorts performed by people with OCD had their ideal self and their ought self 
in separate groups compared with less than five percent of people without OCD. A 
discrepancy between ideal and ought self in people with OCD is consistent with Bhar 
& Kyrios’ (2007) findings of higher levels of self ambivalence in people with OCD. 
However, rather than the ambivalence being about people with OCD holding two 
conflicting beliefs about what they think they are and what fear they might be as
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suggested by Bhar & Kyrios (2007), these results suggest the ambivalence could also 
be about a conflict between the way people with OCD would like to be and the way 
they think they should be. Examining the questions in the Self Ambivalence Measure 
used by Bhar & Kyrios (2007) would suggest it is conceivable that a conflict between 
ideal self and ought self could lead to high scores for people with OCD. For example, 
the first question asks people to rate how true the statement 61 feel tom between 
different parts of my personality’ is for them. This would be very true for somebody 
with a conflict between the way they want to be and the way they think they should 
be.
There was one OCD participant for whom there was no discrepancy between ideal self 
and ought self. This was the same participant for whom the actual self and the feared 
self were close together. This is consistent with findings of Carver et al (1999). 
Carver et al (1999) found that a small discrepancy between actual self and feared self 
was a predictor for anxiety type disorders, and that when this was the case, actual self- 
ought self discrepancies were not predictive of anxiety disorders. However when 
there was a large discrepancy between feared self and actual self, ought self-actual self 
discrepancies did then predict anxiety related disorders. Based on Carver & Sheier’s
(1998) self regulation model, it may be hypothesised that when people are 
experiencing distressing symptoms such as intrusive thoughts which mean they 
experience their feared self and actual self as close together, they are driven solely by 
the motivation not to be their feared self such that all else becomes irrelevant to them. 
However when they have managed to achieve some distance from their feared self 
then they are motivated to try to move towards their ideal and/or ought selves so any 
conflict between these becomes more significant to them. Carver et al (1999) describe 
the ought self as combining a feeling of obligation to be a certain way with a sense 
that not fulfilling this obligation satisfactorily would entail disapproval from self or 
others and hence the possibility of moving back towards the feared self. If the ought 
self and ideal self are not consistent then one my hypothesise this sets up an 
impossible dilemma -  either one aims to fulfil the demands of the ought self which 
causes distress because it is not the ideal self, or one aims to fulfil the demands of the 
ideal self which causes distress because it is not the ought self and hence makes the 
feared self a possibility.
203
Development of a discrepancy between ideal self and ought self
Doron & Kyrios (2005) and Kempke & Luyten (2007) had both hypothesised that an
ambivalent self-concept in people with OCD could be the result of an ambivalent 
attachment pattern. While there is some empirical evidence to suggest an 
overprotective and/or very strict parenting style is associated with OCD research is 
inconsistent. The results of the present suggest that an ambivalent attachment pattern 
could be a contributory factor to OCD.
Although people with OCD did not place their parents with their ought self on every 
sort overall, on all sorts where there was a discrepancy between their ideal and their 
ought selves, OCD participant’s placed one or both of their parents in the same group 
as their ought self. Their ideal self was quite distant from their ought self and their 
parents, with their actual self placed somewhere in between these. This suggests that 
when people with OCD experience a conflict between the way they want to be and the 
way they think they should be, they associate the way they think they should be with 
one or both of their parents. This is reminiscent of traditional psychoanalytic theories 
of OCD. Kempke & Luyten (2007) describe traditional psychoanalytic theories of 
OCD as conceptualising the ego (the predominantly conscious part of self, which in 
this study could be said to be represented by the actual self) as being trapped in an 
impossible conflict between the superego (the moral compass which develops from 
the internalization of the primary caregiver, so in this study potentially represented by 
the ought self) and the id (natural human impulses such as aggression and sexual 
desire, so in this study being potentially represented by the ideal self). While 
psychoanalytic theory sees this tension between the id and the superego as existing in 
all of us, in normal development people would find adaptive strategies for managing it 
and more or less integrate these contradictory parts of self. However those who 
develop OCD are understood to be unable to integrate the id and the superego as their 
superego is thought to be excessively harsh as the result of an overly demanding or 
critical primary caregiver, qualities thought to lead to ambivalent attachments. 
Couched in more cognitive terms one may hypothesise that while most people develop 
their own internal sense of right and wrong, a personal rule book of beliefs and
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assumptions, which is both mediated and is moderated by their personal goals and 
desires, it is proposed that for people with OCD their sense of what they should be 
remains externalised and represented by others such as their parents. Theories of 
Salkovskis et al (1999) and O’Connor (2007) describe pathways which could lead the 
hypothesised inability to internalise the ought self. Salkovskis et al (1999) describe 
how being given too much responsibility in early childhood; being over-protected and 
given no responsibility in early childhood; or having overly rigid or extreme standards 
to which they must conform in childhood; could all lead people to develop inflated 
beliefs about their personal responsibility. However, it could also be argued that these 
three scenarios could lead to people being prevented from fully developing their own 
internal sense of how they should be since in each case it is external factors, such as a 
parent, determining what they can and cannot do. O’Connor’s (2007) theory on how 
overprotection or undershielding in early childhood could lead to OCD, offers a 
similar explanation of how people may fail to internalise their ought self. Using 
O’Connor’s (2007) theories, it could be hypothesised that people who are 
overprotected are not given enough access to the world to form their own internal set 
of rules so remain reliant on the externalised rules of others. On the other hand people 
who are undershielded may be flooded with experiences which overwhelm them and 
leave them with no internal sense of being able to cope, leading them to look 
externally for guidance on how to manage their internal dilemmas. O’Connor’s 
(2007) theory would also explain how an unobtainable ideal self may develop. He 
theorises that if people are overprotected and do not have enough exposure to the 
world, then they develop exaggerated fantasies about how it may be, which it could be 
hypothesised may in turn lead to exaggerated desires about what they would like to 
become.
Sensitive domains of self
The present study did not support the hypothesis of Doron & Kyrios (2005) that 
people with OCD have less domains of self they value. The current study asked 
participants to sort people into groups based on aspects of personality traits or 
characteristics. The categories people chose to sort on represent the aspects of 
personality that they consider most important, the domains of self they value most
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(Canter et al, 1985). Although there was variation between individuals as to how
many aspects of self they sorted on, there was no difference between people with
OCD and people without OCD on the number of individual sorts performed, nor on 
the overall number of different categories (or self domains) they sorted on. What was 
different between groups was the amount of detail they used to describe their sorts. 
People without OCD described their categories using abstract concepts e.g. ‘Honesty’ 
while people with OCD tended to give a quite detailed, concrete, operational
definition of their categories and the groups within those categories e.g.
‘Trustworthiness, as in whether if you told someone a really personal secret they 
would tell anybody else’. This is perhaps not surprising given the ‘intolerance of 
uncertainty’ and ‘perfectionism’ schemas found in people with OCD by the OCCWG 
(2001,2003,2005)
Doron et al (2008) found that people with OCD were more sensitive than people with 
other anxiety disorders and non-clinical controls in the self domains of morality and 
job competence. In the present study the categories of virtue and competence could 
be said to be representative of the self domains of morality and job competence. 
Contrary to the findings of Doron et al (2008), the distance between actual self and 
ideal self or ought self in people with OCD on these two categories was less than that 
of people without OCD, suggesting if anything the OCD participants were slightly 
less sensitive in these domains than NOCD participants. Although this study did not 
find people with OCD to be more sensitive than people without OCD on domains 
specifically relating to morality, it could be argued that the discrepancy between ideal 
self and ought self found in people with OCD indicates their sensitivity to moral 
concerns as compared to people without OCD. Only three people from each group 
sorted on domains related to morality or job competence so the lack of specific 
sensitivity found in people with OCD could be due to sampling error. However it is 
also possible that the sensitivity found in these self domains by Doron et al (2008) 
could be due to the a combination of the intolerance of uncertainty schema (OCCWG 
2001, 2003, 2005) in people with OCD which was demonstrated in this study in the 
difficulty they had in leaving concepts at the abstract level and the confirmatory 
design of the Doron et al (2008) study. Doron et al (2008) selected three domains of 
self -  job competence, morality and social acceptability - that they felt may be of
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relevance in OCD. Using a confirmatory design they then classified participants as 
sensitive in these domains if they rated the domain as important but did not rate 
themselves as competent in the domain. It is possible that if people with OCD were 
unable to be absolutely certain they could say they were competent they would 
classify themselves as incompetent in the area. This hypothesis is supported by the 
fact that Doron et al (2008) found people with OCD were sensitive in all three of the 
self domains they investigated, although it was only the domains of morality and job 
competence in which they were more sensitive than the other groups in their study. 
Therefore it is possible that using the study design of Doron et al (2008), people with 
OCD could potentially be classified as sensitive in every self domain that was 
important to them. The present study allowed people to give their own descriptions of 
how they rated themselves on each category. As such they could classify themselves 
as ‘Trustworthy, as in if you told the person a really important secret they would be 
trusted with if ,  rather than simply as ‘Trustworthy’ which could feel uncomfortable 
for someone who finds it difficult to tolerate uncertainty.
OCD and significant others
There was no previous research on the way people with OCD conceived of significant 
others. Drawing on the theories of Doron & Kyrios (2005) and Kempke & Luyten 
(2007) it was hypothesised that people with OCD may idealise significant others, or 
that they may tend to see people in a very ‘all or nothing’ kind of way — that is 
somebody is either good or bad, no middle ground. Apart from the stronger 
identification of parents with the ought self outlined above, this study found no 
difference between the way people with OCD see significant others to the way people 
without OCD do. For both groups there were some people that tended to be closer to 
the ideal self than others, but there was no obvious difference between the groups. 
Both groups also seemed to hold a view of people as having strengths and weaknesses 
in different areas hence the problems in producing plots partitioned on all sorts. It is 
possible that the method used in this study may have not detected differences in the 
way the two groups perceive significant others. For example ambivalence about 
others may only be activated in actual interpersonal situations.
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Summary of Findings
The main finding of this study was that there appears to be a discrepancy between the 
ideal self and the ought self in people with OCD which did not appear to be present in 
people without OCD. This discrepancy was bi-directional in the sense that on some 
occasions it was their ought self that was beyond what anybody could realistically 
achieved, and on other occasions it was their ideal self. On occasions where there was 
a discrepancy between the ideal self and the ought self in people with OCD, one or 
both parents was associated with the ought self, suggesting theories linking OCD to an 
ambivalent attachment pattern to be a useful way of understanding the development of 
OCD.
Although this study did not find the discrepancy between the actual self and feared 
self to be smaller in people with OCD than in people without OCD in a general sense, 
the results did suggest that it could be helpful to conceptualise distressing OCD 
symptoms as occurring when the actual self and feared self are experienced as being 
close together.
With the exception of their parents, there did not seem to be any difference in the way 
people with OCD conceptualise significant others, to the way people without OCD 
conceptualise significant others.
Treatment Implications
The results of this study would suggest that focusing on reconciling peoples beliefs 
about the way they think they should be with the way they want to be may be 
beneficial in both ameliorating symptoms and preventing relapse. All the OCD 
participants in this study with a discrepancy between their ideal and their ought selves 
had previously received at least one course of psychological therapy, yet their 
symptoms persisted. Perhaps a goal of therapy could be to help people uncover and 
deconstruct their ideal, ought and feared self constructs in terms of where they come 
from (i.e. who or what has shaped what they feel they ought to be? From where do 
their ideals originate? What has led to beliefs about what they fear becoming?), and in
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terms of how realistic they are (i.e. is it realistic never to become angry? Is the desire 
to be humorous, always cheerful and continually entertaining others feasible?) This 
could be done within various therapeutic paradigms such as CBT, psychodynamic 
therapy, Cognitive Analytic Therapy (CAT), and aspects of these suggestions are 
already employed (e.g. CBT deconstructs people’s beliefs about the feared self of their 
specific symptoms). The ‘actual self may be thought of as an integration between 
these three self constructs and as previous authors have suggested (e.g. Markus & 
Kunda 1986) the balance may shift depending on the situation and interpersonal 
context. The conflict between extreme selves in people with OCD may prevent them 
from being able to accept this perpetually shifting sense of self. The therapeutic 
relationship may be used to expose the client to different ideas about ways of being, 
and enable them to become more benevolent about themselves and their qualities and 
hence more comfortable with a self that is in ‘the bit in the middle’.
Limitations
This study was exploratory in nature and used a small, self selected sample and whilst 
the sample size is appropriate for MSP, due to self-selection and a small sample size 
the results cannot be generalised to all individuals with OCD, nor may they be 
relevant in all OCD subtypes. Therefore while the results of this study have produced 
the theoretical speculations outlined above, none of these speculations are empirically 
supported by the study. Nonetheless the bottom up exploratory approach used has 
suggested a number of new areas to be investigated that may well not have been 
uncovered using more traditional methods.
This study was based on the Western conception of an individual sense of self and all 
participants were white British. Many authors (e.g. Smith & Bond 1993) suggest that 
in Eastern cultures people have a more collective sense of self. Therefore it is not 
clear how people from cultures with a more collective sense of self would make sense 
of the constructions of feared self, ideal self and ought self, and hence these findings 
may not be valid cross culturally.
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Potentially this method may not have been sensitive enough to detect differences in 
the way people with OCD and people without OCD conceptualise significant others. 
Although all the significant others selected by participants had the same general role 
description (e.g. family member 1, friend I see most frequently) there was no measure 
of the closeness or quality of these relationships. For example family member 1 for 
one participant could be a cousin they see once a year while for another participant 
family member 1 could be their spouse, in which case it may not be meaningful to try 
and make a comparison between the two. Moreover, allowing participants total 
freedom in the way they described the groups into which they placed significant 
others may have enabled them to avoid making any uncomfortable judgements which 
other methods may have been able to elicit.
Future Research
Future research would be advised to focus on further investigation of the discrepancy 
between the ideal self and ought self found in the present study. It would be useful for 
this to be investigated in further depth using MSP and with larger scale quantitative 
methodologies in larger sample sizes in order to establish if results may be 
generalisable. Qualitative studies could be employed in order to gain a deeper 
understanding of the way people with OCD manage and make sense of the potential 
conflict between these two self structures.
It would also be helpful to assess attachment styles of individuals with a conflict 
between their ideal and ought selves in order to investigate the proposal that an 
ambivalent attachment style may lead to the development of a conflict between these 
two self constructs. It would be advisable to do this using a comprehensive well 
validated measure such as the AAI.
Conceptualisation of significant others could be investigated further using a structured 
sort MSP which may reveal clearer distinctions in the way people with OCD and 
people without OCD conceptualise significant others. Results from this study would 
suggest that people with OCD may struggle to categorise themselves and significant 
others under vague, abstract categorisations. Therefore a structured sort MSP
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designed to investigate the conceptualisation of significant others in people with OCD 
would need to take this into consideration when devising the categories and group 
descriptions of the structured sorts.
Final thoughts
This study set out to explore the conceptualisation of self and significant others in 
people with OCD using an MSP. This methodology is not commonly used in clinical 
research but the MSP proved to be an effective way of exploring the area. Not only 
did participants report finding the sorting task and enjoyable and illuminating 
experience, but the MSP enabled some insights in the way people with OCD 
conceptualise themselves that potentially would not have been discovered using 
alternative methodologies. The most striking of these was the discrepancy there 
appears to be for people with OCD between the way they want to be and the way they 
think they should be.
It is worth noting that during this study the hypothesis that people with OCD may 
have an ambivalent sense of self was discussed with people with OCD at self-help 
group meetings and at conferences. An ambivalent self-concept was described to 
people as ‘a feeling that you must be either all one way or all another way with no 
option of in between -  an inability to inhabit in the grey area in the middle where most 
people sit quite comfortably’. This description seemed to resonate with people with 
OCD with the majority endorsing it with comments like ‘That is exactly me’. It 
remains to be seen how the new perspective resulting from this study on what may be 
driving this ambivalence fits with people’s actual experience, it is encouraging that the 
idea of self-ambivalence as an underlying factor in OCD has good face validity for 
people who actually have OCD.
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I am carrying out a study looking at the way people with OCD see themselves and 
significant others compared to people without OCD. In a minute, I am going to ask 
you to sort the cards we have just prepared which contain the names of your friends 
and family, and some descriptions of yourself, into groups. I want you to sort the 
cards into groups in such a way that all cards in any group are similar in an important 
way and different to the cards in the others groups. I do not want you to sort on the 
physical attributes of people but will give you an example using a physical attribute. 
If you decided to sort on ‘height’ you could sort all the cards in to one of two groups, 
tall or short. Alternatively you could sort the cards into the groups ‘Taller than I am’, 
‘about the same height as I am’, ‘Not as tall as I am’. Or you could sort into the 
groups ‘less than 5ft’, ‘5ft -  5.5ft’, ‘5.5ft-6ft’, and ‘more than 6ft’. And so on. You 
can sort the cards into as many or as few groups as you wish each time. When you 
have carried out a sorting I would like you to tell me overall what you sorted the cards 
on and what it is that the cards in each group have in common. You can sort as many 
times as you want for up to an hour. Do you have any questions?
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Appendix 3 -  Overall description of Participant
sorts
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Category
OCD Non OCD
Kindness PI (si) P8 (s6)
Getting things done PI (s2), P2 (s3)
Forming relationships PI (s3)
Sociability PI (s4) P6 (s5), P9 (s2), P10 (s8)
Honesty PI (s5), P4 (s2) P6 (s9)
Self-Centredness PI (s6)
General Worrying PI (s7), P2(sl2)
Worrying bad person PI (s8)
Listening/talking P2 (si)
Happiness/ serenity P2 (s2), P4 (s9)
How much I’d like to be 
like this
P2 (s4)
Religious Faith P2 (s5)
Loving others P2 (s6)
Trustworthiness P2 (s7) P6 (s6)
Ability to do task to my 
standards
P2 (s8)
Intelligence P2 (s9) P6 (s4)
Moral standards P2 (slO)
People I’d call right now P2 (s ll)
Parenting skills P2 (s!3)
Ability to see things 
through
P2 (si4)
Care for environment P2 (s i5)
Noticing and correcting 
hazards
P2 (s i6)
Caring for people P3 (si) P6 (s2), P9 (s4)
Funniness, can have a 
laugh with
P3(s2) P6 (slO), P8 (s2)
Care for animals P3(s3) P7 (s6), P9 (s6)
Understanding P3 (s4), P5 (s3)
Anger P3 (s5), P5 (s4)
Selfishness P3(s6)
Disclosure (of feelings) P4 (si)
Inspirational P4 (s3)
Conventional P4 (s4)
Ability to stand up for 
beliefs
P4 (s5)
Empathy P4 (s6)
Valuing family P4 (s7)
Non judgemental P4 (s8)
Tidiness/ house proud P5 (si)
How good with money P5(s2)
228
Leadership skills P6 (si)
Communication skills P6 (s3)
Aggressiveness P6 (s7)
Self confidence P6 (s8)
Entrepreneurial P6 (s ll)
Artisticness P6 (s i2)
Equanimity P6 (s i3)
Materialism/ homes etc P7 (si)
Generous/ Helpful P7 (s2), P10 (s2)
Make effort to keep in 
touch
P7 (s3)
Visiting P7 (s4)
Worry about health P7 (s5)
Dependable P8 (si)
Loyalty P8 (s3), P10 (si)
Sporty P8 (s4)
Competitiveness P8 (s5)
Sincerity P8 (s7)
Peoples nature P9 (si)
Gossipy P9 (s3)
Opinionated P9 (s5)
Adventurousness P9 (s7)
Driven P10 (s3)
Likes to be centre of 
attention
P10 (s4)
Organised P10 (s5)
People I have 
disagreements with
P10 (s6)
Easily wound up/ 
aggravated
P10 (s7)
Reliable P10 (s9)
Arrogance PlO(slO)
229
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Appendix 7 -  OCD Feared Self description
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Appendix 9 -Top Plots of Participants Friends 
and Families Partitioned for each Sort
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Research Log Checklist
1 Formulating and testing hypotheses and research questions X
2 Carrying out a structured literature search using information 
technology and literature search tools
X
3 Critically reviewing relevant literature and evaluating research 
methods
X
4 Formulating specific research questions X
5 Writing brief research proposals X
6 Writing detailed research proposals/protocols X
7 Considering issues related to ethical practice in research, including 
issues of diversity, and structuring plans accordingly
X
8 Obtaining approval from a research ethics committee X
9 Obtaining appropriate supervision for research X
10 Obtaining appropriate collaboration for research X
11 Collecting data from research participants X
12 Choosing appropriate design for research questions X
13 Writing patient information and consent forms X
14 Devising and administering questionnaires X
15 Negotiating access to study participants in applied NHS settings X
16 Setting up a data file X
17 Conducting statistical data analysis using SPSS X
18 Choosing appropriate statistical analyses X
19 Preparing quantitative data for analysis X
20 Choosing appropriate quantitative data analysis X
21 Summarising results in figures and tables X
22 Conducting semi-structured interviews X
23 Transcribing and analysing interview data using qualitative methods X
24 Choosing appropriate qualitative analyses X
25 Interpreting results from quantitative and qualitative data analysis X
26 Presenting research findings in a variety of contexts X
27 Producing a written report on a research project X
28 Defending own research decisions and analyses X
29 Submitting research reports for publication in peer-reviewed journals 
or edited book
tba
30 Applying research findings to clinical practice X
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The reported training experiences of a group of male clinical 
psychology trainees and their perceived experiences of being
on a female majority course.
Qualitative Research Project
June 2008
Year 1
274
Abstract
Within the field of psychology females traditionally outnumber males, both at 
undergraduate and post-graduate level. In addition, research suggests that female 
students on these courses outperform their male minority peers. This suggests there is 
a need to explore how male psychology students experience being a minority gender. 
This study looked specifically at the experiences of male clinical psychology trainees 
doing a doctoral level course and their perceived experiences of being on a female 
majority course. Five male clinical psychology trainees at the University of Surrey 
were interviewed and an IP A approach was adopted as a framework for the study. 
Analysis identified three superordinate themes. Male trainees identified both 
advantages and disadvantages of being a male minority; however it was felt that the 
most pertinent theme to emerge was the questioning o f minority gender status as an 
influential factor. The implications of these findings are discussed within the context 
of enhancing understanding of male trainees’ experiences within a female majority 
course.
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